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ABSTRACT 
 
 Global climate change is one of the most pressing threats to humanity in the 
21st century.  Not only is evidence of this warming unequivocal, scientific consensus 
holds that it is the result of human activity.  If left unchecked, climate change will 
result in, at best, serious harms to many and, at worst, catastrophic harms to all.  In 
the face of this threat, the international community has failed to agree on a set of 
norms for addressing the problem.  This stalemate centers on three general questions: 
(1) What is the harm brought by climate change?; (2) Who is responsible?; and (3) 
What are the obligations borne by responsible parties? 
 My dissertation answers these questions, offering an alternative to current 
attempts from legal and philosophical frameworks.  Finding current legal structures 
limiting, my discussion operates primarily in the moral domain.  I focus on “rights-
based approaches” rather than approaches premised on principles of distributive 
justice, what I call “equity-based approaches.”  The human rights framework I 
provide grounds human rights in the Capabilities Approach, which has been used 
extensively in development literature.  This allows my argument to employ a 
vocabulary more sensitive to individual vulnerabilities and geographical diversity, 
while moving beyond mere material or economic provision. 
 In addressing the primary issues of harm and responsibility vis-à-vis climate 
change, my argument goes as follows.  Following an introductory discussion of the 
problems posed by climate change, the politics of the divide between the Global 
North and Global South on climate policy, and existing philosophical approaches, I 
offer an argument for an interest-based account of human rights grounded in the 
	   xi	  
Capabilities Approach.  Using recent work by Breena Holland, I argue that this 
approach yields a right to a functioning and sustainable environment.  Applying this 
framework, I argue that the impacts of unabated climate change clearly violate this 
right.  Additionally, I defend the claim that this discussion applies to both current 
and future generations. 
 Having addressed the harm of climate change, I offer an examination of the 
resulting responsibility and obligations.  Highlighting the nature of climate change as 
an “aggregative harm,” I note the difficulties involved in applying typical individual 
and collectivist paradigms for moral responsibility to the case of climate change.  
Drawing from Tracy Isaacs’s work on responsibility in collective contexts and 
focusing on forward looking obligations, I argue for a four-fold taxonomy of 
differentiated responsibility: (1) the obligations of states; (2) the obligations of non-
state collectives (e.g. corporations, NGOs); (3) the obligations of individuals as 
citizens; and (4) the obligations of individuals as members of the private sphere.  
These distinctions allow us to hold individuals morally accountable while still 









“Today 56 newspapers in 45 countries take the unprecedented step of 
speaking with one voice through a common editorial. We do so because 
humanity faces a profound emergency. Unless we combine to take 
decisive action, climate change will ravage our planet, and with it our 
prosperity and security. The dangers have been becoming apparent for 
a generation. Now the facts have started to speak: 11 of the past 14 
years have been the warmest on record, the Arctic ice-cap is melting 
and last year's inflamed oil and food prices provide a foretaste of future 
havoc. In scientific journals the question is no longer whether humans 
are to blame, but how little time we have got left to limit the damage. 
Yet so far the world's response has been feeble and half-hearted.”1 
 
 
These are the opening sentences of a common editorial published in 
newspapers throughout the world on the opening day of the 15th Conference of 
Parties (COP15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) held in Copenhagen in December 2009.  The editorial made clear the 
urgent need for collective action in the face of the “profound emergency” presented 
by climate change, and it seemed the world was ready to take such a step.  COP15, 
or the “Copenhagen Summit,” brought together not only the usual diplomats and 
negotiators, but also, in an unprecedented move, included the participation of 120 
heads of state.  Hope ran high.  Ultimately, however, the Copenhagen Summit failed 
to produce any substantial agreement.  While non-binding pledges for reductions and 
a commitment to future dialogue were made, the result was viewed by most as a 
disappointment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: ‘Fourteen Days to Seal History’s Judgment on this 
Generation’,” The Guardian, December 7, 2009, p. 1; available on-line at < http://www.guardian.co. 
uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/06/copenhagen-editorial> (Accessed 1 December 2010). 
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Two years on from Copenhagen, the facts of the editorial still ring true.  The 
summits since, COP16 in Cancun and COP17 in Durban, have shown few signs of 
progress toward meaningful collective action, emphasizing the world’s feeble 
response.  The main changes of context are for the worse: the window for action has 
shortened and impacts are now being felt more acutely.  Global climate change 
remains one of the most pressing threats to humanity in the 21st century.  Evidence of 
global warming is unequivocal, and scientific consensus holds this warming to be 
almost certainly anthropogenic, resulting from increased greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions caused by industrial activity.  If climate change is left unchecked, climate 
modeling shows at best an increased risk for serious and life-threatening harms for 
individuals in many countries—particularly those who are already in the most 
vulnerable locations—and at worst catastrophic harms across the entire planet.  
Given that human activity affects the global climate for better or worse, it is 
important to establish a recognized system of international norms for addressing the 
current threat from climate change. 
However, as demonstrated by the failures of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
recent series of climate negotiations from Copenhagen to Durban, there is no existing 
consensus within the international community about what norms ought to be used.  
While most states agree that action is necessary, they disagree about who bears 
responsibility for addressing climate change and what that responsibility means in 
terms of policies related to mitigation (e.g. the reduction of GHG emissions) and/or 
adaptation (e.g. the development of new technologies to make populations less 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change).  Generally, the developing countries of 
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the global South argue that the developed nations of the global North emit GHGs 
disproportionately and bear historical responsibility for present GHG levels.  The 
countries of the North focus, on the other hand, less on historical responsibility and 
more on the need for all countries to move forward in a responsible manner, which 
they take to require limits on developing countries’ GHG emissions.  However, the 
North’s position is often taken to be purely self-interested, since a primary reason 
given by developed nations for limiting the South’s emissions is that without 
emission limits the countries of the North would be at an economic disadvantage.2  
This stalemate comes down to the inability to agree on two primarily ethical 
questions: Who is morally responsible, and, given this responsibility, what 
obligations do responsible parties bear?  The differing responses of the North and 
South reflect differing ethical viewpoints. 
This dissertation provides a moral framework for addressing these two 
central questions, which could then be used to evaluate climate policies as to their 
justness.  In crafting my argument, there are three important facts to keep in mind.  
First, I am engaging the issue solely from an anthropocentric perspective.  This is a 
conscious methodological choice made from the start, though it will quickly become 
clear this is due to my interest in using human rights as a tool for analyzing climate 
change.  It is worth noting, however, that my framework is not necessarily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This is most explicit in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution passed unanimously by the United States 
Senate in 1997, which set forth the conditions for the United States to become a signatory to any 
international climate treaty.  In this resolution, the Senate made it clear that their rejection of the (at 
the time) proposed Kyoto Protocol was based on the fact that “the disparity of treatment between 
Annex I Parties [the global North] and Developing Countries and the level of required emission 
reductions, could result in serious harm to the United States economy, including significant job loss, 
trade disadvantages, increased energy and consumer costs, or any combination thereof” (United States 
Senate, Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Congress, 1st Session).  
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incompatible with claims for more demanding obligations or limits on human 
activity that might arise from non-anthropocentric approaches.  With its human 
rights focus, my account only sets minimal thresholds related to harm stemming 
from climate change and thus offers obligations related to those thresholds.  Such an 
approach does not preclude the possibility we have other reasons (moral or 
prudential) for setting more stringent demands on human activities.  Second, my 
analysis is conducted from a moral perspective.  While appeals to legal and political 
matters might appear as examples to aid in understanding the moral issue at hand (or 
to help show how some moral idea might be manifested in reality), I am primarily 
interested in the underlying moral norms.  I am therefore generally not concerned 
about the feasibility of my framework within current legal and political structures, 
since it might simply be the case that those structures perpetuate morally problematic 
inequalities and ought to be changed.  Third, the framework offered in the 
proceeding chapters is just that: a framework.  I do not intend to provide a complete 
application of the methods of analysis offered within this project.  Consequently, I 
will not provide a specific listing of all existing obligations; instead offering a 
general typology of obligations.  As will become clear, to engage in a complete 
application of my framework and identify all the obligations possessed in light of it 
would require a collaborative effort on the part of various experts across numerous 
domains.  I simply offer an approach that could be used in future dialogue regarding 
climate change and global environmental regulatory policy. 
In seeking to identify moral responsibility and any resultant obligations 
arising from that responsibility, it is important to first clearly identify the harm for 
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which responsibility is being determined.  Consequently, the bulk of the dissertation 
seeks to detail the moral issues connected to climate change, offering a way to 
clearly identify and articulate the harm it poses (at least from a moral perspective).  
Chapter 1 will offer a general overview of the core issues related to climate change 
and historical attempts by the international community to address it.  I use this 
discussion to identify the underlying political and ethical issues related to climate 
change.  Here, the divide between the global North and South will be made clear 
through an examination of recent data related to GHG emissions, which point to a 
prima facie case for placing responsibility squarely on the countries of the developed 
North.  Having provided the general background and isolated the relevant issues, I 
move to recent literature addressing responsibility related to climate change.  In 
discussing the literature, I isolate two strands: what I term “equity approaches” and 
“rights-based approaches.”  The former type analyze the issue as a matter of 
distributive justice, treating it predominately as an economic issue.  I reject this 
approach due to its inability to address the daily needs of individuals in diverse 
geographical areas, favoring recent efforts to offer rights-based approaches as the 
best way forward. 
Following this general orientation, Chapter 2 explores the applicability of 
rights-based approaches to environmental matters and whether the current versions 
can adequately respond to the problems posed by climate change.  The opening 
section of the chapter offers a general account of human rights, identifying them as 
universal moral rights and arguing for an interest theory of rights, based on the work 
of Joseph Raz.  With this in hand, I then examine two different rights-based 
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approaches in the literature: (1) that climate change violates a generic environmental 
right; and (2) that climate change violates other fundamental basic rights (e.g., life, 
health).  I argue that the first approach has trouble identifying the scope of resulting 
duties and leaves us with the need to identify what interests are harmed by climate 
change.  This points us toward the second account, which highlights specific rights 
and consequently specific interests that are harmed by climate change.  However, as 
I show, the second approach, in its current incarnation in the literature, only provides 
a partial account of the relevant rights and interests.  In response, I offer an 
alternative account linking human rights and the environment that provides a more 
complete picture of the fundamental interests involved.  In doing so, I turn to the 
Capabilities Approach, as championed by Martha Nussbaum.  This move allows one 
to tap into a wealth of existing literature on human development, which could prove 
useful in future applications of my account.  Invoking recent work by Breena 
Holland integrating the environment into the Capabilities Approach, I show how this 
approach yields an environmental meta-capability and a corresponding right to a 
sustainable ecological capacity that can give a more complete account of the link 
between climate change and human rights. 
With my account of human rights in place, Chapter 3 turns to the task of 
offering a scheme for identifying human rights violations stemming from climate 
change.  Since rights violations are understood through capabilities, my presentation 
here begins by offering a method for determining violations of the capabilities 
generally, and then moves into a presentation of how to determine violations of 
individuals’ environmental meta-capability specifically.  With respect to violations 
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of the environmental meta-capability, I offer two approaches: one focusing on 
particular impacts of climate change and one focusing on countries’ overall ability to 
respond to climate change.  With clear methods for determining rights violations (i.e. 
identifying actual instances of harm), the chapter moves to a brief presentation of 
various scientific data and issues in climate modeling necessary for applying those 
methods to the case of climate change. 
Chapter 4 takes up the actual evaluation of climate change to argue that it can 
be legitimately seen as violating individuals’ environmental meta-capability, and 
thus their human rights, under certain climate scenarios.  In identifying future 
climate scenarios that result in rights violations, I initially limit my focus in this 
chapter to the time horizon of the current generation (i.e. the present to 
approximately 2100 CE) to avoid some philosophically contentious issues 
surrounding the rights of currently non-existent, future persons.  After establishing 
that the impacts of climate change violate human rights in the current generation, I 
turn to the question of future generations (i.e. 2100 CE and beyond).  Assuming the 
negative impacts of climate change will likely increase in future generations, I focus 
solely on philosophical reasons for accepting the rights claims of non-existent future 
persons as legitimate.  In doing so, I draw heavily on existing work by Joel Feinberg 
and Ernest Partridge, as both have offered significant defenses of the rights of future 
persons, making particular use of Partridge’s identification of four types of 
objections to the rights of future persons: indeterminacy, non-actuality, incapacity, 
and temporal remoteness.  I address each of these, rejecting them as morally 
irrelevant.  I then note that one might accept the legitimacy of future persons’ rights 
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while still arguing that temporal distance requires future persons’ rights claims to 
count less than the current generation’s claims, a practice known as discounting.  I 
close the chapter using recent work by Simon Caney to argue that the conditions 
related to climate change, and action sufficient for preventing harmful climate 
change, are such that it would be wrong to engage in discounting in this particular 
context.  Thus, in addition to identifying morally unacceptable climate scenarios, my 
account also adequately responds to objections typically faced when considering 
future generations. 
Having completed my analysis of the harm related to climate change (both 
what it is and how to identify it), I turn, in Chapter 5, to the question of responsibility 
for this harm and any resultant obligations for current or future action.  Here, I offer 
a discussion of the troublesome nature of climate change as an “aggregative harm,” 
that is, as a kind of harm that no single individual or act, in and of itself, can cause.  
Given climate change’s aggregative nature, determining moral responsibility for 
climate change becomes a contentious matter.  Some argue that any individual’s 
GHG emissions considered in isolation cannot result in identifiable harm, thus no 
attribution of responsibility to individuals is allowed.  Instead, responsibility is best 
attributed to states.  However, this purely collectivist approach has come under 
attack as most views on collective responsibility require a discernable collective 
acting with an intent to harm—something difficult to identify in this case.  To 
address this, I present recent work by Tracy Isaacs on collective and individual 
responsibility, offering her “two-level” theory of moral responsibility for situations 
requiring collective action. 
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Applying the theoretical considerations of Chapter 5, along with my previous 
discussion related to the harm of climate change, I argue, in Chapter 6, for the 
identification of two distinct levels of moral responsibility: (1) collective 
responsibility borne by states and corporations, and (2) individual responsibility 
borne by individuals based on their roles as citizens and members of the private 
sphere.  While many discussions of responsibility focus on the past, my analysis 
looks squarely to the future, focusing on what Isaacs calls responsibility as 
obligation.  I argue that states and corporations have moral obligations to not bring 
into being any future climate scenarios that would violate individuals’ human rights, 
and individuals have obligations to do what they can as citizens, consumers, and 
employees to help states and corporations act in a morally appropriate manner.  In 
closing the chapter, I address an epistemic objection to my account related to 
whether one can bear moral obligations without the belief (or knowledge) that 
anthropogenic climate change is occurring.  I respond to this objection by an appeal 
to testimonial knowledge from experts and a corresponding need for “green 
education.” 
 The political stalemate highlighted at the beginning of this introduction 
pointed to a need to resolve normative questions related to responsibility.  Moreover, 
in order to address moral responsibility, we need to have a clear understanding of the 
harm posed by climate change.  With the conclusion of Chapter 6, this project will 
have provided a framework that can address both issues.  Consequently, moving 
forward, we could apply this framework to evaluate the policies offered by the North 
and South in an effort to identify those that are just.  By addressing this normative 
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aspect of climate policy, we can provide strong reasons for preferring one policy to 
another.  Ultimately, my framework would side with the policies of the South, but in 
doing so, it would also provide a helpful new vocabulary for trying to break the 
deadlock between the North and South.  
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CHAPTER 1 
The Political and Ethical Challenges of Climate Change 
 
 
1. The Problem of a Warming World 
 Global climate change is one of the most pressing issues facing humanity in 
the 21st century.  As the most recent assessment report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) makes clear, “[w]arming of the climate system is 
unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air 
and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global 
average sea level.”1  From 1901-2000, this warming resulted in a 0.6 oC increase in 
average global surface temperature, and current climate projections show an 
additional increase between 1.1 and 6.4 oC over the course of this century.2  The 
IPCC and other reports have shown that this warming has already lead to changes in 
sea levels and weather patterns yielding negative impacts on individuals, in addition 
to placing numerous plant and animal species under threat.3  More troubling is the 
fact that these changes in the climate are occurring at historic rates.  Taken together, 
these realities make potential impacts of any future warming extremely worrisome.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report – Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III 
to the Forth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. Core Writing 
Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri, and Andy Reisinger (Geneva: IPCC, 2007), 30; available on-line at 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_r
eport.htm> (Accessed 17 November 2010). 
2 Ibid., 30 and 44-45.  For an explanation of the different scenarios used in climate projections, 
see the box on the bottom of p. 44.  The scenarios are based on different development pathways and 
levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  See also my more detailed discussion of climate 
scenarios and projections in Chapter 3. 
3 For an excellent short summary of some presently observable impacts of climate change, see 
James Garvey, The Ethics of Climate Change: Right and Wrong in a Warming World (New York: 
Continuum, 2008), 8-12; cf. IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 30-33.  See also my more 
detailed discussion of the impacts and harms of climate change in Chapter 4.	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 This concern is increased by the IPCC’s more important claim that this 
warming is very likely anthropogenic, due to significant increases in greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions.4  Given that GHGs can remain in the atmosphere for centuries, the 
actions of the past and our current actions will have profound effects on future 
generations.5  Increased emissions (coupled with emissions from the past still in the 
atmosphere) will more than likely lead to temperature increases on the higher end of 
projections.  This could prove devastating for many parts of the world.  Michael 
Mann, a leading climatologist whose work has featured significantly in IPCC reports, 
captures the scope of possible negative consequences succinctly:  
These changes in climate are likely to have profound impacts on 
ecosystems, human health, water resources, agriculture, and the basic 
infrastructure that supports modern civilization.  On balance, impacts 
are likely to be harmful, rather than beneficial, and include a greater 
tendency for drought and loss of water resources in some regions, and 
increased spread of infectious disease.  These additional stresses on 
society could, in turn, lead to greater conflict.6 
 
However, actions taken now and in the future through mitigation (i.e., reduction of 
resource inputs and emissions per output), adaptation (i.e., the reduction of 
vulnerability to the impacts of climatic changes), or some combination of both could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 38-41.  The IPCC’s use of “very likely” 
expresses a greater than 90% probability that the current warming has resulted due to human activity 
through GHG emissions.  For an explanation of the IPCC’s treatment of uncertainty, see p. 27. 
5 For example, carbon dioxide (CO2) which accounts for 70% of GHG emissions, has a typical 
lifetime of hundreds of years, while other GHGs range from as little as 12 years (methane) to 50,000 
years (some perfluorocarbons); for a listing of the lifetimes of the primary GHGs, see Table 2.14 in 
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis - Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. Susan Solomon, 
Dahe Qin, and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 212-213; available on-line at 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg1_report
_the_physical_science_basis.htm> (Accessed 24 November 2010).	  
6 Michael Mann, “Do Global Warming and Climate Change Present a Serious Threat to Our 
Welfare?” Social Philosophy and Policy 26, no. 1 (2009), 207. 
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reduce the potential for serious harm.7  What is clear is that regardless of the course 
of action we take, human activity will affect the global climate, and without any 
action, the possibility for negative impacts increases. 
 Unfortunately, climate change is a global problem that cannot be addressed 
by a single country (or even a handful of countries).  Mitigation by a single country 
would not be enough to fully protect its citizens, since GHG emissions disperse 
throughout Earth’s atmosphere and collectively affect all the planet’s inhabitants.  
What is worse is that countries with the greatest ability to act, or whose reductions 
would be the most significant, are among the least vulnerable.  According to a recent 
study by J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley Parks, the five states most vulnerable to 
climate disasters in terms of death when adjusted for population (Mozambique, 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Honduras, and Bangladesh) have rates of death ranging from 5.55 
to 1.23 people killed by climate related disasters per thousand, compared to the 
United States’ rate of 0.03 killed per thousand.8  When we take these same countries 
and compare their GHG emissions in 2005 (the last year of complete GHG data), the 
five countries identified by Roberts and Parks produced a combined 378 metric tons 
of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) and 0.99% of the total world emissions, while the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Mitigation generally consists of the general reduction of GHGs emitted and/or the enhancement 
of carbon sinks (natural or artificial) that remove CO2 from the atmosphere.  Examples of adaptive 
actions include the replacement of temperature sensitive plants with more shock resistant ones or 
implementation of shore protection measures (e.g. improved seawalls) to reduce vulnerability to rising 
sea levels. 
8 J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley Parks, A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South 
Politics, and Climate Policy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 76-81.  In this study, Roberts 
and Parks consider data related to major hydrometerological disasters, such as windstorms, droughts, 
floods, and heat waves. 
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United States produced 6,900.9 MtCO2e and 18.26% of the total world emissions.9  
Thus, mitigation only on the part of Roberts and Parks’s five most vulnerable 
countries would do little reduce their vulnerability to climate change, without 
significant GHG reductions from larger emitters like the United States.  Additionally, 
countries listed throughout Roberts and Parks’s study as most vulnerable to climate 
disasters generally lack the infrastructure and economy to develop the adaptive 
capacities necessary to reduce their vulnerability without significant emission 
reductions by other countries.  Consequently, climate change presents a clear harm 
and raises questions about the responsibility for that harm, with the evidence 
pointing to a prima facie case for a moral obligation for large emitters to reduce their 
emissions protecting vulnerable countries. 
 Not only is action required by the larger emitters, they must act in concert.  
Without binding international agreements, it could be in a country’s self-interest to 
not reduce GHG emissions, particularly if its risk from future climate change is low.  
In such cases, if others imposed GHG reductions, a country that does not make 
reductions might gain an economic advantage in the short and mid-term, while 
focusing on developing adaptive technologies to protect its citizens in the long-term.  
However, any nation acting in that manner would face a difficult challenge, as its 
attempts at adaptation might not keep pace with the impacts of climate change.  If 
adaptive capacity were outstripped, that state would face significant harms that could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 9.0 (Washington, D.C.: World Resources 
Institute, 2011); available on-line at <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php> (Accessed 16 February 2012).  This 
newest version of CAIT released in December 2011 includes emissions data and other relevant 
indicators related to climate change through 2008.  However, the data for 2006-2008 is limited to only 
CO2 emissions, whereas the data for 2005 includes all GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFC, PFC. And SF6).  
Consequently, I use the 2005 data, as it offers a more complete picture of GHG emissions. 
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have been avoided through earlier joint action with other countries.  Consequently, 
collective global action is needed.  As forcefully expressed in the Forward to the 
2010 World Development Report, the need for international consensus and 
agreement is essential: “No country is immune.  No country alone can take on the 
interconnected challenges posed by climate change, including controversial political 
decisions, daunting technological change, and far-reaching global consequences.”10  
Given the interconnected nature of climate change, and the fact that no matter how 
humans behave we will have some effect on the Earth’s climate, positive or negative, 
it is important to develop a set of international norms to determine how and by whom 
the Earth’s thermostat ought to be controlled.11 
 
2. “Climate Change”, “Global Warming”, and GHGs: Clarifying Terminology 
Before advancing my discussion any further, it is important to make a few 
clarifications regarding terminology.  To start, I draw from Stephen Gardiner, who 
notes that, “[p]otential confusion about the climate-change problem begins even with 
the terms used to describe it: from greenhouse effect to global warming to the more 
recently favored climate change.”12  The term greenhouse effect is less problematic 
than the other two, as it is merely a scientific term for the process that results in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010), xiii; available on-line at <http://siteresources.worldbank. 
org/INTWDR2010/ Resources/5287678-1226014527953/WDR10-Full-Text.pdf> (Accessed 17 
November 2010). 
11 The notion of “controlling Earth’s thermostat” comes from journalist Jeff Goodell, whose 
recent book has brought public awareness to humans’ ability to control Earth’s climate through 
geoengineering.  See Jeff Goodell, How to Cool the Planet Geoengineering and the Audacious Quest 
to Fix Earth’s Climate (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010). 
12 Stephen M. Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics 114, no. 3 (2004): 555-600; 
reprinted in Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, eds. Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale 
Jamieson, and Henry Shue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3-35 (page citations are to the 
reprint edition).  The quote given appears on p. 4. 
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increased surface temperature due to GHGs that results in both global warming and 
climate change, and without which the surface temperature on Earth would not be 
able to support life.13  The terms global warming and climate change, however, are 
the source of confusion and problems since they are often used interchangeably and 
assumed to refer to the same problem.  However, as a recent study from Britain has 
shown, public conceptions of these terms diverge, with members of the general 
public treating “global warming” to refer to heat-related impacts, human causes, and 
the greenhouse effect, while taking “climate change” to refer to more varied impacts, 
past events, and natural causes.14  Consequently, it is necessary to identify the 
primary problem facing humanity and how these terms relate to it. 
 Global warming is a term that, at least in a technical sense, refers solely to the 
increase in global surface temperatures that is the result of increased concentrations 
of GHGs in the Earth’s atmosphere.  However, taking this as the primary problem 
facing humanity misrepresents the issue.  Gardiner highlights three reasons why 
defining the issue solely in terms of increased temperatures is problematic: (1) 
“…considered in isolation, there might be no particular reason to prefer the world as 
it is now to one several degrees warmer”; (2) the primary concern of scientists is that 
global warming puts extra energy into the earth’s climate system, disrupting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Referencing John Houghton’s work, Gardiner summarizes this mechanism in the following 
manner: “Some atmospheric gases (called greenhouse gases, or GHG) have asymmetric interactions 
with radiation of different frequencies: just like glass in a conventional greenhouse, they allow short-
wave incoming solar radiation through but reflect some of the earth’s outgoing long-wave radiation 
back to the surface.  This creates ‘a partial blanketing effect,’ which causes the temperature at the 
surface to be higher than would otherwise be the case” (Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate 
Change,” 4).  For Houghton’s explanation of the greenhouse effect, see John Houghton, Global 
Warming: The Complete Briefing, 4th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 10-21.	  
14 Lorraine Whitmarsh, “What’s in a Name? Commonalities and Differences in Public 
Understanding of ‘Climate Change’ and ‘Global Warming’,” Public Understanding of Science 18, no. 
4 (2009): 401-420. 
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current climatological and ecological equilibrium, and creating an imbalance that is 
“occurring at an unprecedented rate” for which “any equilibrium position is likely to 
be thousands, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands, of years off, and that existing 
species are unlikely to be able to adapt quickly and easily under such conditions”; 
and (3) it is possible that increases in GHGs and global temperatures could lead to 
drastic cooling (particularly due to changes in ocean levels that could shut down the 
system that circulates ocean currents, which distribute heat around Earth) and this 
cooling could create the same problematic imbalance noted in (2).15  Thus, by only 
addressing a single component of the complex phenomena involved, the term global 
warming fails to fully capture the entire scope of the problem facing humanity today. 
 This bring us to the more inclusive term climate change, which the IPCC 
defines in the following manner: 
Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can 
be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean 
and/or variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended 
period, typically decades or longer.  Climate change may be due to 
natural internal processes or external forcings, or to persistent 
anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in 
land use.16 
 
“Climate” in this definition refers to average weather, where temperature is only one 
component of this analysis.  Here, it is important to note that the IPCC understands 
climate change as something with both natural and anthropogenic causes, while the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) separates 
these causes, referring to changes that are attributable to human activity as climate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” 4-6. 
16 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 78. Emphasis original. 
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change and changes that are attributable to natural causes as climate variability.17  
My use of climate change to this point has focused on the anthropogenic side, and 
consequently, I use the UNFCCC’s definition of climate change throughout my 
discussion while also recognizing there are natural causes of changes to the climate.  
Gardiner notes that this is the best terminology insofar as it “captures the fact that it 
is interference in the climate system itself that is the crucial issue, not what the 
particular effects of that interference turn out to be.”18  Gardiner’s point here is that 
climate change as a term places the emphasis not on whether there is warming or 
cooling as the effects of interference, but rather that there is some change to the 
current climatological and ecological equilibrium based on interference with the 
natural equilibrium.  The problem is this human-made imbalance.  Thus, I use 
climate change to refer to this general issue of the change in the climate system 
(particularly the problematic rate of that change), while treating global warming as a 
manifestation of the general issue of climate change and the greenhouse effect as the 
mechanism through which global warming happens. 
I will close this section with a brief statement about the primary human 
activity that has increased the rate of climate change to an unsustainable degree.  As 
noted above, the greenhouse effect results from numerous gases known as GHGs, 
some of which occur naturally.  While carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most commonly 
mentioned GHG, as it accounts for over 70% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions, 
the UNFCCC identifies five other primary GHGs: methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 1 [1771 UNTS 107; S. 
Treaty Doc No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992)]. 
18 Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” 5.	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(N20), sulphurhexafluoride (SF6), hydroflurocarbons (HFCs), and perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs).  These gases differ in both their radiative properties (i.e., how much energy 
they reflect back onto Earth) and their lifetimes in the atmosphere.  Thus, they have 
different influences over climate change.  To address this, a common metric is used 
to evenly compare the impacts of differing GHG emissions: CO2-equivalent (CO2e) 
emissions.19  As noted, this metric is often expressed in metric tons (MtCO2e) and is 
used throughout my discussion whenever I address any GHG emissions other than 
CO2.  Additionally, my usage of GHGs is meant to refer to all GHGs, unless noted 
otherwise. 
 
3. Historical Attempts to Assess and Address Climate Change 
 What then has been done to address climate change so far?  Have any 
effective, let alone just, results been produced?  These questions are particularly 
important for the discussion in the following sections of this chapter, which isolate 
the political and ethical issues that arise in trying to address the harmful impacts of 
climate change.  Engaging in this historical survey will also help us develop an 
understanding of the extent to which humans are aware of the causes and impacts of 
climate change.  This is of particular significance for later discussions related to 
identifying both the harm posed by climate change in Chapters 3 and 4 and the 
obligations of individuals and collective entities (e.g. states) that stem from that harm 
in Chapter 6.  If it turns out that humanity lacks a relevant level of awareness about 
the possible harms of climate change, then it is more difficult to place responsibility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 CO2e emission = “the amount of CO2 emission that would cause the same time-integrated 
radiative forcing, over a given time horizon, as an emitted amount of a long-lived GHG or a mixture 
of GHGs” (IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 36). 
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on any part of humanity.  Yet, if, as will be shown below, most countries are not only 
aware of the issue, but also engaged in treaty negotiations due to the recognized 
threat, then there is good reason to think those countries bear a responsibility for the 
continuation of the harm. 
 Though climate change did not become a chief concern of international 
politics until the late 1980s, the roots of the global response to it can be traced to the 
1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in 
Stockholm, Sweden.  This was the first international summit on environmental issues 
and set the groundwork for the current system of global environmental politics.  One 
of the most important outcomes of UNCHE was The Declaration on the Human 
Environment (also called the Stockholm Declaration), which outlined principles for 
addressing environmental matters in the future.  Most relevant for transboundary 
issues like climate change is Principle 21, which established that states possess “the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies” coupled with “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”20  However, the declaration 
contained no binding or enforceable requirements, and was described by many as 
“merely a cosmetic event.”21  Nonetheless, its principles framed future discussions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21 [U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972)]. 
21 Denise DeGarmo, International Environmental Treaties and State Behavior: Factors 
Influencing Cooperation (New York: Routledge, 2005), 41.  For a detailed history of the major events 
and agreements in international environmentalism, including those I discuss in this section, see pp. 
31-71 of DeGarmo. 
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on climate change and are still very much at the fore of environmental politics, most 
notably in the UNFCCC. 
 Following the 1972 UNCHE, environmental issues gained more international 
awareness and traction.  At the same time, some of the first efforts to examine 
climate change as a threat to humankind were occurring.  Following a series of 
studies and reports mostly conducted within the United States, the International 
Council of Science (ICSU), United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), and 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), initiated the first international 
environmental assessment in 1980.22  This report led to continued assessments, 
which culminated in the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
which had been convened by the UN, producing the 1987 report Our Common 
Future (also known as the Bruntland Report, after the commission’s chairman).  Our 
Common Future tied GHGs (in the form of fossil fuels) to global warming and 
issued one of the first major warnings regarding the potential negative implications 
of increased GHG use: 
The burning of fossil fuels puts into the atmosphere carbon dioxide, 
which is causing global warming.  This ‘greenhouse effect’ may by 
early next century have increased average global temperature enough 
to shift agricultural production areas, raise the sea level to flood 
coastal cities, and disrupt national economies.23 
 
This heightened awareness and urgency led to the two most important developments 
in climate change assessment and policy: (1) the establishment of the IPCC in 1988, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Bert Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change: The Role of the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 33-35.  
For details on many of the early reports, as well as a more detailed discussion of the events leading up 
to the formation of the IPCC, see pp. 33-52 of the same work.	  
23 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, ed. Gro Harlem 
Bruntland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 2-3. 
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and (2) the signing of the UNFCCC, an international treaty resulting from the 1992 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio 
de Janiero, Brazil (the “Earth Summit”). 
 UNEP and WMO formed the IPCC in 1988, with 28 countries initially 
responding to an invitation to participate.24  Presently, 195 countries participate as 
member governments who sign off on IPCC reports and in doing so take the 
information contained within them as authoritative.25  The IPCC operates not as a 
scientific body, but instead provides periodic assessments on the state of our 
knowledge about climate change and its implications for the future: 
The role of the IPCC is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open 
and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic 
information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of 
human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for 
adaptation and mitigation. IPCC reports should be neutral with 
respect to policy, although they may need to deal objectively with 
scientific, technical and socio-economic factors relevant to the 
application of particular policies.26 
 
Since its creation, the IPCC has released four assessment reports, the most recent 
coming in 2007.27  These reports are important as they present the consensus of the 
international scientific community.28  They simply present the facts related to climate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Bolin, A History of the Science and Politics of Climate Change, 49. 
25 The current number of member organizations comes from the IPCC’s website, accessible at 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_secretariat.shtml> (Accessed 27 March 2012). 
26 IPCC, “Principles Governing IPCC Work,” 14th Plenary Session of the IPCC (1 October 1998); 
available on-line at < http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_procedures.shtml> (Accessed 29 
November 2010).	  	  
27 The other reports were released in 1990, 1996, and 2001.  The fifth assessment report is 
currently underway and set to be released in 2014. 
28 In light of the recent “Climategate” scandal involving hacked e-mails from scientists involved 
in the assessment process and whose work features prominently in IPCC reports that purported to 
show intentional attempts to cover-up or alter data, it is important to recognize those skeptical of the 
IPCC and climate science generally.  However, most of the skepticism comes not from scientific 
circles, but instead from political circles, something that has been highlighted by James Garvey (see 
his Ethics and Climate Change, 12-14). For other more complete discussions of climate skepticism, 
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change as they have been established by a broad consensus of international 
researchers, and offer models of future states of the world based on numerous 
possible climate scenarios without making any claims about which scenario we 
ought to choose, how we ought to choose, or how we ought to bring about whatever 
scenario is chosen.  These reports serve to offer the best available portrayal of 
current scientific knowledge on the matter, which can then be used by others in 
determining how to best utilize this knowledge.  Of greatest importance is that each 
successive report has shown an increased confidence in the attribution of climate 
change to human activity.  Consequently, the IPCC provides the best available facts 
related to human activity and that activity’s impact on the world, information 
essential to answering the questions of harm, responsibility, and obligation raised in 
the following two sections. 
  Following the initial appraisal of climate change in Our Common Future and 
the first assessment report of the IPCC, the Earth Summit was held with the goal of 
addressing the growing consensus that poverty and excessive consumption by the 
affluent were both damaging the environment in important ways, one being through 
climate change.  This summit resulted in the signing of the UNFCCC, which enjoys 
near-universal membership and has the following goal:29 
…[to achieve] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.  Such a level should be achieved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
scientific uncertainty, and reasons for disregarding it in philosophical discussion see Gardiner, “Ethics 
and Global Climate Change,” 7-9, and Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory 
of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 21-44.	  
29 Presently, the UNFCCC has 195 parties (194 countries and the European Union) who have 
ratified the treaty.  The current list of countries party to the UNFCCC can be found on-line at 
<http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php> (Accessed 
27 March 2012). 
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within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and 
to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.30  
 
However, while the UNFCCC itself affirms the anthropogenic nature of climate 
change and identifies GHG emissions as the primary culprit, it does not contain any 
binding measures or policies for addressing the problem.  Instead, it simply sets out 
goals and procedures for future meetings of its signatories.  These meetings, known 
as the Conference of Parties (COP), have been held annually since 1995. 
 The best-known result of these yearly conferences is the Kyoto Protocol that 
emerged from COP3 in 1997.  This treaty stepped beyond the UNFCCC’s 
encouragement to reduce GHG emissions and committed its signatories to actual 
reduction targets, with 37 industrialized countries and the European Community 
committing to reductions of at least 5 percent of their 1990 emission levels between 
2008 and 2012.31  However, the United States notably rejected this addition to the 
UNFCCC, primarily for not including reductions (or emissions caps) for developing 
countries.  While the Kyoto Protocol has been seen as an important first step, it has 
generally been heralded as ineffective in addressing climate change.  
The next decade of COPs produced little progress towards any effective or 
binding agreements.  However, hope ran extremely high in the lead up to COP15 
(the “Copenhagen Summit”) in late 2009.  On the opening day of talks, 56 papers in 
45 countries ran a common editorial calling for COP15 to produce a binding, global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2. 
31 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 3 
[UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998)].	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treaty.32  More importantly, COP15 included 120 heads of state, which was an 
unprecedented level of participation.  Unfortunately, talks at this meeting stalled, 
with differences between the developed and developing countries yet again 
providing the cause.  The underlying problems faced by the UNFCCC and its 
subsequent COPs will be addressed in the next two sections, as we look to draw out 
the philosophical issues brought forward by climate change. 
 
4. Diagnosing the Political Problems: Sovereignty and the North-South Divide 
 As noted in the previous section, the UNFCCC has failed to produce an 
effective, binding solution to the problem of climate change.  This is predominately 
due to the nature of the UNFCCC, and the international treaty system generally, 
which is the only current mechanism for addressing concerns related to climate 
change.  This system, which comprises various international actors, most of which 
are states, is characterized by the following actions taken by one or more states in 
concert with one another: 
These actors gather information, exchange ideas, formulate proposals, 
and meet in informal and formal sessions to negotiate, prepare legal 
documents, and vote whether or not to accept new responsibilities, 
including taxing themselves to cover the costs of monitoring their 
global environmental management efforts.33 
 
This system is voluntary and can only produce binding agreements for signatories of 
the treaties resulting from this process.  Thus, when states refuse to accept certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 “Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: ‘Fourteen Days to Seal History’s Judgment on this 
Generation’,” The Guardian, December 7, 2009, p. 1; available on-line at <http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/commentisfree/2009/dec/06/copenhagen-editorial> (Accessed 1 December 2010). 
33 Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global 
Agreements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 11. 
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conditions they can simply choose not to become a signatory to the treaty.  When 
that happens they are free to act however they want. 
 With this in mind, we can examine the two primary reasons for the current 
political stalemate in climate negotiations and see if they suggest a better way to 
develop a set of international norms for effectively combating climate change, which 
could then be implemented in an actual agreement between states.  The first reason 
for the political stalemate is the problem of national sovereignty, which often leads 
to a lack of enforceability and adjudication.  This stems from the fact that most argue 
a state’s emission of GHGs is a domestic matter and since the state is the final 
authority on domestic matters, no other state can legitimately force it to alter its 
GHG emissions beyond what it decides for itself.34  Moreover, if one state claims 
another is failing to meet GHG reduction targets, there is no international court to 
decide the disagreement between the two states in a binding fashion.  The second 
problem, which stems from the voluntary nature of the UNFCCC and the need for 
joint action, is the inequality that exists between the developed world and the 
developing world (known as the North-South divide).  As this section will show, 
these problems are not merely theoretical obstacles complicating the establishment 
of international norms, but instead point to deeper substantive ethical problems 
posed by climate change. 
 Sovereignty poses a prima facie problem for establishing a system of 
international norms for climate change, as it appears to reject the possibility of one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 However, the real problem might lie in the state’s failure to make any decisions and simply 
allow private actors to emit GHGs at whatever level the economy happens to generate.	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state legitimately imposing actions (or restrictions on actions) on another state.35  It 
is for this reason that the current system of international politics and the UNFCCC 
operates in the manner it does.  If the United States could require GHG reductions in 
China, without China’s consent, this appears to violate China’s sovereignty.  More 
importantly, as noted above, the right of each state to be the sole determiner of how 
natural resources can be exploited within its borders was set forth in Principle 21 of 
the Stockholm Declaration.  This is related to climate change, since it is the 
exploitation of various natural resources (e.g. the burning of coal) that produces 
GHGs.  Still, one might argue that in the case of climate change and GHGs, a 
country’s lack of action would violate the responsibility to not exploit (or at least not 
allow private actors to exploit) natural resources in ways that harm other states.  
However, this claim requires establishing that an individual state’s GHG emissions 
are responsible for climate change as a whole, which is made problematic by the fact 
that climate change is an aggregative harm (i.e., a kind of harm that no single 
individual or act, in and of itself, can cause).  Addressing the issues related to climate 
change as an aggregative harm and assigning responsibility for it will be the primary 
focus of Chapters 5 and 6.  Ultimately, I will argue that while states cannot be held 
responsible for causing the harm, they can be responsible for a failure to respond to 
the harm appropriately.  Regardless of this claim, or how one interprets the 
responsibility clause of Principle 21 vis-à-vis climate change, there is a second 
problem posed by strong conceptions of state sovereignty. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This is assuming the modern understanding of sovereignty in the vein of Bodin, Hobbes, and 
the Treaty of Westphalia.  See Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 172-227.  It is this strong view of sovereignty that generally 
dominates international law. 
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 This second difficulty is the lack of enforceability related to international 
agreements and adjudication when disputes arise.  I will return to this issue during 
the dissertation’s concluding chapter when looking at the problem posed by non-
compliant states (i.e. states that fail to take action necessary to address harmful 
climate change), but we can see the general problem here.  If sovereignty is absolute 
(or at least understood in a strong sense), then there cannot be any institution beyond 
the state to monitor its behavior and enforce any deviation from agreed actions.  
While it is certainly the case that most states abide by the international treaties they 
sign, without effective enforcement mechanisms or fora to adjudicate disputes 
among states there is nothing to keep states from blatantly disregarding their 
promises or simply failing to live up to them.  It is true that other states could try to 
force the offending state to act through sanctions or military force, yet such action 
might be illegitimate and constitute a violation of the offending state’s sovereignty.  
The legitimacy of such intervention would depend partially on how one understands 
climate change as an aggregative harm (i.e. whether or not the state being attacked is 
actually responsible for the harm coming from climate change), since if the 
offending state is not responsible for the harm, other states could not legitimize their 
intervention with a claim of self-defense.  While the establishment of an international 
body for environmental regulation might address some of these questions, it is not 
entirely clear whether such a body would itself constitute a violation of state 
sovereignty.  If states have sole authority over domestic issues and GHG emissions 
fall under that heading, even an international regulatory body would violate a state’s 
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sovereign right to determine its own GHG emission levels and environmental 
policies.36 
 Due to the emergence of numerous multilateral organizations and 
international bodies, however, much theoretical work has been done to demonstrate 
why sovereignty ought not be the obstacle it often is taken to be by observers.  
Within this literature, some authors demonstrate how international organizations can 
be structured to allow states to generally maintain their sovereignty, while others 
simply reconceptualize sovereignty and move away from the modern understanding 
of absolute sovereignty.37  While this theoretical work is insightful, it does little to 
reduce the problem of sovereignty, as it exists in current climate policy negotiations.  
In this sphere of international politics, sovereignty simply is the base notion of 
absolute domestic authority and self-determination related to the use of natural 
resources within a county’s own borders, and this is something that, at least for the 
near future, appears non-negotiable.  Politicians who are seen as allowing other 
countries to dictate climate policy are ousted from office.  While the theoretical work 
might remove the apparent problems posed by sovereignty, the political will clearly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 One might look to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer for 
guidance with these types of issues, as it is one of the most successful UN treaties and dealt with 
transboundary environmental issues. For detailed information on the Protocol, see the webpage for the 
UNEP Ozone Secretariat at <http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_protocol.php> (Accessed 28 
March 2012).  It is worth noting that while some trade sanctions were included in the treaty, it relied 
heavily on economic incentives and assistance to get developing countries like China and India on 
board.  Such conditional assistance, according to Royal Gardner, “provides a mechanism that deals 
with global environmental issues, yet avoids the problem of sovereignty,” since states still are free to 
choose whether to accede to the treaty [Royal C. Gardner, “Respecting Sovereignty,” Fordham 
Environmental Law Review 8, no. 1 (1996): 137]. 
37 For an example of the first approach, see Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting 
States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2009).  The second approach is exemplified by the collection of articles in Edgar Grande and Louis 
W. Pauly, eds., Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-first Century 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). 
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seems not ready to accept this work.38  I will not take up this practical concern in the 
dissertation, but it is worth noting that if the underlying philosophical arguments I 
offer in the following chapters are successful, then there is good reason, rooted in the 
demands of justice, to work to change the political will and create a global 
environmental regulatory regime. 
 The issues just discussed related to sovereignty point us to the other primary 
problems plaguing recent attempts to address climate change: the need for unanimity 
and the North-South divide.  Sovereignty is only a problem insofar as there is 
disagreement and lack of unanimity (or at least a general consensus).  If all the states 
agree not only that something must be done, but also agree about what each of them 
must do, then sovereignty does not pose a problem for collective action.  However, 
when there is disagreement among states about what action they need to take, the 
problems of sovereignty highlighted above begin to manifest—the need for 
enforceability and adjudication only surfaces when differences exist.  While there is 
unanimity that some action needs to be taken, there is no consensus on what that 
action ought to be and who should take the lead.  As noted in the previous section 
regarding the highly touted climate negotiations at the Copenhagen Summit 
(COP15), the disagreement on action generally pits the developed (the global North) 
against the developing (the global South) world.  Understanding this North-South 
divide illuminates some of the core ethical issues currently preventing the 
establishment of a system of international norms to govern climate matters and how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 I should note that the emergence of the European Union and the passage of the Treaty of 
Lisbon might be a sign that political will is shifting regarding the issue of sovereignty.  However, 
even those discussions were (and continue to be) plagued by concessions to limit the authority of the 
EU.	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disagreement over these ethical issues creates the problems related to sovereignty 
discussed above. 
 The conflict between the North and the South is best seen through a series of 
inequalities related to patterns of development and consumption.39  Of primary 
concern are issues surrounding past development (which produced significant GHG 
emissions) and models for future development.  These inequalities can be effectively 
captured by comparing both historical and recent GHG emissions for the top ten 
emitters in 2005 (by total emissions produced in MtCO2e), along with a general 
comparison between emissions data for developed countries as a whole (those 
labeled Annex I countries under UNFCCC) and major developing countries (labeled 
non-Annex I countries under UNFCCC).40  In the following discussion, data for 
Annex I countries will be treated as representative of the global North, while data for 
non-Annex I countries will be treated as representative of the global South. 
 The main trend that emerges from a comparison of data for GHG emission 
levels is that wealthy, developed countries have disproportionately high levels 
relative to their populations (See Table 1.1).  While this disproportionality is 
maintained by all Annex I countries, it is driven primarily by the United States, 
which in 2005 emitted 18.26% of the total GHGs that year, while being home to only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For a different presentation of the inequalities leading to the North-South conflict, based more 
on susceptibility and vulnerability, rather than development and consumption issues, see Roberts and 
Parks, A Climate of Injustice, and Bradley C. Parks and J. Timmons Roberts, “Inequality and the 
Global Climate Regime: Breaking the North-South Impasse,” Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 21, no. 4 (2008): 621-648. 
40 In 2005, the top ten emitters by amount in MtCO2e were in order from largest to smallest: 
China, United States, Russia, India, Japan, Brazil, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, and Mexico 
(with those countries listed in italics being Annex I countries).  Data from 2005 is used, as it is the 
most recent complete GHG data available; see note 9 above. 
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4.59% of the world’s population.41  The disparity between the North and the South is 
most apparent when one considers that Annex I countries, which accounted for only 
19.48% of the global population while emitting 46.87% of the total world GHG 
emissions, yet non-Annex I countries emitted only 5 percentage points more with a 
population that is nearly 60 percentage points higher.  The numbers are even starker 
when adjusting for population and considering per person usage.  Here, we find a 
“typical” individual in Annex I countries emitted 14.1 MtCO2e, with Americans 
setting the bar with 23.3 MtCO2e, compared to the 3.6 MtCO2e emitted per person in 
non-Annex I countries.  
 








% of Total 
World 
Emissions 
% of World 
Population 
(in 2005) 
China 5.6 7,242.1 19.16 20.19 
United States 23.3 6,900.9 18.26 4.59 
Russia 13.5 1,939.6 5.13 2.22 
India 1.7 1,865.0 4.93 16.94 
Japan 10.6 1,349.2 3.57 1.98 
Brazil 5.4 1,010.5 2.67 2.89 
Germany 11.9 977.5 2.59 1.28 
Canada 23.0 741.8 1.96 0.50 
United Kingdom 10.7 642.2 1.70 0.93 
Mexico 5.9 631.0 1.67 1.60 
Total 6.8 23,299.8 61.65 53.11 
     
UNFCCC Party Totals     
Annex I Countries 14.1 17,714.2 46.87 19.48 
Non-Annex I Countries 3.8 19,482.0 51.54 79.44 
NOTES: Countries listed in italics are Annex I Countries in the UNFCCC 
SOURCES: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 9.0 (Washington, DC: World 
Resources Institute, 2012); World DataBank (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2012) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 CAIT Version 9.0; all subsequent statistical data in this section comes from this source and is 
for the year 2005 (the last year with full data for all primary GHGs) unless otherwise noted.	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Given that the IPCC has identified GHGs as a primary cause of climate 
change, the disproportionality highlighted above has led to the view that those with 
higher emissions are more responsible for reducing emissions to prevent harmful 
future climate scenarios.  This prima facie case for blaming developed countries and 
calling for reductions on their part is strengthened when we consider cumulative 
emissions over time; this is important since, as noted above, GHGs persist in the 
atmosphere long after their initial emission.  On any historical measure, the 
disproportionality shifts even more towards the North (See Table 1.2).42  For 
example, the United States accounts for 25.88% of total GHG emissions from 1950-
2008, a nearly 8-point increase from its 2005 annual share.  More importantly, on 
this analysis, Annex I countries are responsible for nearly 70% of all emissions from 
1950-2008.  As with before, the disproportionality is emphasized when considering 
per person emissions, with Annex I countries emitting 534.2 MtCO2e per person 
over this period compared to 56.4 MtCO2e for non-Annex I countries.  This shows 
that viewed over time, Annex I countries emitted nearly nine and a half times as 
many GHGs per person compared to non-Annex I countries, while the yearly time 
slice for 2005 shows Annex I countries emitting only about four times as much per 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 It is important to note that in considering cumulative data, these numbers only speak to how 
much any given country has emitted over a specific period.  While this can be used along with the 
world total for that same period to say what percent of global emissions belong to each country, the 
data cannot be used to provide the percentage of GHGs presently in the atmosphere for any given 
country.  While the general lifespans of each GHG are known, these are only typical lifespans.  Some 
individual molecules might have shorter or longer lifespans.  Coupling this with the fact that once in 
the atmosphere the origin of a specific GHG molecule cannot be determined, it is impossible to look 
at GHG levels in the atmosphere in a singular moment and assign what percent of those GHGs came 
from any given country.  Cumulative emissions over a historical period are the best estimate available 
for who has contributed most to the current predicament. 
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person.  While the emissions gap between the North and South might be closing 
(though there is still a significant gap), the historical disparity is drastic. 
 
Table 1.2. Cumulative Emissions of CO2 (for energy use) – 1950 to 2008 
COUNTRY MtCO2e 




China 111,351.5 11.23 84.1 
United States 256,485.0 25.88 842.7 
Russia 89,777.0 9.06 632.5 
India 28,192.5 2.84 24.7 
Japan 46,865.8 4.73 367.0 
Brazil 9,913.3 1.00 51.8 
Germany 53,454.3 5.39 651.0 
Canada 21,935.2 2.21 658.5 
United Kingdom 33,368.5 3.37 543.5 
Mexico 11,937.5 1.20 107.9 
Total 663,280.7 66.92 188.6 
    
UNFCCC Party Totals    
Annex I Countries 681,045.0 68.71 534.2 
Non-Annex I Countries 300,635.4 30.33 56.4 
NOTE: Countries listed in italics are Annex I Countries in the UNFCCC 
SOURCE: CAIT Version 9.0 (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2012) 
 
 
These drastic inequalities have in turn led the North and South to argue for 
two diverging approaches to action.  The South, highlighting the extremely 
disproportionate consumption historically, seeks to place primary responsibility for 
climate change on the North and calls for the countries of the North to drastically 
reduce their GHG emissions.  Additionally, the countries of the South defend their 
right to continue to develop, which will increase their GHG emissions.  Some 
proposals also call for the countries of the North to compensate the countries of the 
South.  As many developing countries have argued, any agreement to reduce 
emissions at an even rate for all countries would not only be unfair given the 
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disproportionality of emissions, but would also continue to hinder the South by 
stunting its ability to develop.  The North, on the other hand, seeks to emphasize the 
need for all countries to move forward evenly, pointing to projections of increased 
GHG emissions by the South and an increased risk of harm. 
 While development and GHG emissions do not have to bear a positive 
correlation, data on development indicators for the top ten emitters in 2005 shows 
support for such a relation in current development practices.  However, it is 
important to note that the correlation is not simply between high emissions and 
development, but disproportionate emissions and development (to normalize for 
population differences).  As such, it is important to compare the ratio of each 
country’s percent of total world GHG emissions to its percent of the global 
population (See Table 1.3).  In making such a comparison, a ratio of 1 would mean 
that a country emits the same percent of GHGs as it has people, what one might call 
their “equal share.”  A ratio above 1 means that country emits more GHGs than is 
share, while a ratio below 1 means it does not emit as much as its share allots. 
Considering the data for the top ten total emitters in 2005, we see three of the 
four non-Annex I countries have a ratio below 1, while the other (Mexico) sits just 
above the threshold for proportional emissions at 1.044.  Considering GDP per capita 
as a mark of development, we can see that these four countries have relatively low 
GDP (ranging from $3,452 to $10,751) in addition to their less than proportional 
emission levels.  Annex I countries, on the other hand, have ratios that show 
increased emissions, ranging from 1.81 (Japan) to 3.99 (United States), and relatively 
high GDP per capita, as all countries in this group save for Russia have a GDP per 
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capita above $29,000.  This same relation exists when comparing proportionality 
ratios and human development indices (HDI).  The non-Annex I countries have low 
development (HDIs from 0.619 to 0.829) and all rank outside the top 50 most 
developed countries in the world, while the Annex I countries, excluding Russia 
(HDI = 0.802), have extremely high development (HDIs from 0.935 to 0.961) and 
rank inside the twenty-five most developed countries in the world.43  These numbers 
show that, at present, as countries’ emissions have increased beyond their baseline 
share, so too have their development levels.  The more one develops, the more one 
emits.  Worse, this increased development has come by not only producing more 
emissions, but by producing disproportionate emissions. 
 
Table 1.3. Development Indicators for Top Ten GHG Emitters in 2005 
COUNTRY 
Emissions Rank 
by Total GHG 
Emissions 
Ratio of % of Global 
Emissions to % of 
Global Population*  
GDP per 
capita 
(in PPP US$) 
Human Development 
Index Value (RANK) 
China 1 0.949 6,757 0.777 (81) 
United States 2 3.978 41,890 0.951 (12) 
Russia 3 2.311 10,845 0.802 (67) 
India 4 0.291 3,452 0.619 (128) 
Japan 5 1.803 31,267 0.953 (8) 
Brazil 6 0.924 8,402 0.800 (70) 
Germany 7 2.023 29,461 0.935 (22) 
Canada 8 3.920 33,375 0.961 (4) 
United Kingdom 9 1.828 33,238 0.946 (16) 
Mexico 10 1.044 10,751 0.829 (52) 
*This row contains my calculations using the data in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.1 
NOTE: Countries listed in italics are Annex I Countries in the UNFCCC 
SOURCES: CAIT Version 9.0 (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2012); 2007/2008 
Human Development Report (UNDP, 2008). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2007/2008 – 
Fighting Climate Change: Solidarity in a Divided World (New York: UNDP, 2007).  While the report 
is for 2007/2008, the HDI values it provides are for 2005. 
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 This split creates problems for addressing climate change by adding 
questions about responsibility and fair development when trying to determine 
appropriate action.  It cannot just be about blanket GHG reductions.  It is also about 
understanding the relation between development and GHG emissions.  The 2010 
World Development Report captures this succinctly: “Climate change policy is not a 
simple choice between a high-growth, high-carbon world and a low-growth, low-
carbon world—a simple question of whether to grow or to preserve the planet.”44  
While new technologies can be developed and used to allow high-growth with low 
emissions, this development requires money and infrastructure not possessed by the 
South.  Thus, a demand would have to be placed on the North to not only develop 
this technology but also freely transfer it to the South.  However, this turns us in the 
direction of underlying questions of harm, responsibility, and obligation to which the 
North and South have different answers.  It is here philosophers and theorists have 
made their mark, and these contributions are taken up in the next section. 
 
5. Addressing the Ethical Problems: Harm, Responsibility, and Obligation 
 As the previous section highlighted, much of the disagreement on climate 
policy stems from disagreement about deeper questions of justice: What is the harm 
of climate change?  Who is responsible for this harm, and, once responsibility is 
determined, what obligations do responsible parties bear?  Understood in this sense, 
climate change becomes fundamentally an ethical problem: 
Climatologists can tell us what is happening to the planet and why it 
is happening, they can even say with some confidence what will 
happen in the years to come.  What we do about all of this, though 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 World Bank, WDR 2010, 1. 
	   38 
depends on what we think is right, what we value, what matters to 
us.45  
 
While politicians and negotiators answer the “what matters to us” in more self-
interested ways keeping their focus within their own borders (as we saw in the 
discussion of the North-South divide in the previous section), scholars have entered 
the fray with attempts to answer these questions in terms of what we ought to do, 
rather than what is in any particular country’s self-interest. 
 However, engagement with climate change by scholars is a recent 
phenomenon and until the past five or so years has been confined primarily within 
legal scholarship.46  Most of this literature has focused primarily on efforts to find 
avenues within environmental law for the rights of future generations, sovereignty 
over natural resources, and the jurisdiction of international courts over transboundary 
environmental matters (e.g., pollution of rivers that flow into other countries and 
now more recently climate change).47  However, by working within existing legal 
structures, these discussions are unable to provide a complete examination of the 
underlying ethical questions regarding harm and responsibility.  One can offer 
compelling arguments for bringing the existing system of international law to bear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Garvey, The Ethics of Climate Change, 2.	  
46 The most notable exceptions being Dale Jamieson and Henry Shue, who both started writing 
explicitly on the ethical implications of climate change in the early 1990s.  See especially, Dale 
Jamieson, “Ethics, Public Policy and Global Warming,” Science, Technology and Human Values 17, 
no. 2 (1992): 139-153, and Henry Shue, “Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions,” Law and 
Policy 15, no. 1 (1993): 39-59.  
47 Among the recent scholarship on these matters see William C.G. Burns and Hari M. Osofsky, 
eds., Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National and International Approaches (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Svitlana Kravchenko, “Right to Carbon or Right to Life: Human 
Rights Approaches to Climate Change,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 9, no. 3 (2008): 513-
548; Edith Brown Weiss, “Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and International Law,” 
Vermont Journal of International Law 9, no. 3 (2008): 615-628 [an updated reprint of an article 
published in 1989]; and Burns H. Weston and Tracy Bach, eds., Recalibrating the Law of Humans 
with the Laws of Nature: Climate Change, Human Rights, and Intergenerational Justice (South 
Royalton, VT: Vermont Law School, 2009).	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on climate change, without offering any claims about what morality itself demands.  
While legal scholarship can prove insightful for examinations of the moral questions 
related to climate change, it cannot itself answer them.  Thus, it is important to move 
from the legal to the moral domain.  This is particularly useful since, as Steve 
Vanderheiden notes, “if a moral right can be justified, then there is a strong case for 
recognizing a legal right, as well.”48  Consequently, if the issue can be 
conceptualized in terms of the moral realm, there would not only be reason to alter 
international law and policy, but it would also legitimate actions against states that 
are not in compliance with the demands of morality. 
 Philosophers and political theorists have made such a move to the moral 
domain, and it is here that my argument makes its primary contribution.  While the 
ethical and political theory literature has generally been much slower to develop than 
the legal scholarship, recent years have seen an increased engagement with climate 
change as a central focus of discussion.49  My goal in the following chapters is to 
offer my own account of how best to address the general ethical and political 
problems of climate change.  With this goal in mind, it would be impossible to offer 
a complete analysis of the existing philosophical literature.  However, a helpful 
distinction between two general types of approaches in the literature both situates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice, 126. 
49 It is worth noting, however, that even with this recent increase in attention, direct engagement 
with climate change still finds itself limited when compared to other foci of philosophy and applied 
ethics. Stephen Gardiner highlights this in the Preface to a recent edited collection on climate change: 
“…as of January 2009, the Philosopher’s Index listed only about 100 articles under ‘climate change’ 
and ‘global warming,’ most of them recent.  By contrast, there were more than 700 listings for 
‘informed consent’ and more than 1,000 for ‘euthanasia’” [Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale 
Jamieson, and Henry Shue, eds., Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), xi]. 
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and motivates my account.  The two general types that can be identified are what I 
term “equity” approaches and “rights-based” approaches.50 
 Equity approaches typically focus on climate change first and foremost as a 
matter of distributive justice, concentrating on the allocation of the benefits and 
burdens of climate change.  They view the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere as a 
good to be distributed among the Earth’s population and then use different principles 
of equity and fairness to portion out GHG emissions and address responsibility for 
any inequalities.  Two of the most prominent equity approaches are the Polluter Pays 
Principle (most notably associated with Henry Shue) and the notion of equal per 
capita emission entitlements (most notably associated with Peter Singer and Dale 
Jamieson).51  The former operates on a general principle of distributive justice that 
those who create a problem must pay for addressing the problem and serves as an 
example of a more backward looking or historical equity approach.  The latter 
focuses on the present, arguing that the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere should 
be divided equally among the Earth’s population.  Accordingly, on this account, each 
country is allowed GHG emissions equal to its population’s emission allowance and 
compensation can then be awarded based on shortages and overages. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 It is important to note that former are not necessarily incompatible with rights, they simply do 
not use them as the central feature the way the latter do.  Thus, one should not treat them as being 
mutually exclusive.	  
51 For examples of these discussions see Henry Shue, “Global Environment and International 
Inequality,” International Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999): 531-545; Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of 
Globalization, 2nd Edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 14-50; and Dale Jamieson, 
“Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice,” in Perspectives on Climate Change, eds. Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong and Richard Howarth (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), 221-253.  All three of these have been 
reprinted in Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, eds. Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale 
Jamieson, and Henry Shue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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 However, there are a few general problems facing equity approaches.  First, 
most operate at the level of state interactions and thus are not sensitive to individual 
vulnerabilities to the adverse effects of climate change, even within fairly well-off 
states.  Second, and more important, these approaches tend to operate within the 
cost-benefit analysis associated with environmental economics, which has been 
criticized as generally not sensitive to the diverse local contexts in which individuals 
live.  For example, the per-capita approach highlighted above assigns all individuals 
equal emission entitlements without acknowledging that those living in significantly 
colder climates might require more emissions for their basic survival than those in 
moderate climates.  Consequently, those in colder climates would have smaller 
emission allotments for non-survival activities than those in moderate climates, 
which would seem to go against the egalitarian spirit of the approach.  While equity 
approaches are not dead-ends, it seems moving from a singular focus on equity to a 
more nuanced attention to need can address some of the pitfalls of equity approaches 
while still adequately dealing with the issue on the whole. 
 Shifting to a focus on need places one squarely in the domain of rights-based 
approaches to engaging climate change that have recently been developed by 
scholars.  Most versions of a rights-based approach focus on human rights at an 
individual level, though some also engage collective rights of states.  However, the 
literature holds far less agreement when it comes to the content of the rights violated 
by climate change.  One version, championed by Paul Baer and his collaborators at 
think-tanks EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute, stresses the rights 
of individuals to a minimal level of development and uses this development right to 
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place strong responsibilities on the wealthy to address the cost of climate change.52  
Simon Caney offers a different version, arguing that climate change will harm some 
individuals’ rights to basic fundamental interests such as health and security, and 
therefore there is an obligation to prevent future climate change.53  Moreover, Caney 
holds this obligation applicable only to those whose basic rights are already 
protected and for whom acting to prevent climate change would not result in a loss of 
those protections.  As such, wealthy states that already protect their citizens’ basic 
rights and can reduce emissions while still protecting those rights bear the bulk of the 
responsibility to act.  A third variation utilizes arguments for the existence of some 
notion of a general environmental right (e.g., a right to a safe environment).54  In this 
version, rather than a right to health being violated, it is an individual’s 
“environmental right” that is violated.  Essentially, this disagreement about what 
right is violated by climate change results from different understandings of the 
interaction between the environment and some package of human rights. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Paul Baer, “Greenhouse Development Rights: A Proposal for a Fair Global Climate Treaty,” 
Ethics, Place, and Environment 12, no. 3 (2009): 268-281; Paul Baer, Tom Athanasiou, Sivan Kartha, 
and Eric Kemp-Benedict, “Greenhouse Development Rights: A Framework for Climate Protection 
That is ‘More Fair’ Than Equal Per Capita Emissions Rights,” in Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, 
eds. Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 215-230. 
53 For Simon Caney’s primary work on climate change and human rights, see his “Cosmopolitan 
Justice, Rights and Global Climate Change,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 19, no. 2 
(2006), 255-278; “Human Rights, Responsibilities, and Climate Change,” in Global Basic Rights, eds. 
Charles Beitz and Robert Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 227-247; “Climate 
Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds,” in Human Rights and Climate Change, ed. Stephen 
Humphreys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 69-90; and “Human Rights and Global 
Climate Change,” in Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from International Law and Political 
Theory, eds. Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 19-
44. 
54 See James Nickel, “The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on Its 
Scope and Justification,” Yale Journal of International Law 18, no. 1 (1993), 281-295, and Tim 
Hayward, Constitutional Environmental Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).	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While this shift in focus to human rights is a helpful one, the current theories 
adopting this type of approach still suffer from general questions about their scope.  
This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, but we can see the issue one 
might have about such approaches through the following questions: on an account 
like Baer’s focusing on a right to development, what is the level of development 
someone has a right to and how is it operationalized (e.g., percent above the poverty 
line, level of basic health)?  Focusing instead on an “environmental right”, how 
should such a right be conceptualized and how far does it extend?  Any type of 
rights-based approach is going to have to provide a clear defense of not only what 
types of material protections must be provided, but also what levels of protections 
are required.  Without such an account, a rights-based approach will not be able to 
provide any practical guidance about what measures need to be taken by countries in 
response to climate change.  It is not enough to say that climate change constitutes 
(or will constitute) a violation of human rights and therefore we must prevent it.  
Rather, an account must be able to clearly explicate exactly what rights climate 
change violates, what impacts of climate change violate those rights, and under 
which climate scenarios a violation or rights would not occur.  Any truly successful 
account will have to provide a detailed justification of the rights involved that 
clarifies their scope, and this is something often lacking in the literature to date.55   
 While equity and rights-based approaches to addressing the ethical aspects of 
climate change can yield similar proposals for action, I favor a rights-based approach 
for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons.  Theoretically, a rights-based account is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Here, I am particularly thinking of the lack of such an account in both Nickel and Hayward’s 
presentation of a generic “environmental right.”  I will argue this point in detail in the next chapter. 
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able to address the intergenerational and transboundary nature of climate change 
with more ease than an equity approach.  Regarding the intergenerational aspect, a 
rights-based account is better able to fully address objections to the claim that future 
generations are the bearers of rights (e.g. Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem) by 
employing an interest-based account of human rights, which is addressed in Chapter 
4.  Concerning the transboundary nature of climate change, since all human beings 
possess the rights present in any rights-based approach, the responsibilities and 
obligations that arise relative to these rights transcend political boundaries.  
Additionally, issues related to sovereignty might be more easily addressed in a 
rights-based approach, as this type of approach can allow one to maintain a general 
commitment to state sovereignty and the role of nation-states while legitimizing 
international regulation or intervention in cases of human rights violations.  Thus, 
human rights can serve as a limiting factor on state behavior.   
 Beyond the theoretical considerations, there are significant real-world 
implications for establishing climate change as a violation of fundamental interests 
and basic human rights.  First, such an account gives credence to the project of 
including environmental matters relevant to climatic issues in existing human rights 
law and conventions.  This allows these matters to then fall under the jurisdiction of 
international courts and existing regulatory mechanisms.  Second, and more 
important, by placing climate change under the aegis of human rights, the issue is 
given the backing of the strongest form of moral rhetoric available in contemporary 
global politics.  The use of such rhetoric gives some hope that the arguments offered 
here might gain some traction in current political negotiations and help break the 
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North-South impasse.  If people come to see their own daily actions as part of large-
scale human rights violations, perhaps they might begin to make needed changes. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 The preceding discussion highlighted the current stalemate that exists in 
global climate policy negotiations.  The countries of the developing world appear to 
have a strong case for placing responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the 
developed world based on the developed world’s disproportionate GHG emission 
levels.  Moreover, the developed world clearly possesses a capacity for addressing 
and responding to climate change that the developing world does not.  To demand 
the same responses by both the developed and developing worlds would be to 
maintain the current development gap, depriving millions of people of living lives of 
decent minimal standards.  However, the countries of the developed world also seem 
to have a legitimate worry about not placing some type of responsibility on 
developing countries.  While the data in Section 4 make the case against the 
developed world clear, it also shows countries of the developing world emitting 
significant amounts of GHGs.  Consequently, it seems reasonable to keep those 
amounts in check, at least to some degree. 
This is where climate negotiations have run aground.  Philosophers and 
political theorists alike have made clear that underlying all this are important value 
judgments related to ideas of fairness and moral responsibility.  However, as Section 
5 noted, there are significant worries related to various approaches that address these 
underlying ethical issues.  Equity approaches appear to be unable to properly respond 
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to individual needs, often missing the poor and vulnerable in the developed world, 
while at the same time ignoring the rich in the developing world.  While being able 
to respond to this worry, rights-based approaches seem vulnerable to objections 
related to their scope and ability to provide an account of the harm that is complete 
enough to produce information relevant for assigning responsibility for addressing 
climate change.  Without a response to this type of objection, rights-based 
approaches are unable to serve as a moral framework that can be used to craft actual 
policy prescriptions. 
The remaining chapters seek to provide an alternative rights-based account 
that is able to provide a moral framework that is capable of producing specific policy 
prescriptions.  Such specifics will not be provided in this project, as the goal is to 
offer the general framework and moral principles that would be used to guide 
relevant experts in various areas of knowledge to develop not only an effective 
global climate policy, but a just one as well.  In doing so, I will work through the 
issues related to identifying the harm of climate change from a moral perspective.  
Once the harm is identified, I will take up the issue of responsibility and what types 
of actions would be demanded in light of climate change’s adverse impacts.  
Drawing from the lessons of current climate negotiations and the problem posed by 
non-compliant states, I will end the project by defending against claims that my 
account runs counter to commonly held views about state sovereignty.  With this 
general trajectory in mind, we can focus our attention on the specifics of my human 
rights framework and responding to the worry about the scope of rights-based 





Human Rights and the Environment 
 
 
The previous chapter highlighted the stalemate that exists in current climate 
negotiations between the developed and developing world and the ethical and 
political problems underlying this impasse.  In addressing the normative aspects of 
the issue, I offered reasons for favoring a rights-based approach in analyzing climate 
change.  This chapter explores the applicability of rights-based approaches to 
environmental matters and examines the adequacy of current rights-based 
approaches responses to the theoretical challenges posed by climate change.  My 
primary interest throughout this chapter is whether an account is available that can 
provide an affirmative answer to the following query: “Do the negative impacts of 
global climate change, in and of themselves, violate human rights?” 
Before providing an answer, I will offer a brief account of what constitutes 
human rights, particularly due to the various uses of that term that exist in both 
contemporary politics and philosophical scholarship.  The first section of this chapter 
provides such an account, identifying human rights as universal moral rights.  The 
subsequent sections of the chapter address two of the primary rights frameworks 
identified in the last chapter: environmental rights and basic human rights.  I do not 
focus on development rights, since such approaches only address climate change 
indirectly.  I will highlight the environmental and basic human rights frameworks as 
helpful, though ultimately inadequate, as they both suffer from a problem in 




of the chapter, to a human rights framework that draws from Breena Holland’s 
environmental extension of Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach.  I argue that 
this framework avoids the scope problem facing the others examined in the chapter.  
The result is a human rights account, yielding a right to a sustainable ecological 
capacity that can be used to directly engage the phenomenon of climate change.   
At the outset, let me reiterate that this project is intentionally being conducted 
from an anthropocentric perspective; hence the focus on human rights.  As such, I 
make no remarks addressing the rights of non-human species.  However, it is 
important to keep in mind that the framework I argue for in this chapter is not 
necessarily inconsistent with a non-anthropocentric view that places more 
demanding obligations and limitations on human activity.  A human rights approach 
simply sets minimal thresholds and establishes obligations humans owe to one 
another not to violate those thresholds.  Such an approach does not speak to how 
these thresholds ought to be met, nor does it rule out the possibility that we have 
other reasons (moral or prudential) to set higher standards or obligations toward 
other humans, as well as non-human species.  With that in mind, we can move 
forward in developing a human rights framework that can adequately address 
environmental matters generally and climate change specifically. 
 
1. Clarifying Human Rights 
The phrase “human rights” can refer to many different things ranging from 
rights codified in actual international documents, such as the International Covenant 




certain moral traditions.  Each represents a differing conception of rights—legal and 
moral, respectively—that can be used when developing a theory of human rights.  
Both types of rights share structural similarities (i.e. they have subjects, objects, 
respondents, and justificatory grounds).1  Yet, their domains differ in important 
ways.  Moral rights derive from ethics and apply across morality as a whole, while 
legal rights exist only within particular political domains, derived from the positive 
law enforced within them.  Thus, while a moral right’s existence is independent of 
the political structure that happens to be in place, a legal right’s existence and 
enforceability are contingent on that particular structure.  While legal rights are 
commonly accepted, moral rights draw more skepticism.  For the purposes of this 
project, however, I assume there are such things as moral rights.2 
Initially, those who tried to link human rights and climate change worked 
within the context of legal rights.3  Unfortunately, this approach is limited in an 
important way: there is no legal body with global jurisdiction.  Thus, there are not 
global legal rights.  This is a severe constraint in light of the global nature of climate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Here, I am using Alan Gewirth’s schema for the structure of a right: “The general formula of a 
right is as follows: ‘A has a right to X against B by virtue of Y.’  In addition to the right itself, there 
are four elements here: the subject of the right, the right-holder (A); the object of the right (X); the 
respondent of the right, the person who has the correlative duty (B); and the justificatory basis or 
ground of the right (Y)” [Alan Gewirth, “Are There Any Absolute Rights?” in Theories of Rights, ed. 
Jeremy Waldron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 93]. 
2 For some of the early debates about universal moral rights, see Jeremy Waldron’s edited 
collection, Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
3 See, e.g., William Burns and Hari Osofsky, eds., Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, 
and International Approaches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); John Knox, “Climate 
Change and Human Rights Law,” Virginia Journal of International Law 50, no. 1 (2009): 163-218; 
Amy Sinden, “Climate Change and Human Rights,” Journal of Land, Resources, and Environmental 
Law 27, no. 2 (2007): 255-271; Edith Brown Weiss, “Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and 
International Law,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 9, no. 3 (2008): 615-628; and Burns 
Weston and Tracy Bach, eds., Recalibrating the Law of Humans with the Laws of Nature: Climate 





change.  Coupling this limitation with the lack of explicit attention by theorists on 
the moral domain is particularly unfortunate, given that, as Steve Vanderheiden 
notes, “if a moral right can be justified, then there is a strong case for recognizing a 
legal right, as well.”4  Consequently, if climate change can be conceptualized in 
terms of justified moral rights, there would not only be reason to expand 
international law and codify new legal rights, but such an account would also 
legitimate action (at least morally) against states who are not signatories to current 
human rights instruments.  For this reason, my focus is on the link between climate 
change and human rights understood as moral rights possessed and shared 
simultaneously by all human beings. 
While the focus on human rights as moral rights has the benefit of 
legitimating action against states not part of current human rights instruments, it 
creates difficulties because arguments for moral rights yield extremely strong claims 
(e.g. they are universal and independent of state recognition).  Many skeptics argue 
that such claims cannot be justified adequately and leave open questions about the 
content of these moral rights.  As a result, there is a vast literature of philosophical 
defenses from human rights proponents and critical analyses from skeptics.5  
Addressing all of the issues involved, and offering a complete theory of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 126. 
5 For excellent discussions of the current literature and recent attempts to offer detailed accounts 
of human rights, see James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd edition (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2006); James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Charles 
Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Johannes Morsink, 
Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots of the Universal Declaration (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).  Nickel also maintains an entry on human rights in the 





rights, is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter, and even of the dissertation as a 
whole.  Thus, I will only speak to those aspects of this literature that relate directly to 
existing discussions linking environmental matters (and therefore climate change) to 
human rights, understood morally. 
The remainder of this section addresses the human rights literature with 
respect to both the justificatory arguments for moral rights and the interpretation of 
their content.  Typically, people refer to two theories of moral rights: will theory 
(sometimes called choice theory) and interest theory.6  These theories are meant to 
apply to any moral right, not just those shared universally by all human beings, since 
it is possible for an individual to have a justified moral right unique to them.  
Consequently, both theories require two steps when identifying human rights (i.e. 
universal moral rights): (1) identify the necessary conditions for any given individual 
to have a moral right to some object, and (2) identify those objects for which the 
conditions found in the first step are met for every human being at all times. 
H.L.A Hart and Alan Gewirth have most prominently espoused the will 
theory of rights though in slightly different variations.7  Taken most generally, a will 
theory of rights “connotes a conception of the right-bearer as agent and chooser 
rather than merely potential victim or potential recipient of assistance.”8  An 
individual then possess a right if and only if that individual is in a position to require 
a particular action of another, i.e. an individual P is in a position relative to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  See Jeremy Waldron, “Introduction,” in Theories of Rights, edited by Jeremy Waldron (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), 9-12. 
7 H.L.A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” in Theories of Rights, edited by Jeremy Waldron 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 77-90; Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on 
Justification and Application (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 




individual Q such that P’s “say-so would be sufficient to discharge Q from the 
requirement” of the duty in question.9  For Hart, this is best exemplified in the 
special case of promising.  When I promise my best friend I will babysit his 
daughter, I incur a duty to babysit his daughter and the only person who can free me 
of this duty is my best friend.10  On this conception, according to Hart, the only 
moral right that applies to all human beings at all times is a right to individual 
freedom, and all other rights are either derived from it or are special rights created by 
the explicit consent of particular individuals (as in the case of promises).11  Gewirth 
takes an approach similar to that of Hart, but focuses on our capacity for rationally 
purposive agency.  Gewirth argues that since freedom and basic well-being are pre-
requisites for engaging in any rationally purposive action, any claims to those pre-
requisites are based on a general attribute of all human beings.  This places all 
human beings in a similar relation with one another, creating universal moral claims 
to freedom and basic well-being.12 
A will theory of human rights is attractive insofar as, if true, it establishes 
powerful rights claims.  However, several worries arise when a will theory of human 
rights is employed.  First, according to this view there is no such thing as an 
unwaivable right, since to have a right means to be in a position to discharge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid., 9. 
10 Hart explains this through an example involving an individual X who promises another 
individual Y that X will look after Y’s mother.  Hart summarizes the right involved in the following 
way: “Certainly Y’s mother is a person concerning whom X has an obligation and a person who will 
benefit by its performance, but the person to whom he has an obligation to look after her is Y.  This is 
something due or owed to Y, so it is Y, not his mother whose right will disregard and to whom X will 
have done wrong if he fails to keep his promise, though the mother may be physically injured.  And it 
is Y who has a moral claim upon X; is entitled to have his mother looked after, and who can waive the 
claim and release Y from the obligation” [“Are There Any Natural Rights?”, 81, emphasis original]. 
11 Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?”, esp. 89-90. 




someone from her duty.  As Jeremy Waldron notes, “[m]ost of us believe, for 
example, that we have duties to not kill, maim and torture other humans, but few of 
us believe that there are good reasons for allowing the potential victims of these 
actions (or anyone else) to set aside our duty not to perform them.”13  Perhaps it is 
simply the case this belief held by many is false, but there is a second and more 
pressing concern—a will theory cannot ascribe rights to those agents who are not in 
the proper relation to other human beings vis-à-vis rationality or individual freedom.  
Consequently, a will theorist has difficulty ascribing rights to any individual with 
marginal rational capacities (e.g. babies, mentally disabled persons).  A third issue 
specific to climate change joins these two general problems.  Clearly, climate change 
will impact future generations, but a will theory of human rights has severe 
difficulties ascribing rights to individuals who do not yet exist (i.e. future 
generations), as those non-existing individuals do not seem to be in the proper 
relation to current generations to allow them to discharge individuals of the current 
generation from their duties.  Taking these three difficulties together, it should be no 
surprise that none of the scholars currently advancing a human rights approach for 
addressing climate change operate with a will theory. 
Rather, scholars utilize an interest theory of human rights, and I do the same.  
This approach is most commonly associated with the work of Joseph Raz, whose 
definition of what it means to have a right I will adopt: 
Definition: ‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other 
things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a 
duty.14  
 
Raz’s definition is based on an additional claim that someone or something can 
possess rights “if and only if either his well-being is of ultimate value or he is an 
‘artificial person’ (e.g. a corporation).”15  On such an account, it is clear that human 
beings are possessors of rights, and thus human rights will be those rights possessed 
by all humans through universally shared interests.16  For example, the interest in not 
being killed is important enough to any individual’s well-being—since being killed 
is a complete destruction of one’s well-being—that it would ground a right to not be 
murdered.   
The advantages an interest theory holds over a will theory of rights should be 
obvious.  The two primary problems for will theory—the issue of unwaivable rights 
and the problem of individuals with marginal rational capacities—are non-existent 
for an interest theory.  Since all that matters is the interest protected by the right, it is 
irrelevant whether the individual can cognize this right or be in some relation to 
another individual in terms of discharging them from the duty required by that right.  
More relevant to our examination of climate change, an interest theory of rights is 
consistent with the claim that future persons have rights.  I will defend the specifics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 166. 
15 Ibid.  For an expanded discussion of what it means to be of ultimate value, see 176-180. 
16 It is worth noting that an interest theory of rights can be argued to ground both positive rights 
and negative rights.  Whether a particular right is positive, requiring some specific provision to be 
provided to an individual, or negative, requiring merely non-interference, will depend on the interest 
that grounds that right.  Moreover, it is possible that the same interest could be interpreted to ground 
both positive and negative duties.  For example, my interest in basic subsistence might be argued to 
only ground a duty for others not to prevent me from obtaining food and shelter, but it could also be 




of this claim in Chapter 4.  For current purposes, it is sufficient to say an interest 
theory can uphold the rights of future generations while a will theory cannot. 
Utilizing an interest theory also holds another advantage, because it offers an 
account that lines up with our general notion of rights in everyday life.  Simon 
Caney, who takes a human rights approach to climate change, aptly summarizes this 
in his affirmation of Raz’s theory: 
In Raz’s view, rights serve to protect fundamental interests.  This 
claim does make sense to our use of the notion of rights.  We ascribe 
rights to protect highly valued interests (such as liberty of conscience, 
association, and expression) and our standard ascription of rights is 
guided by our account of what persons’ most important interests are.17 
 
Not only does the use of fundamental interests connect our everyday usage with the 
philosophical definition, it also allows for a conception of rights that matches up 
with the notion that human rights present minimal standards owed to all.  Clearly, an 
interest in the conditions necessary for survival count as sufficient to generate a right 
in others, but an interest in having delicious food does not.  This is not to say there 
might not be reasons to promote aesthetically pleasing food if everyone’s survival 
conditions were met; there would just not be a human right to such food.  Thus, we 
have a conceptual definition that matches up with the general practice of human 
rights in contemporary life, which is important if one hopes to utilize a human rights 
argument to seek actual change in the world. 
It is important to speak briefly to the worries of human rights skeptics and 
why, in the face of those worries, we still ought to utilize a human rights framework.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Simon Caney, “Human Rights and Global Climate Change,” in Cosmopolitanism in Context: 
Perspectives From International Law and Political Theory, eds. Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner 




Skeptics about human rights generally question, particularly in an age of 
globalization, the legitimacy of claims to universal values, something required by 
human rights.  Martha Nussbaum has highlighted three primary challenges offered 
against universalist claims: the argument from culture, the argument from the good 
of diversity, and the argument from paternalism.18  The argument from culture 
claims we cannot simply assume that cultural views and norms different from ours 
are bad and incapable of allowing individuals to live good lives; this is an argument 
based in a notion of moral relativism.  The argument from the good of diversity 
holds that “our world is rich in part because we don’t all agree on a single set of 
categories, but speak many different languages of value.”19  The world is better for 
its diversity and lack of universality according to this argument.  Lastly, the 
argument from paternalism “says that when we use a set of universal norms as 
benchmarks for the world’s various societies, telling people what is good for them, 
we show too little respect for people’s freedom as agents.”20  Nussbaum rejects all 
three arguments on the grounds they themselves appeal to universal values, and goes 
on to argue for the Capabilities Approach—a framework of values that can be 
applied universally, yet leaves room for cultural variation and local flexibility.  It is 
this very framework I will turn to in the later sections of this chapter to tackle the 
problem facing current human rights approaches for addressing environmental 
matters.  Thus, I will wait until I have fully developed my human rights framework 
to provide specific responses to these skeptical arguments.  At this point, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 41-59. 
19 Ibid., 50. 




sufficient to say that by basing my framework on Nussbaum’s own approach, I can 
avail myself of her rejection of the skeptic for the time being. 
 
2. Linking Human Rights and the Environment 
With the theory of human rights I employ clear, we can turn our attention to 
the possible relations these rights have with environmental considerations.  Here and 
in the following sections, I address this topic with respect to two of the three rights-
based approaches identified in the previous chapter: environmental rights and basic 
human rights.  Before addressing these two approaches, let me first explain why the 
third, the developmental rights framework, will not be considered.  The development 
rights framework was developed to specifically address the appropriate distribution 
of the costs of mitigation and adaptation.21  Given this, any violation of development 
rights would not be the direct result of the negative impacts of climate change.  
Rather, development rights are only violated when individuals are prevented from 
reaching a particular threshold of development.  Most pertinent to climate change, 
this framework holds that when the costs of mitigation and adaptation are dispersed 
in such a way that developing countries are restricted from continued development 
(e.g. by caps on GHG emissions), then those countries’ citizens’ development rights 
are violated.  Consequently, the rights violation is only indirectly linked to climate 
change, while being the direct result of specific patterns of adaptation or mitigation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Paul Baer, “Greenhouse Development Rights: A Proposal for a Fair Global Climate 
Treaty,” Ethics, Place, and Environment 12, no. 3 (2009): 268-281; Paul Baer, Tom Anthanasiou, 
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Readings, eds. Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue (Oxford: Oxford 




By placing the focus primarily on the distribution of costs related to adaptation or 
mitigation, the development rights framework actually has more in common with the 
equity approaches rejected in the previous chapter, rather than the direct link that 
exists between climate change and both environmental rights and basic human rights.  
Another reason for focusing on approaches offering a direct link between climate 
change and rights violations is that they provide a more complete account of what 
the harm of climate change is and where responsibility for it originates.  As it will 
turn out, the account I offer over the next few chapters yields similar consequences 
for the developed and developing world as the development rights framework, while 
offering the extra strength provided by a direct link between climate change and 
human rights. 
In establishing a direct link between climate change and human rights, it is 
essential to provide a clear account of the relation between the natural world and 
human rights.  When examining generally accepted human rights (e.g. right to basic 
health), the environment undoubtedly plays an important instrumental role in 
providing the underlying conditions necessary for the fulfillment of these rights.  
Consequently, one might say that since I need certain environmental conditions to 
have my moral claims met, I have a moral right to those particular environmental 
conditions, as my interest in having my moral claims met constitutes a sufficient 
interest for generating a right.  However, this leaves the following question 
unanswered: is this moral right to those environmental conditions distinct from other 
identified human rights or is it merely a built-in component of other rights?  The two 




rights to climate change.  The first defends a generic “environmental right” that 
while related to other human rights is distinct from them, and then shows that the 
effects of global climate change infringe on this right.22  The second defends the 
claim that the effects of global climate change violate other established human rights, 
such as rights to health, food, and so on.23  However, these approaches are not 
mutually exclusive.  It is possible to defend a generic environmental human right and 
show that climate change infringes not only this right, but other rights as well.24 
To some, it might seem an environmental right can only be understood 
through other rights, and thus the distinction just made is irrelevant.  However, this 
distinction is useful, as it is vitally important to clarify the exact right(s) involved, 
since the scope of resultant duties is dependent on the particular rights in play.  For 
example, if climate change is merely a violation of rights to basic health and 
subsistence, then there might not be any obligations for keeping the environment in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 cf. James Nickel, “The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on Its 
Scope and Justification,” Yale Journal of International Law 18, no. 1 (1993): 281-295; Tim Hayward, 
Constitutional Environmental Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Richard Hiskes, The 
Right to a Green Future: Environmental Rights and Intergenerational Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009).  It should be noted, however, that while all three offer defenses of 
a generic environmental human right (e.g. a right to an adequate environment) none offer a focused 
discussion on how the effects of climate change infringe upon that right. 
23 This approach is typified by the recent work of Simon Caney; see his, “Cosmopolitan Justice, 
Rights and Global Climate Change,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 19, no. 2 (2006): 
255-278; “Human Rights, Responsibilities, and Climate Change,” in Global Basic Rights, eds. 
Charles Beitz and Robert Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 227-247; “Climate Change, 
Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds,” in Human Rights and Climate Change, ed. Stephen 
Humphreys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 69-90; and “Human Rights and Global 
Climate Change,” 19-44.  This type of account is generally tied to the package of basic subsistence 
rights made famous by Henry Shue, see his Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, 2nd Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
24 Steve Vanderheiden seems to take something akin to this route in his recent book by talking of 
both “environmental rights” and how climate change violates a right to basic health, see Atmospheric 
Justice, 240-252.  Additionally, in a footnote in one of his articles, Simon Caney gives the impression 
he is doing the same thing as Nickel and Hayward, which would place him under this combined 
approach (see Caney, “Human Rights and Global Climate Change,” p. 21).  However, I take other 




any particular condition or making GHG reductions, if basic health and subsistence 
can be met through technological advancements.  However, if one holds there is a 
human right to self-determination or a right to one’s homeland, then there might be 
strong obligations to protect certain geographies through massive attempts at 
mitigation and aid directed at adaptation in those areas, in order to avoid having 
environmental refugees whose right to self-determination is infringed.25  Moreover, 
understanding climate change as violating a more general environmental human right 
might entail obligations of sustainable development and strong environmental 
protections that might not exist as components of other established rights.  However, 
the demand of the obligations will depend on the scope of the environmental right, 
which in turn depends on its justificatory argument.  Consequently, it is necessary to 
examine the justificatory arguments used in each approach to draw out the content of 
the rights involved and the scope of resultant obligations.26 
 
3. Climate Change as a Violation of an Environmental Right 
The first way to link climate change to human rights hinges on the 
establishment of a generic environmental right (e.g. a right to an adequate 
environment), which would then be the right infringed by climate change.  While 
there are a few sustained defenses of such a right, there is no sustained argument 
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applying this right to climate change.27  However, if one can justify a right to some 
general level of environmental quality, then the application to climate change is 
straightforward, given the extensive data from the IPCC and other sources regarding 
the myriad ways climate change can harm environmental quality.  Even more 
conservative estimates in the IPCC’s most recent assessment show environmental 
impacts in populated geographic areas, particularly severe flooding in low-lying 
coastal plains, such that it would be hard to conceive how the inhabitants’ right to an 
adequate environment would not be violated.28  Given that obligations, which arise 
from scenarios like the flooding case, will hinge on the nature of the environmental 
right itself, my remarks in this section focus solely on clarifying the content and 
scope of such a right. 
Heretofore, I have been playing fast and loose with what is meant by an 
“environmental human right.”  Generally, I have stuck with the ambiguous “right to 
an adequate environment” without providing any discussion of what makes an 
environment adequate.  The Rio Declaration from the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (known as “the Earth Summit”) 
formulates such a right, perhaps slightly less ambiguously, as a right to a “healthy 
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issue of climate change on ten or so pages.  Steve Vanderheiden might come the closest to this, 
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and productive life in harmony with nature.”29  Other international declarations, 
conventions, and constitutions, as well as the scholarly literature, identify the content 
of such a right in terms of “ecological equilibrium or balance”, “sustainable 
development”, “an environment suitable for development of the person”, or through 
“aesthetic aspects of environmental quality”.30  Even more unhelpfully, the primary 
defenders of a general environmental human right show no prima facie agreement 
among themselves.  James Nickel advocates a “right to a safe environment”, while 
Tim Hayward defends a “right to an adequate environment for (human) health and 
well-being” and Richard Hiskes simply talks of “environmental rights” with no clear 
statement of their content.31 
However, this disagreement and ambiguity fades as one moves from the 
general locutions each uses to their justificatory arguments.  By shifting focus, we 
see that each defense and formulation of the environmental right hinges on the 
instrumental relationship between environmental conditions and the enjoyment of 
other established fundamental rights.  For example, both Nickel and Hayward use 
similarly structured arguments focused on identifying vital interests that are 
universally applicable and then showing how environmental conditions are relevant 
to those interests.  In defending their claims, both turn to health impacts, with Nickel 
drawing heavily on cases of severe pollution and contamination and Hayward 
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31 Nickel, “The Right to a Safe Environment,” 281-295; Hayward, Constitutional Environmental 
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utilizing Nickel’s argument.32  Both continuously return to underlying human 
interests already protected by or connected to generally recognized human rights.  
From this, they conclude that potential harms to these interests justify a general right 
to some particular environmental standard. 
To many this might reduce the concern about vagueness or ambiguity in 
addressing an environmental right.  Whatever locution we use is merely a 
placeholder for saying that we have a right to the environmental conditions that 
allow the satisfaction of recognized human rights.  Such conditions are generally 
discussed via health, indicating a strategy for addressing violations and determining 
what obligations individuals possess.  Yet, this might lead to the conclusion that an 
environmental right is ultimately epiphenomenal.  It is something fully contained, 
conceptually, within other rights (e.g. the right to basic health) and can yield no 
additional obligations beyond those already demanded. 
Think for a moment how this approach would work with respect to climate 
change.  To claim the effects of climate change infringe on a generic environmental 
right, one has to show that those effects damage the fundamental interests justifying 
the environmental right.  As such, if the environmental right is justified by our 
interest in basic health, we can recognize violations of the environmental right via 
health impacts (i.e. if climate change negatively impacts health beyond some 
minimal threshold, then it violates our environmental right).  However, if we 
concede there is a right to basic health, then it is not entirely clear whether climate 
change is violating both our right to basic health and our environmental right or only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





one of them.  The unease here is that our environmental right is actually doing no 
work in determining human rights violations and resultant obligations; rather, it is 
our interest in and right to basic health doing the work, making our environmental 
right superfluous (see Figure 2.1).  Yet, the reference to basic health begins to sound 




The problem with the environmental rights approach can be generalized in 
the following manner.  Assume there is some right to X for which interests A, B, and 
C provide complete justification.  Now, assume we identify what we call a right to Y 
that also happens to be justified by interests A, B, and C.  Even though we might use 
different names, X and Y, to refer to the object of the rights in question, it would 
seem that in line with the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles the right to X and 
the right to Y must be identical.  As long as they are justified through the exact same 
interests, the rights cannot be conceptually distinct in the moral domain. 
A proponent of environmental rights might respond in one of three ways.  




















from other justified human rights, but still claim that the language of environmental 
rights provides a helpful tool, within certain political and policy domains, for 
highlighting a specific aspect of human rights (i.e. that they have ecological 
considerations as part of their moral claims).  However, even if the language is 
useful, we still need a detailed analysis of particular interests involved to know what 
policies this language supports.  Second, she might appeal to the fact that while they 
are extensionally equivalent, they are intensionally distinct.  Yet, any such appeal is 
still going to require an examination of the particular interests involved for either 
intension (i.e. basic rights or the environmental right) in order determine which 
interests are relevant to environmental matters.  Third, she might reject the 
implication in the previous paragraph that the interest(s) sufficient for justifying any 
particular human right would be sufficient for grounding an environmental right.  On 
this response, a proponent of an environmental right would argue that 
operationalizing an environmental right via health impacts is only one of many ways 
to address the scope of the interests impacted.  Thus, if there is a right to basic health 
and this right is completely justified by interests H1, H2, and H3, these interests 
would only be necessary, but not sufficient, for justifying our environmental right.  A 
complete justification of our environmental right would come from the conjunction 
of all relevant justificatory interests for human rights with ecological aspects. 
This conceptualization of a fully justified environmental right distinct from 
other human rights can be seen in the following, where HR stands for any given 
human right and I stands for a justificatory interest.  Suppose that HR1 is completely 




ecological aspects built-in (and for the sake of discussion are the only human rights 
with such aspects), then one’s environmental right would be the right that is fully 
justified by the conjunction of I1, I2, I3, I4, and I5.  Thus, there would be a right that is 
distinct from HR1 and HR2, while still being tied to those operational elements. 
Still, this attempt to defend an environmental right as distinct and thus 
yielding its own obligations apart from any other right runs into a serious problem of 
scope.  If we want to be able to claim that climate change violates an environmental 
right and address all the obligations such a violation would entail, then we will have 
to identify all the justificatory interests for the environmental right and analyze how 
climate change impacts that entire package.  This can be put another way by 
returning to our examples of HR1 and HR2, and assuming there is an environmental 
right (ER) fully justified by the conjunction of I1, I2, I3, I4, and I5.  Assume that 
climate change negatively impacts I2, I4, and I5.  If we only understand ER through 
HR1 (as it seems Nickel and Hayward do), then we would recognize the adverse 
impact to I2 and claim that ER would demand some obligation related to that impact.  
However, even if that obligation were fulfilled, there would still be a violation of ER 
since the obligations of ER would be defined not only through I2, but also through I4 
and I5.  Thus, to fully address a violation of ER, one would have to be able to 
identify all relevant interests, consequently identifying the complete scope of ER. 
What should be clear is that any attempt by proponents of environmental 
rights requires a closer examination of the specific interests involved.  In the case of 
admitting no conceptual distinction between an environmental right and other 




define the scope of our obligations.  In cases maintaining the conceptual distinction 
between an environmental right and other established human rights, we have to be 
able to identify all the relevant justificatory interests of other human rights that have 
ecological aspects in order to know the scope of an environmental right and what 
obligations it would entail.  In either response, we see the importance of other human 
rights and their justificatory interests, which consequently turns our attention to the 
second approach for linking climate change to human rights. 
 
4. Climate Change as a Violation of Non-Environmental Rights 
The second way of understanding how effects of climate change constitute a 
human rights violation is straightforward and can be inferred from the discussion in 
the previous section.  Drawing from the recent work of Simon Caney, we can outline 
the general argument in the following fashion: 
1. “A person has a right to X when X is a fundamental interest that is sufficient 
to impose obligations on others.”33 
2. “Global climate change damages persons’ fundamental interests.”34 
3. “Adequate protection of the interest in not suffering from the ill effects of 
global climate change does not impose unduly demanding obligations on 
others.”35 
4. Therefore, “[p]ersons have a right not to suffer from the ill effects associated 
with global climate change.”36 
 
Though Caney takes the additional step to establish a “right not to suffer from the ill 
effects of global climate change”, this simply derives from individuals’ “fundamental 
interests” in Step 2, which for Caney is synonymous with an individual’s human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Caney, “Human Rights and Global Climate Change,” 25.  Here we simply see an affirmation of 
Raz’s interest theory of rights I presented in Section 1. 
34 Ibid., 26. 
35 Ibid., 28. 




rights.  Thus, the moral claims involved stem from the various human rights 
individuals possess, without making any general environmental claims.  Among the 
interests relevant to climate change Caney counts interests in “access to food and 
water”, “avoiding involuntary threats to persons’ health”, and “not being deprived of 
the capacity to develop”.37  For Caney, or anyone taking this approach, these basic 
interests define the content and scope of human rights violations due to the effects of 
climate change.  There is no need for a general environmental right, given that 
particular rights cover all necessary aspects. 
While Caney’s argument is generally more helpful than the first approach in 
terms of isolating the particular content of the rights involved, there is still a question 
about the completeness of his account.  Caney provides no general argument for the 
fundamental interests he identifies as being sufficient for grounding human rights—
though the interests he uses seem uncontentious.  What is problematic is that he does 
not make it clear whether these interests exhaust those impacted by climate change.  
The concern is that Caney relies too much on rights (and thus the interests justifying 
them) generally recognized in current international law and then only addresses a 
handful of these, rather than attempting to get a more complete picture of all relevant 
moral rights or underlying interests.  Though this is likely intentional on Caney’s 
part due to the difficulties of such an inventory, the argument leaves open a question 
about the full extent of the obligations resulting from the relevant moral claims.  
Caney concludes that each generation is obligated to maintain environmental 
standards that “it is willing to apply to others and which it would want preceding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




generations to have applied to it.”38  Yet, given the numerous options available for 
mitigation and adaptation, it is not entirely clear what standards ought to be 
maintained and which options should be selected for maintaining those standards.  
Moreover, given the fact that Caney derives his claim from a discussion of John 
Rawls’ just savings principle, it is not clear the environmental standards he calls for 
necessarily follow from the rights violations he identifies.39 
To make the point clear, consider the following two interpretations: the 
Minimalist and the Maximalist, referring to the extent of rights coverage in each.  
 
Minimalist.  The only vital interests damaged by the effects of climate 
change are those to basic subsistence.  As a result, climate change 
only violates rights to basic health and food, and the only protections 
that ought to be afforded to individuals (both present and future) are 
with respect to their being able to meet minimal levels of these.  If 
this is the case, then the resultant obligations due to the effects of 
climate change can only be understood vis-à-vis these interests and 
might not entail reductions of GHGs, assuming all present 
individuals’ minimal health and food needs could be met through 
technological or medical advancement (and the same could 
reasonably be said for all future persons).  Thus, this interpretation 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Caney, “Human Rights and Global Climate Change,” 44. 
39 See particularly, Caney, “Human Rights and Global Climate Change,” 41-44. 
Figure 2.2. Basic Rights Approach (Minimalist) 
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Maximalist. The vital interests and package of rights infringed 
includes not only basic subsistence rights, but also, social, cultural, 
and political rights (e.g. the right to self-determination mentioned 
earlier in the chapter).  Consequently, the resultant obligations due to 
the effects of climate change on both present and future generations 
will cover a much larger scope than in the Minimalist Interpretation 
and will more than likely require both significant mitigation efforts 
and reduction of GHGs, as well as the development of adaptive 
technologies that are freely transferred to the developing world.  
Additionally, it is plausible that under this interpretation, the package 







Caney’s general position would most likely fall closer to the Maximalist than the 
Minimalist.  In comparing these two scenarios, the point is simply to highlight the 
fact that it is not enough to establish that climate change infringes on some human 
rights.  Rather, we must understand conceptually the entire package of relevant 
interests involved and how the environment relates to them.  This is particularly 
important when examining the resultant obligations, since if it is only a matter of 
health interests there might be numerous options available that would fulfill our 
obligations.  However, if one of these options does not also respond to climate 
Figure 2.3. Basic Rights Approach (Maximalist) 
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change’s harm of another fundamental interest (or perhaps harms another interest 
itself), then that option ought to be ruled out, changing our obligations.  
Consequently, just as the first approach required us to ultimately turn our focus to the 
underlying interests, this approach points to the need to examine the relation between 
the environment and all interests fundamental to human well-being. 
While acknowledging the helpful shift in focus provided by this second 
approach, it seems we are still unable to avoid the scope problem facing the 
environmental rights approach.  Though we are better able to capture some of the 
specific ways in which climate change infringes on human rights, we still need an 
exhaustive list of human rights and an understanding of the full extent of how the 
effects of climate change impact those rights.  Without a complete account, we are 
unable to identify the scope of rights violations or the scope of resultant obligations 
due to the effects of climate change (or any type of environmental impact for that 
matter). 
One might object to the legitimacy of this concern for multiple reasons.  First, 
with an issue as complex as climate change, particularly given uncertainties 
regarding future projections, it seems impossible to identify all relevant interests.  
Second, responding to this concern demands an exhaustive list of fundamental 
human interests, and thus an exhaustive list of human rights, something highly 
contentious.  Third, one might say that even if you cannot produce an exhaustive list, 
a partial account like Caney’s results in enough obligations to significantly reduce 
the extent of unknown rights violations.  Lastly, it might seem at this point it is no 




the effects of climate change—something better left to climatologists, geographers, 
and other social scientists.  To fully address these worries would be an impossible 
task.  However, I will offer an alternative framework that can be used to link the 
environment to human rights in a way that avoids the problem of scope and need for 
an exhaustive listing of fundamental interests, or at least greatly diminishes the 
problem of scope.  This task takes up the remainder of this chapter, which examines 
the Capabilities Approach and recent work by Breena Holland. 
 
5. Identifying Relevant Interests: Capabilities and Human Rights40 
Amartya Sen originally developed the Capability Approach as an alternative 
to the standard economic frameworks used to analyze international development 
policy.  While Sen has continued to develop and refine his theory, it remains focused 
on the importance of the individual’s freedom and her ability to turn things she has at 
her disposal into outcomes she values: 
A person’s advantage in terms of opportunities is judged to be lower 
than that of another if she has less capability – less real opportunity – 
to achieve those things that she has reason to value.  The focus here is 
on the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that – things 
that he or she may value doing or being.41 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In this section discussing capabilities theory, I follow many scholars in distinguishing between 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s work, by referencing the former’s as the Capability Approach 
and the latter’s as the Capabilities Approach.  Capabilities theory will be used as a general reference 
for any work that employs a capabilities framework.  I am indebted to Breena Holland for pointing 
out this manner of distinguishing the theories when commenting on a previous draft of the chapter.  
Ultimately, I focus solely on Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach. 
41 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009), 231-232.  For Sen’s 
earlier presentations of his theory and its development see his Commodities and Capabilities (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1984); The Standard of Living: The Tanner Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987); “Capability and Well-Being,” in The Quality of Life, eds. Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 30-53; and Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 




Martha Nussbaum, with her Capabilities Approach, has further developed this key 
insight from Sen.42  Nussbaum offers arguments for its philosophical roots and 
justification and presents a list of central human capabilities (something Sen is 
hesitant to provide).  In doing this, she offers a partial theory of justice, rather than 
Sen’s more evaluative version with room for plural forms of application.  Regardless 
of focus, both Sen and Nussbaum’s versions of capabilities theory offer an important 
insight: well-being ought to be conceptualized in terms of individuals’ abilities to 
actually do things resulting in things or states they value. 
This insight can be further explained by differentiating among three concepts 
central to capability theory: functionings, capabilities, and an individual’s capability 
set.  Sen defines the first two in the following manner, which has been taken up by 
Nussbaum as well: 
Functionings represent parts of the state of a person–in particular the 
various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life.  
The capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of 
functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she can 
choose one collection.43 
 
Capabilities are the possible things people can do, while functionings are what 
people actually do.  For example, if I have been accepted to both Generic State 
University and Typical Liberal Arts College—and can afford to attend either—I have 
the capability to go to college.  This is a real, live option for me.  This is true whether 
I choose to attend one of the schools or not.  Now, say I choose to attend TLAC.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For Nussbaum’s primary presentations of her variation of the Capabilities Approach see her 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) and Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2006).  For more on the explicit differences between Nussbaum and Sen, see Women 
and Human Development, 11-15. 




Going to TLAC (and not GSU, or no school) is then my functioning.  Expanding 
from this, we can then say that an individual’s capability set is the set of all 
capabilities a person possesses, which determines the alternative functionings the 
individual can achieve.44  An individual’s capability set ought to be considered when 
determining an individual’s well-being, rather than her particular functionings. 
Nussbaum draws on these distinctions to define a list of central human 
capabilities.  According to Nussbaum, this list “isolates those human capabilities that 
can be convincingly argued to be of central importance in any human life, whatever 
else the person pursues or chooses.”45 These central human capabilities consist in the 
following, which I quote at length: 
1. Life.  Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal 
length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as 
to be not worth living. 
2. Bodily Health.  Being able to have good health, including 
reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate 
shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity.  Being able to move freely from place to place; to 
be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and 
domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction 
and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought.  Being able to use the senses, 
to imagine, think, and reason—and to do these things in a “truly 
human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate 
education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and 
basic mathematical and scientific training.  Being able to use 
imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and 
producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, 
literary, musical, and so forth.  Being able to use one’s mind in 
ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with 
respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of 
religious exercise.  Being able to have pleasurable experiences 
and to avoid nonbeneficial pain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” 36. 




5. Emotions.  Being able to have attachments to things and people 
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve 
at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience 
longing, gratitude, and justified anger.  Not having one’s 
emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety.  (Supporting 
this capability means supporting forms of human association that 
can be shown to be crucial in their development.) 
6. Practical Reason.  Being able to form a conception of the good 
and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s 
life.  (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and 
religious observance.) 
7. Affiliation. 
A. Being able to live with and towards others, to recognize 
and show concern for other human beings, to engage in 
various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine 
the situation of another.  (Protecting this capability means 
protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such 
forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of 
assembly and political speech.) 
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; 
being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth 
is equal to that of others.  This entails provisions of 
nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin. 
8. Other Species.  Being able to live with concern for and in relation 
to animals, plants, and the world of nature. 
9. Play.  Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over One’s Environment. 
A. Political.  Being able to participate effectively in political 
choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political 
participation, protections of free speech and association. 
B. Material.  Being able to hold property (both land and 
movable goods), and having property rights on an equal 
basis with others; having the right to seek employment on 
an equal basis with others; having the freedom from 
unwarranted search and seizure.  In work, being able to 
work as a human being, exercising practical reason and 
entering into meaningful relationships of mutual 
recognition with other workers.46 
 
It is important to note that, for Nussbaum, moral claims are to capabilities, not actual 
functionings.  Taking “Bodily Health” as our example, my moral claim is simply to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





the conditions being such that it is possible for me to be adequately nourished, if I so 
chose.  My moral claim here is not to be to be adequately nourished, which might 
require force-feeding me if I choose not to eat.  Rather, my moral claim is to have 
nothing preventing me from having adequate nourishment, if I want it.  Thus, I have 
a right to the ability to acquire food necessary for nourishment, but not necessarily 
having food directly given to me.  Since the claim here is to the capability, it also 
means that someone who is of the upper-middle class has a moral claim to food they 
can afford to purchase, while the individual of the lower class could have a claim to 
food assistance programs, when her wages do not provide the ability to purchase 
adequate nourishment.  Moreover, Nussbaum holds that capabilities have threshold 
levels, “beneath which it is held that truly human functioning is not available to” 
individuals.47  Thus, from these capabilities all individuals have shared moral claims 
to the minimal thresholds for each capability.  Note, however, that in many cases 
these claims would generally be conceived in terms of negative rights (i.e. rights of 
non-interference), thus not creating overly demanding obligations (something, as we 
saw above, Caney regards as essential for rights claims). 
With this framework in place, we can now connect the Capabilities Approach 
to our primary topic of human rights.  Though Nussbaum regards her approach “as a 
species of the human rights approach,” she is hesitant to make a direct correlation 
between the central capabilities and human rights.48  However, this hesitancy appears 
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48 Ibid., 284.  For Nussbaum’s general discussions on the relation between her approach and 
human rights see, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96-101, and “Capabilities and Human Rights,” in Global Justice 




to come from a focus on legal rights.  Nussbaum rightly highlights that a focus only 
on rights (in a legal sense) does not address whether an individual is actually able to 
engage in the activity protected by that right.  I will discuss this issue in more detail 
in the next chapter, but as seen in this simple example, Nussbaum’s reasoning is 
clear.  Just because an individual has a legal right to vote, it is still possible she will 
be prevented from actually voting if there are other defeating factors (e.g., inability 
to get to the polling station).  In a case with defeating factors, a focus on rights (in a 
legal sense) leads to the conclusion the individual’s right to vote was not violated.  
Yet, this seems to miss important considerations leading Nussbaum to prefer 
capabilities as the primary mode of analysis. 
However, if we are treating human rights in a strictly moral sense, as outlined 
at the beginning of the chapter, there is every reason to claim a direct correlation 
between the central capabilities and human rights.  If human rights are defined by 
those interests shared universally and of fundamental importance to one’s life as a 
human, such that they would be sufficient to ground obligations in others, then it 
seems Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities identifies those interests.49  I, and every 
other human being, have an interest in the conditions being such that those 
capabilities’ threshold levels are met.  Put generally, if X is a central human 
capability, then I have a human right to X, where the obligations would be spelled 
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49 For Nussbaum, given her focus on a political justification and implementation of her approach, 
capabilities ground obligations borne by states, not individuals.  However, in applying an interest 
theory of rights, as I do here, it seems there is no reason to exclude individuals as bearing duties 




out in terms of protecting the conditions that allow me to actually fulfill X (i.e. make 
it a functioning) if I so choose.50 
Treating human rights and capabilities in this manner allows us to have, as 
Bernard Williams has commented, the capabilities “do the work”.51  Human rights 
present minimum moral demands for human interactions, and these demands are set 
by the capabilities.  We can see this in the example of voting given above.  I have a 
minimum moral demand to participate in the political process, under the capability of 
“Control over One’s Environment.”  Yet, since it is a capability that defines my 
entitlement, it is not simply that I have a legal right to participate; my demand is that 
I have an actual opportunity to participate, when examined in a broad context.  If you 
steal my car so I cannot get to the polling station, you have violated my right to 
political participation.  One’s being human entitles her to threshold levels of the 
central capabilities identified above.  Nussbaum speaks to the advantage of using 
capabilities in this relation to rights, noting that “thinking in terms of capability gives 
us a benchmark as we think about what it is to secure a right to someone.”52  If I act 
in a way that prevents someone from reaching her minimal threshold level for any 
given capability, I thereby violate her human rights.  Capabilities give us an 
operational vocabulary for assessing whether basic human entitlements are met, and 
thus whether human rights, from a moral perspective, are violated. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Johannes Morsink uses this type of argument and connection between capabilities and 
fundamental interests to argue that the Capabilities Approach can provide the ground from the human 
rights identified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see his Inherent Human Rights: 
Philosophical Roots of the Universal Declaration (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2009), 161-185. 
51 Bernard Williams, “The Standard of Living: Interests and Capabilities,” in The Standard of 
Living, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 100; quoted in 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 97-98. 




At this point, it might seem that not only have we done little to help solve the 
scope problem identified with the human rights approaches addressed above, we 
have said nothing about how the Capabilities Approach helps us address 
environmental issues generally and climate change specifically.  Unless we think 
Nussbaum has provided an exhaustive list of central capabilities, something she 
denies as she leaves open the possibility for continued cross-cultural dialogue that 
could alter the list, we have no answer to whether we can fully address the scope of 
rights violated by climate change.  Moreover, only the “Other Species” capability 
seems suited for directly addressing environmental matters and even then, the scope 
of this capability is unclear, given the ambiguity of the phrase “concern for”.  To 
address how the Capabilities Approach can help provide an answer to the problem of 
scope and provide the grounding for a human rights approach to addressing climate 
change, we bring in the work of Breena Holland, who has helpfully shown how the 
Capabilities Approach can be expanded to include an environmental meta-capability.  
This environmental meta-capability makes the direct link between climate change 
and human rights and lessens the scope problem. 
 
6. Bringing in the Environment: Ecological Sustainability as a Meta-Capability 
Holland recognizes the absence of an account of the instrumental value of the 
environment in Nussbaum’s theory and offers an expanded reading of the 
Capabilities Approach emphasizing this fact.  In doing so, Holland treats “certain 
environmental conditions as instrumental to human capabilities in the same way that 




instrumental to human capabilities.”53  More importantly, Holland offers the 
important insight that some environmental conditions are a pre-requisite even for the 
things Nussbaum treats instrumentally, and thus we ought to conceive these 
environmental conditions as their own “meta-capability.” 
Holland begins her argument by noting the role that ecological systems and 
the natural environment play in enabling the capabilities on Nussbaum’s current list.  
Holland observes, regarding the capability of “Bodily Health,” that: 
Being able to have good health and nourishment requires that 
ecological systems function at a level that can sustain the provision of 
soil, water, and atmospheric temperature that enable agricultural 
production and the absorption of human produced waste (pollution).54 
 
This fits with the appeals to health that we saw from Hayward, Nickel, and Caney.  
However, Holland notes that the instrumental value of the environment extends to 
other capabilities that might not be as easily connected to the natural world.  She 
notes regarding the fourth capability, “Senses, Imagination, and Thought,” that 
“components of ecological systems influence the religious, spiritual, and cultural 
aspects of human experience, making it possible for people to use their senses, 
imagination, and thought in ways that make their lives meaningful.”55  Holland 
concludes that this relation holds for all central human capabilities and consequently 
they all require “a natural environment that enables the components of that 
capability.”56  
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From this observation, Holland claims that Nussbaum’s account is unable to 
fully identify what morality demands.  However, integrating the insights of the 
previous paragraph into the Capabilities Approach can solve this.  To do this, 
Holland adds “Sustainable Ecological Capacity” to Nussbaum’s list as a meta-
capability, noting that it enables all other capabilities on the list.  She defines this 
meta-capability in the following manner: 
Having this meta-capability involves being able to live one’s life in 
the context of ecological conditions that can provide environmental 
resources and services that enable the current generation’s range of 
capabilities; to have these conditions now and in the future.57 
 
Holland takes this to be more fundamental than any capability on Nussbaum’s list, 
and notes that protection of this meta-capability will require not only “the protection 
of ecological systems at a level that promises to sustain the conditions of life on 
earth,” but also “the protection of ecological systems at a level that promises to 
sustain the particular resources and maintain the physical context for environmental 
experiences that enable threshold levels of other central human functional 
capabilities.”58 
Before making the link between this meta-capability and human rights, it is 
important to respond to the idea that in making this move, we have not done 
anything to help address the problem of scope present in the other rights approaches.  
While Holland’s work usefully highlights the instrumental value of the environment, 
that value is still something operationalized via specific capabilities, and thus would 
require an exhaustive list of capabilities to fully address the moral claims related to 
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the effects of climate change.  However, this unease is lessened due to the nature of 
“Sustainable Ecological Capacity” as a meta-capability.  Since capabilities are 
understood via threshold levels, then there is a base threshold level for ecological 
capacity, which would be the functioning of natural systems such that they enable 
the conditions of life and the possibility of other capabilities.  This means that all 
local ecosystems must maintain a basic functional state, which points to, at 
minimum, a need to maintain and protect ecosystems that have yet to be harmed and 
restore those that have been harmed.  This will be true regardless of the specific 
capabilities identified. 
Sustainable ecological capacity can skirt the scope problem with respect to 
climate change.  This is clear from Holland’s own discussion of this meta-
capability.59  She notes that due to the interconnected nature of ecological systems 
and the fact that in a world of globalization the material needs of people in one 
country often are met by natural resources from others, it is likely that when people 
in the United States increase their capabilities beyond minimal thresholds, it 
decreases the likelihood for meeting the ecological capacity threshold in a place like 
Bangladesh.  As we (in developed countries) use additional resources beyond what 
capability thresholds require, we create impacts that threaten the capability 
thresholds of those in other countries.  Moreover, since “Sustainable Ecological 
Capacity” is more fundamental than any other capabilities (whatever they might be 
identified to be), it is what must be addressed in the first instance, rather than impacts 
to other capabilities. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Holland notes that this fundamental role of the environment also yields 
maximum allowable levels of capability protection, creating “capability ceilings.”  
She summarizes this with the following: 
The relationship between Nussbaum’s capabilities and the ecological 
meta-capability also suggests that in a world connected by large-scale 
ecological interactions, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach not only 
needs to account for the ecological conditions that enable a minimum 
threshold (or floor) of capability protection required for justice, as 
Nussbaum already argues, but also needs to account for the maximum 
(i.e. ceiling) level of capability protection that a society can justify 
without impacting ecological conditions in ways that undermine the 
capabilities of vulnerable populations in sometimes distant 
locations.60 
 
While this notion of capability ceilings will feature more prominently when 
explicitly discussing the responsibilities that result from a right to sustainable 
ecological capacity, it stresses the central role of ecological capacity and the fact it 
would bear the same relation with any identified capabilities.  Regardless of what 
capabilities we place on the list, due to the nature of environmental systems, we 
would have to support local ecologies that are both functional and sustainable. 
So, what then does this mean for human rights?  As the previous section 
argued, since human capabilities are universal and set out objective conditions 
necessary for individuals to attain outcomes they value, then capabilities count as 
interests sufficient for justifying human rights.  Since sustainable ecological capacity 
is not only a capability, its status as a distinct meta-capability means that it is an 
interest clearly sufficient to generate obligations in others.  Thus, all individuals have 
a human right to sustainable ecological capacity.  We each possess a general 
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Justice: Establishing Capability Ceilings in Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach,” Journal of Human 




environmental right to functioning ecological systems capable of enabling basic 
human capabilities. 
 
7. Responding to the Human Rights Skeptic 
Earlier, I presented three general skeptical arguments against human rights.  
Before concluding this chapter, it is important for me to say a bit more in response to 
those arguments.  The first skeptical argument mentioned was the argument from 
culture, i.e. that we cannot assume superiority of one cultural view over another.  
However, by basing my human rights framework on the Capabilities Approach, I am 
offering an account that yields entitlements to the very basic conditions and 
circumstances that allow any given culture to flourish.  Since the Capabilities 
Approach does not connect moral claims to specific functionings, space is left for 
multiple realizations of each capability.  As previously noted, the environment 
creates the conditions for aspects of culture, which in turn allow for the development 
and use of senses, imagination, and thought (i.e. Nussbaum’s fourth capability).  
More importantly, for the right to sustainable ecological capacity, no entitlements 
exist to conditions beyond the minimal threshold allowing the development of life 
and culture. 
A similar response can be given with respect to the argument from the good 
of diversity.  Recall that this objection holds that the world is better due to diverse 
understandings of life and a lack of universality.  Yet, given the space allowed for 
the multiple realizability of capabilities just noted, diversity can still exist.  




different manifestations of the underlying capabilities.  Additionally, we can say that 
without the functional ecosystems protected by the environmental meta-capability, 
there could be no development of diverse views and ways of life.  Consequently, if 
one takes diversity to be good, in and of itself, then one ought to support a protection 
of those conditions necessary for allowing diversity to manifest itself in the world.  
Thus, the environment holds the same relation to diversity as any other capability 
does to diversity. 
Lastly, there was a worry from the skeptic that any universal value or human 
rights claims fail to fully respect individuals’ freedom—that it is too paternalistic.  It 
should be clear by this point that the entire point of the Capabilities Approach is to 
protect those objective values and conditions that make it possible for individuals to 
choose what they want to do and be.  Sen’s initial focus with the Capability 
Approach was to focus on human freedom, specifically political freedom.  Moreover, 
one cannot be free as an agent without the ecological conditions that make life 
possible.  Just as rights to any capability respect an individual’s freedom to choose 
those functionings they value, a right to a sustainable ecological capacity does not 
cut against individual freedom.  Rather, it supports it by merely providing the 
requisite conditions for an individual to be able to exercise her freedom.  Given the 
Capabilities Approach’s ability to address these issues, the skeptic’s worries are 







8. Concluding Remarks 
The preceding portions of this chapter sought to examine whether one can 
affirm the claim that climate change constitutes a violation of human rights.  In 
presenting two possible approaches present in the literature (Sections 2-4), I noted 
that while helpful they both fall prey to a problem of scope, i.e. they are unable to 
identify all the relevant considerations for human rights claims regarding the impacts 
of climate change.  I proposed an alternative framework (Sections 5 & 6) that is less 
susceptible to this problem by providing a justificatory argument for a right to 
sustainable ecological capacity distinct from other rights, which operates consistently 
regardless of the other interests one might identify.61  This feature provides a more 
complete manner of addressing the ecological aspect of human rights and lessens the 
need to identify all relevant interests.  Additionally, by turning to the Capabilities 
Approach, this framework can draw on a well-developed literature and vocabulary 
for addressing human needs, be they material or otherwise.  While this framework 
might still fail to capture some rights violations, it is less likely to do so than the 
other approaches.  How rights violations relevant to climate change can be identified 
using the account offered here is the focus of the next chapter.  There I will provide 
an affirmative answer the query in the opening section of this chapter—arguing that 
the phenomenon of climate change constitutes a violation of human rights.  In doing 
so, I will address potential worries about how to understand the content of the 
environmental right arising from the environmental meta-capability.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Perhaps one might want to argue that this account is more of a hybrid between the 
environmental right and basic human rights approaches highlighted above.  I take it that regardless of 
which camp my account is placed, it is still able to better capture the interests at stake and is more apt 





Methods for Identifying Rights Violations Due to Climate Change 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the best way to link the environment to 
human rights is through Breena Holland’s extension of the Capabilities Approach.  
This modification adds an environmental meta-capability that in turn provides a clear 
notion of the interests and entitlements grounding the ecological aspects of human 
rights, justifying an “environmental right” to the ecological conditions necessary for 
the fulfillment of the central human capabilities.  At the outset of my discussion, I 
noted that if such an environmental right could be adequately justified, it could be 
straightforwardly used to determine whether the phenomenon of climate change 
might constitute a violation of human rights.  Providing an account of how rights 
violations can be identified under this framework and answering the question just 
posed regarding climate change is the focus of the next two chapters. 
This chapter will present methods that can be employed to identify rights 
violations using the account of human rights I offered in the previous chapter.  On 
my account of human rights, the capabilities themselves do the “heavy lifting.”  As 
such, the opening two sections of this chapter detail how rights violations can be 
identified vis-à-vis capability thresholds.  I begin by presenting a method for 
determining violations of capabilities generally speaking (Section 1), and then move 
into a focused discussion related to violations of an individual’s environmental meta-
capability (Section 2).  The third section offers a brief presentation of relevant 




applying the procedures identified in the first two sections to the issue of climate 
change. 
 
1. Assessing Rights Violations through Capability Thresholds 
Adopting a human rights framework based on the Capabilities Approach 
should make clear that any rights violations would be understood in terms of the 
capabilities themselves.  Though our primary interest is in assessing violations via 
the environmental meta-capability, it is helpful to first examine how violations of 
capability thresholds are generally identified.  We should remember at the outset that 
the Capabilities Approach is focused on the things people can actually do if they so 
choose (i.e. capabilities), not what they actually do (i.e. functionings).1  
Consequently, the Capabilities Approach asks us to consider the following: 
Is the person capable of this, or not?  We ask not only about the 
person’s satisfaction with what she does, but about what she does, and 
what she is in a position to do (what her opportunities and liberties 
are).  And we ask not just about the resources that are sitting around, 
but about how those do or do not go to work, enabling [people] to 
function in a fully human way.2 
 
The emphasis is on whether the conditions on the ground and the institutions in place 
are such that an individual can, if she so chooses, have functionings that meet the 
minimal level demanded by human dignity.  She is entitled to her capability 
thresholds being met, which is the moral claim specified by her human rights. 
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How then can we better understand what this requires?  Consider the 
following concrete example.  In discussing what it means to actually secure a right to 
something, Nussbaum offers an analysis of the particulars one is entitled to by a right 
to participate in the political process.  She notes that in many nations even though 
women have a legal right to participate in the political process, there are other factors 
that prevent them from actually exercising that right (e.g. the very real threat of 
violence if they so act).3  If we analyze this scenario from a purely legal rights 
perspective, it appears those women’s right to participate is not violated.  However, 
if we consider it from a moral rights perspective, and conceptualize rights through 
capabilities as I (and to a certain degree Nussbaum) propose, those women have their 
right to participate in the political process violated.  This is because the focus is on 
moral entitlements and whether people can actually enjoy those entitlements, rather 
than a mere presence of legal or political entitlements.  For those women, there is no 
real opportunity to participate and fulfill their entitlements. 
If the right to political participation could be justified as a human right (in the 
strict moral sense of my analysis), then cases where participation is blocked are 
examples of human rights violations.  As Nussbaum stresses, using capabilities 
makes clear that to secure a right “involves affirmative material and institutional 
support, not simply a failure to impede.”4  Consequently, people are entitled to the 
relevant support—material, institutional, and otherwise—necessary for the capability 
in question.  In the case of political participation of women, this might include not 
only the legal right to participate, but also institutions in society that protect those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





women who exercise their right from violence, as well as basic education that 
provides the abilities necessary for effective participation in political processes. 
While clarifying the general types of things individuals are entitled to, there 
is still a question of how to determine what the relevant support is for any particular 
capability and where the minimal threshold ought to be set.  To address this we have 
to recall that Nussbaum intentionally presents the central human capabilities in an 
abstract manner, noting that different contexts will require different specifics for how 
capabilities are realized.  This multiple realizability of any given capability is central 
to the approach as it accommodates cultural and geographic diversity, while still 
providing grounding for universal moral claims.5  Thus, for any given capability, the 
specific conditions required to meet the minimal threshold will be contingent—to a 
certain degree—on the local context. 
While Nussbaum does not offer specifics related to where threshold levels 
should be set for particular locales, she does offer two helpful comments in thinking 
about setting thresholds.  First, she makes it clear that the threshold for each 
capability must be set “with an eye to the other capabilities.”6  The threshold levels 
for each capability must be coherent with one another.  Second, threshold levels 
should be set based on what is adequate or “enough.”7  Here, Nussbaum points out 
that for some capabilities the demand of adequacy might require equality (e.g. the 
right of political participation under the capability “Control over One’s 
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Environment”).  Other capabilities, particularly those connected with material goods, 
would have thresholds tied to whatever is determined to be “enough” for the 
maintenance of human dignity and coherent with the other capabilities.8  From this, 
and Nussbaum’s general reliance on similar processes elsewhere, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that these thresholds would be determined through a reasoning process 
resulting in a reflective equilibrium.  One simply has to take the relevant knowledge 
of the context being considered and compare this to an idea of adequacy, repeating 
this process until one has reached a threshold that could stand up under scrutiny by 
any reasonable individual.9   
To understand how this process operates, consider Nussbaum’s capability of 
“Bodily Health,” specifically its component of having adequate shelter.  Given that 
the Capabilities Approach, as does any human rights approach, operates by setting 
minimal thresholds, adequacy can be understood as the minimal shelter an individual 
needs to function as a human being.  It is clear from the outset that the definition of 
adequate shelter is contingent on one’s geographic location.  What is adequate in the 
Arctic will be drastically different from what is adequate in the tropics.  In the 
Arctic, adequate shelter will demand a fully enclosed structure, with significant 
insulation and heating, while in the tropics it might demand only a partially enclosed 
structure with mosquito netting.  Beyond geographic contingencies, there might be 
locales in the tropics that for cultural reasons—something protected under the 
capability “Senses, Imagination, and Thought”—do not allow the use of a specific 
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type of building material.  Thus, in that context, adequate shelter would demand a 
partially enclosed structure with mosquito netting that is not made of this forbidden 
material.  In such contexts, if the acceptable building materials were taken away, and 
all that remained was the unacceptable material, then those individuals’ capability of 
“Bodily Health” would fall below the minimal threshold, since the conditions are not 
present to meet the requirement of adequate shelter. 
In the above example it is important to highlight that the approach says 
nothing about the space above adequacy, nor does it detail the specific means for 
fulfilling individuals’ capabilities.  In both the Arctic and the tropics, there is nothing 
stopping individuals from building more substantial shelters, as long as their doing 
so does not prevent others from having access to the relevant minimum.10  Moreover, 
it is possible the mechanisms used to protect capability thresholds could vary across 
locales.  Assume that in the tropics individuals are allowed to hold private property, 
and those who do not have the means to acquire or rent property are provided with 
access to adequate shelter (e.g. monetary aid for rent).  Contrast this with a 
hypothetical situation in the Arctic, where the holding of private property is 
forbidden, yet the government provides all individuals with access to adequate 
shelter in government owned structures.  In both scenarios, we can say that 
individuals’ entitlements are met and thus there are no rights violations, even though 
the mechanisms in place for protecting capabilities are vastly different. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The fact that everyone is required access to the relevant minimums, coupled with the finitude 
of natural resources, yields the notion of “capability ceilings” introduced in the previous chapter.  I 




From the discussion so far, we can identify a general process that can be 
followed to determine if there is a violation of one’s entitlements, and consequently 
rights, for any given capability.  First, identify the relevant cultural and geographic 
context for the individual(s) in question.  Second, determine the standard of 
adequacy for the capability in question, keeping in mind this requires consideration 
of multiple factors, not limited to material and institutional ones.  Adequacy for any 
given context can be estimated using a hypothetical reasoning process based on the 
knowledge and beliefs of individuals in that context.  Whatever any reasonable 
individual would accept as adequate is what each is morally entitled to.  Again, this 
merely establishes a procedure for the standard of adequacy, not the means for 
fulfilling it (e.g. adequate shelter does not in and of itself require individuals to be 
allowed to hold property).  This standard can then be compared to the conditions on 
the ground to determine if the individual(s) in question can in actuality have that 
standard met.  If those conditions do not allow for the standard of adequacy to be 
met, then there is a rights violation. 
Following this practice for many, if not most, of the capabilities on 
Nussbaum’s list would more than likely result in the verdict that most nations fall 
short of fulfilling the entitlements demanded by the Capabilities Approach.  
Consequently, most states (including those in the developed world) fall short of 
fulfilling all of their citizens’ human rights.  In some cases, individuals whose rights 
are being violated might have nominal legal or political rights, but other social 
institutions are structured in ways that negate those individuals’ abilities to actually 




the framework I am proposing, most states are guilty of human rights violations.  For 
example, consider the implementation of policies in many U.S. states requiring 
individuals to present photo identification in order to vote.  While it is clear no one’s 
legal right to vote is taken away, various other factors related to obtaining an 
acceptable form of photo identification (e.g. lack of transport to the locations for 
getting a driver’s license, cost of getting a license made) can be used to argue that 
such requirements effectively take away some individuals’ ability to vote (or at least 
make it unduly cumbersome).11  Thus, such policies actually work against securing 
one’s right to vote, unless individuals are given relevant support for obtaining valid 
forms of photo identification.  Consequently, on my framework, those citizens who 
do not have proper photo identification (and for whom obtaining it would be 
problematic) are having their right to participate in the political process violated.  By 
allowing such policies, the U.S. is guilty of perpetuating human rights violations. 
Adequately addressing the issues for each capability is a project in its own 
right and one I will not engage in here, other than to note that any fully satisfactory 
response to climate change must also consider broader institutional questions 
relevant to other capabilities.  Rather, the focus here is to assess whether the impacts 
of climate change violate human rights, and this can best be done through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For example, a 2005 study by the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Employment and 
Training Institute examined not only who in the state of Wisconsin did not have driver’s licenses (the 
most commonly required form of ID under voter photo ID laws), but also offered some explanations 
for why there are large discrepancies between the percent of whites with driver’s licenses compared to 
minority groups.  See John Pawasarat, The Driver License Status of the Voting Age Population in 
Wisconsin (Milwaukee, WI: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Employment and Training Institute, 
2005); available on-line at <http://www4.uwm.edu/eti/barriers/DriversLicense.pdf> (Accessed 8 
March 2012).  The Institute maintains a webpage documenting various court cases challenging photo 
ID laws that have utilized this research; see <http://www4.uwm.edu/eti/2007/VoterID.htm> 




environmental meta-capability defended in the previous chapter.  As such, we must 
shift our attention to how the general procedure presented in this section for 
identifying capability violations can be applied to the particular case of an 
environmental issue like climate change and violations of individuals’ environmental 
meta-capability. 
 
2. Identifying Violations of the Environmental Meta-Capability 
It seems the procedure outlined in the previous section ought to be applicable 
for identifying violations of the environmental meta-capability.  The unique nature of 
the environmental meta-capability, however, allows for a slightly different method 
for identifying violations.  Recall that the environmental meta-capability is the 
ability “to live one’s life in the context of ecological conditions that can provide the 
environmental resources and services that enable the current generation’s range of 
capabilities.”12  Given the relation that exists between it as a meta-capability and the 
other capabilities, we can construct a method for identifying violations via the other 
general capabilities, which are more easily discussed (and already extensively 
evaluated in existing literature). 
In clarifying the manner in which the environmental meta-capability works, it 
is crucial to stress that it is still something that operates and can be evaluated on an 
individual level.  Though the environment is often viewed as a collective good, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Breena Holland, “Justice and the Environment in Nussbaum’s ‘Capabilities Approach’: Why 
Sustainable Ecological Capacity is a Meta-Capability,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 
324.  I take it that the reference here to “the current generation’s range of capabilities” refers to the 
range of shared capabilities possessed by all individuals of the current generation; it is these 
universally shared capabilities that we are entitled to on my framework and that are captured by 
Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities.  The next paragraph offers a defense of why this meta-




clear from Breena Holland’s analysis that the environmental meta-capability is 
something that must be part of each individual’s capability set, rather than some 
collective capability: 
…the ecological conditions that constitute the capability are a 
component of individual opportunity in the same way that landed 
property and shelter are, respectively, a component of one’s capability 
to have “Control over One’s Environment” and to have “Bodily 
Health.”13 
 
This is essential, since if the environment could not be treated at the individual level 
like other capabilities, then the human rights framework argued for in the previous 
chapter would not be applicable.  Given that it can be, we can address human rights 
violations via the environmental meta-capability. 
How, then, can these violations be identified?  Just as the discussion of the 
previous section did not dictate specific means for protecting capabilities, the 
environmental meta-capability does not set any specific environmental conditions—
the basic conditions for human existence notwithstanding—as the only conditions for 
enabling the capabilities.  Consequently, the environmental meta-capability is not 
violated when the underlying environmental conditions are such that it is possible 
(through some combination of available technology, social structures, and so on) to 
meet the threshold levels of all other capabilities.  The environmental meta-
capability will only be violated when it is impossible, given the available technology 
and social structures, to meet the threshold levels of the other capabilities. 
One way to think about violations of the environmental meta-capability is to 
contrast the following two possible worlds: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




World A.  This is a world in which no matter what institutional structures are 
put in place and regardless of technological advancement, it is impossible for 
the threshold levels of at least some capabilities to be met. 
 
World B.  This is a world in which there are possible institutional structures 
and levels of technological advancement such that the threshold levels for all 
capabilities could be met through the right combination of available 
institutions and technology. 
 
The failure to meet capability thresholds in World A is solely the result of underlying 
environmental conditions, since there is no social structure or technology that could 
transform those environmental conditions into a world where capability thresholds 
are met.  World A is subsequently one in which there is a clear violation of the 
environmental meta-capability.  We can contrast this with World B, where there are 
ways of structuring institutions and using technology to meet capability thresholds.  
Thus, any failures to meet capability thresholds (and thus any corresponding rights 
violations) in World B are not the result of environmental conditions, but are instead 
the result of particular institutional structures or the failure to implement available 
technology, both of which can be changed.  The important difference between World 
A and World B is that the rights violations in the latter are the direct result of a 
failure of the people in that world’s present, whereas the rights violations in the 
former are the direct result of a failure of the people in that world’s past.  The 
individuals in World B still have a chance to adapt, those in World A do not. 
While thinking in terms of two worlds is useful, given the individual focus of 
rights violations and the environmental meta-capability, it is important to maintain a 
similar focus here.  This requires examining the particular ecological contexts in 




problematic, since we can treat Worlds A and B as different geographic locations (or 
ecological contexts).  However, in doing so, we have to recognize the manner in 
which actions in one locale impact environmental conditions in another and vice 
versa.  Actions yielding benefits in context A can yield harms in context B.  Holland 
captures this nicely, remarking that “[m]aximizing food production in croplands and 
grazing lands, for instance, can alter ecological processes in ways that severely 
impact natural services (e.g. water purification) in places distant from the agricultural 
land itself.”14  Due to this fact of ecological interconnectedness, we cannot look 
solely at a single context, identifying violations of any capabilities and then acting to 
address those violations, since doing so might result in a violation of the underlying 
environmental meta-capability elsewhere.  In Holland’s example, this would mean 
that when deciding how to maximize food production a larger analysis must be 
made.  It is not just about the impacts to the croplands, but also the locations that are 
ecologically connected to the croplands.  Failure to look at anything other than the 
maximization of food production in the croplands, can lead to the implementation of 
policies or actions that produce negative environmental impacts in lands outside the 
croplands.  Implementing such policies would be wrong under our framework, since 
doing so would create rights violations. 
Moreover, it would be far worse to protect capabilities in one locale by 
making environmental sacrifices in another, for if the environmental meta-capability 
is violated it is then impossible to achieve threshold levels simultaneously in all 
capabilities.  Consider the following scenario.  The citizens of country A need 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Breena Holland, “Ecology and the Limits of Justice: Establishing Capability Ceilings in 




materials for their houses.  While there are domestic resources available, the citizens 
of Country A decide to cut down the forests in Country B (which happens to be 
under Country A’s power) and ship that timber to Country A.  This timber will then 
be used as the primary building material in Country A.  However, the destruction of 
the forests in Country B will damage the ecology in a way that impacts everything 
from water to food supplies.  Moreover, the inhabitants of Country B treat trees as 
sacred objects, and their removal will no longer allow the performance of their 
rituals.  Country A’s decision to improve its citizens’ capability protections at the 
cost of damaging the environment to the extent they did is particularly problematic 
since it does not just damage a particular capability of the inhabitants of Country B.  
Rather, it damages the possibility of enabling multiple capabilities at the same 
time.15 
This relation leads to an important concept for identifying violations of the 
environmental meta-capability (and its corresponding right).  While Nussbaum’s 
framework operates with minimal thresholds (i.e. levels of capability protection that 
are necessary for a life of human dignity), as we saw in the previous chapter, Holland 
stresses that the finite nature of environmental resources requires maximum 
thresholds for capability protection.16  In discussing the use of an SUV (i.e. a more 
resource intensive vehicle than other available options) as a means of exercising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 A similar analysis holds if Country B were not under Country A’s power, and instead A bought 
the timber from B.  The primary difference in this case, is that Country B commits the rights violation 
by allowing the sale of the timber.  Assuming Country A was aware the transaction would damage the 
environment in Country B in the problematic way highlighted here, it would be wrong of Country A 
to participate in this harmful exploitation. 
16 Holland does note that while Nussbaum does not explicitly argue for mandatory limits on some 





one’s ability to realize her capability to “Bodily Integrity,” Holland offers the 
following reasoning for setting maximal thresholds for capability protection, or 
“capability ceilings”: 
For if some people do have this extent of mobility, then not only will 
their realization of that capability promote competitive tendencies that 
artificially inflate other’s valuation of the capability to drive SUVs, it 
will also divert resources that could otherwise go to protecting 
threshold levels of more fundamental capability protections.  In this 
instance, to fail to establish a ceiling for the bodily integrity capability 
is to treat moving freely from place to place in an SUV as if it were a 
fundamental entitlement for those who can afford it that is equivalent 
to achieving a threshold level of bodily health capability for those 
who cannot afford this threshold level of bodily health capability.17 
 
Thus, when considering the fact of ecological connectedness, capability protections 
in one locale that exceed the requisite capability ceilings constitute a violation of the 
environmental meta-capability for some individuals (either in that same locale or in 
another locale).  This will be important in Chapters 5 and 6 when addressing the 
obligations held by both individuals and collectives in the face of climate change.  
What is key at this juncture is that given the relation between the environmental 
meta-capability and other capabilities, violations of the former are understood 
through the latter. 
At this point, one might protest that we are left with an entirely abstract and 
contingent framework for evaluating violations of fundamental capability thresholds 
and their corresponding rights that cannot usefully be applied to environmental 
matters.  As the discussion above has shown, violations of the environmental meta-
capability are identifiable through the other capabilities, either due to violations of 
other capabilities that can be attributed to environmental conditions (e.g. like the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




case of World B) or capability protections that surpass the requisite capability 
ceilings.  However, identifying either requires a determination of the relevant 
thresholds for each locale, which in turn requires reaching the reflective equilibrium 
noted above.  The nature of the information required for this reasoning process 
would require the consideration of a diverse amount of information about the local 
context ranging from scientific to cultural.  Yet, our general aim here does not 
require as much. 
For our purposes in this chapter, all we need to establish is that regardless of 
where those more contextual deliberations set the thresholds, unabated climate 
change will result in environmental conditions that would clearly yield in a world in 
which the environmental meta-capability is not met.  I do not claim to be able to 
offer any exact cut-off point for violations stemming from climate change (e.g. a 3 oC 
change would not violate the environmental meta-capability, while a 3.1 oC change 
would).  I simply seek to show that, based on most climate models, without 
significant action on the current generation’s part there will be clear cases of 
violations and that understanding the entitlements protected by human rights via 
capabilities gives us a strong framework for working out what morality requires of us 
in the face of climate change. 
That said, I offer the following as a test for whether violations of human 
rights occur due to climate change (see Figure 3.1).  If we were dealing with the 
immediate present, we would simply examine the ecological conditions and ask 
whether those conditions allow the threshold levels of the general capabilities to be 




meta-capability is not being violated.  If the minimal threshold levels are not met, we 
then ask whether they could be met given possibly available institutions and 
technology.18  If we can identify institutional or technological changes in the present 
that would result in individuals’ capability thresholds being met, then any failure to 
meet those levels is not due to a violation of the environmental meta-capability (as in 
the case of World B above).  In this scenario, any rights violations stem not from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I do not use “possibly available” in a sense of strict metaphysical possibility, but rather a looser 
notion of what is reasonably possible or conceivable given the current state of affairs.  To use the 
language of possible worlds, I would take this use to limit discussion to only close possible worlds.  
As such, currently, I do not take the institution of communism to be something that is possibly 
available to the United States.  Moreover, I take this use of what is possibly available to fit the 
approach used by the IPCC in developing the different emissions scenarios discussed in the next 
section. 
Start by gathering the relevant 
information (e.g. environmental, 
technological, social) about the 
context being evaluated. 
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climate change itself, but from humanity’s failure to properly adjust institutions and 
implement relevant technology in response to climate change.  However, if it were 
the case that there are no institutions or technology reasonably available (as in the 
case of World A), then the violation is of the environmental meta-capability and it is 
the direct result of climate change and humanity’s failure to engage in actions in the 
past that would have prevented the current environmental conditions from coming 
into being.  Thus, in a case like World B, there is a failure to make the appropriate 
changes in the present, while cases like World A have a failure in the past that cannot 
be adequately addressed by anything in the present. 
However, we must recognize that we are analyzing a future-oriented problem 
and in doing so are relying on various projections and assumptions about what the 
world will be like.  This must be built into our test.  Consequently, we have to 
operate with models that project future conditions: climatic, environmental, but also 
institutional.  As we will see in the next section, not only are institutional projections 
necessary for making environmental ones, but these are also required for identifying 
whether a projected future rights violation is due to a failure in the past due to lack of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions or due to a failure in the future to 
implement appropriate institutions or adaptive technologies.  Thus, when we apply 
our framework to climate change the notion of what is possibly available in terms of 
institutions and technology will be based on the underlying storylines used to create 
the climatic models. 
For example, treating future conditions as roughly a continuation of the 




sources for energy, little regulation, continued population growth), we can project 
future environmental conditions based on a continuation of our current trajectory and 
assess whether individuals in the future will likely have their capability thresholds 
met.  Since this scenario is based on maintaining current institutional conditions, we 
can consider those institutions reasonably available to us presently, coupled with a 
reasonably expected advancement of technology given the institutional conditions 
(and the incentives for advancement under such institutions).  In examining this 
future, we might find that there will be a relatively low reduction of GHG emissions 
(i.e. mitigation) and if the limit of possibly available adaptive measures were to point 
X, there would be a violation of individuals’ environmental meta-capability.  
Moreover, such a case would point to the need for emission reductions in the present 
to respond to that violation, since that would be the only way to move out of the zone 
in which the environmental meta-capability is violated, assuming X is the maximum 
degree of adaptive measures (see Figure 3.2).  However, if the reasonable 
advancement of adaptive measures were to point Y, there would not be a violation of 
the environmental meta-capability and any violations of human rights would be due 
to failed institutional structures or failures to actually implement technological 
advancements that should be reasonably available.  The difference in these 
evaluations has to do with whether the individuals in the future, when facing rights 
violations, could do otherwise and eliminate those violations.  If they cannot do 
otherwise, it is due to the environmental conditions’ inability to enable the 








Analyzing future scenarios with this framing allows us to identify those 
scenarios that include rights violations, given assumptions about how much 
technological adaptation will be possible.  Moreover, this framework allows us to 
identify between two types of scenarios: those in which the fault lies in the 
environmental conditions and those in which the fault lies in a failure to implement 
appropriate institutions and technology to meet capability thresholds.  Making such a 
distinction allows us to determine whether the fault lies in failures to mitigate climate 
change through the reduction of GHG emissions, or failures to implement 
appropriate institutional or technological changes.  This will prove helpful in Chapter 
5 when addressing the obligations that arise due to the potential harms of climate 
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impacts of climate change to see if any future scenarios show a violation of our 
environmental meta-capability, or even of our general capabilities for that matter. 
 
3. Future Climate Scenarios: Projecting GHG Emissions and their Impacts 
Before turning directly to the possible impacts of climate change, it is 
important to offer a brief explanation of the science behind these impacts and how 
this relates to the framework just offered.  As noted above, we are dealing with a 
future oriented phenomenon; as such, scientific models are necessary to create 
projections of likely climatic conditions in the future that can then be used to 
determine the impact of those conditions on human life and activity.  Generally, 
these models function around projected levels of total CO2 (which, recall, is the 
primary GHG) in the atmosphere at any given point in time. 
However, projecting future levels of CO2 requires making significant 
assumptions about the future.  Drawing from previous work on creating CO2 
projections, Stephen Schneider offers the following formula for calculating future 
emissions, noting it has four components, each based on different assumptions about 
the future: 
 
[CO2 Emissions](t,x) = Population(t,x) x  [GDP/capita](t,x) x 
[Energy/GDP](t,x) x [Carbon/Energy](t,x) 
 
Emissions at a time in the future, t, and the region, x (x could be the 
whole globe, or it could be one place like California), is a product of 
four things (this is true by definition, as it is an identity): 1) 
Population at that time and place; 2) The affluence as measured by 
gross domestic product (GDP), … 3) Energy per unit GDP, a very 




energy it takes to produce a unit of GDP; and 4) Carbon produced per 
unit of energy, the so-called carbon intensity.19 
 
What is important here is that in order to project CO2 emissions (and any GHG 
emissions for that matter) and predict future climate change, we have to make 
assumptions about the extent and type of not only technological advancement, but 
also economic and social policies.  Are we talking about a world that is actively 
interested in developing less carbon-intensive technology?  A world that places 
strong curbs on population growth?  A world less concerned with continual 
economic growth?  We have to bring together all these questions and make 
demographic, economic, technological, and social assumptions about the future in 
order to develop projections for GHG emissions and create climate models.   
Consequently, the IPCC has constructed different sets of scenarios that do 
just that.20  The IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) presents 40 
different scenarios that “represent the range of driving forces and emissions in the 
scenario literature so as to reflect current understanding and knowledge about 
underlying uncertainties.”21  Each scenario is understood to belong to a different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Stephen Schneider, “Climate Change: Do We Know Enough for Policy Action?”, Science and 
Engineering Ethics 12, no. 4 (2006): 614.  Schneider cites this formula as coming from the work of 
Yoichi Kaya.  For an extended discussion of this approach to CO2 projections, see Christopher Yang 
and Stephen Schneider, “Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions Scenarios: Sensitivity to Social and 
Technological Factors in Three Regions,” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 2, 
no. 4 (1997): 373-404, especially 374-379. 
20 Alternative models and approaches to analyzing future climate change have been employed in 
non-IPCC studies, notably a 2008 report on climate projections by the U.S. Climate Change Science 
Program (CCSP), see CCSP, 2008: Climate Projections Based on Emissions Scenarios for Long-
Lived and Short-Lived Radiatively Active Gases and Aerosols, eds. Hiram Levy II and others 
(Washington, D.C.: NOAA National Climatic Data Center, 2008).  However, these results generally 
fall within the same ranges as those found in the IPCC’s most recent assessment report.  For ease and 
consistency, I draw primarily from IPCC data. 
21 IPCC, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: A Special Report of Working Group III of the 




storyline that provides the basic demographic, technological, and social assumptions 
necessary for constructing that storyline’s climate model.  The primary storylines 
used by the IPCC are as follows: 
(A1) “The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very 
rapid economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and 
declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient 
technologies.  Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, 
capacity building, and increased cultural and social interactions, with a 
substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income.  The 
A1 scenario family develops into three groups that describe alternative 
directions of technological change in the energy system.  The three A1 
groups are distinguished by their technological emphasis: fossil intensive 
(A1FI), non-fossil energy sources (A1T), or a balance across all sources 
(A1B).”22 
 
(A2) “The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous 
world.  The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local 
identities.  Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, which 
results in continuously increasing global population.  Economic 
development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic 
growth and technological change are more fragmented and slower than 
in other storylines.”23 
 
(B1) “The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with 
the same global population that peaks in midcentury and declines 
thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid changes in economic 
structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in 
material intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient 
technologies.  The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social, 
and environmental sustainability, including improved equity, but without 
additional climate initiatives.”24 
 
(B2) “The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the 
emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability.  It is a world with continuously increasing global 
population at a rate lower than A2, intermediate levels of economic 
development, and less rapid and more diverse technological change than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3. An on-line version of the report without page 
numbers is available at <http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/emission/index.php?idp=0>.   
22 Ibid., 4. 





in the B1 and A1 storylines.  While the scenario is also oriented toward 
environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on local and 
regional levels.”25 
 
Each of the 40 scenarios examined in the SRES belongs to one of these general 
family types, with the A1 family being generally discussed at the sub-family level 
(see Figure 3.3).  Within each family grouping, some scenarios are created with 
shared assumptions about certain driving forces (those marked HS in Figure 3.3), 
while others seek to explore other uncertainties in driving forces (those marked OS 
in Figure 3.3). 
 




While these scenarios are all used in creating different ranges for possible 
climate outcomes, as well as the likelihood for those outcomes, focus is generally 
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placed on each group’s illustrative scenario.  However, for our purposes we will 
consider the full range of possibilities.  Given the manner in which the scenarios 
were crafted, they present themselves as a reasonable sample of the possible worlds 
we are interested in evaluating using the method highlighted in the preceding section. 
Most discussions of climate change’s impacts are framed in terms of the 
likelihood of a particular impact given a certain change in global temperature, rather 
than in terms of the amounts of atmospheric GHGs (though some discussions are 
framed this way).  Consequently, it is most useful for our purposes to look at the 
various ranges of temperature change projected under the IPCC emission scenarios.  
Figure 3.4, taken from the most recent IPCC assessment report, shows the projected 
ranges of temperature change across the different scenario groups, with the dot 
representing the best estimate within each group. 
From these projections, we see that by the end of the 21st century global 
average temperatures will likely be somewhere between 1.1 oC (the low range of B1 
projections) to 6.4 oC (the high range of A1FI projections) warmer, with the most 
likely change being an increase between 1.8 oC (B1 scenario) and 4.0 oC (A1FI 
scenario).27  One implication of these projections is that sea levels will likely rise 
anywhere from 0.18m to 0.59m, depending on the scenario under consideration.28  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report – Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III 
to the Forth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. Core Writing 
Team, Rajendra Pachauri, and Andy Reisinger (Geneva: IPCC, 2007), 45.  For expanded data see 
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis – Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. Susan Solomon 
and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Chapters 10.5 & 10.6. 
28 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 45.  This change is based on projected average 
sea levels from 2090-2099 relative to the levels from 1980-1999, excluding “future rapid dynamical 
changes in ice flow” due to limitations of current research on the driving forces of sea level rise.  For 




As we will see in the next section, sea level rise is one way individuals’ capability 
sets, including their environmental meta-capability, can be violated. 
 
Figure 3.4. Global Temperature Change across IPCC Scenarios29 
 
 
One last thing needs to be mentioned in relation to climate modeling and 
temperature projections.  This is the issue of climate sensitivity, which is a general 
property of the climate system that translates the extent to which changes in GHG 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Martin Parry, et al., “Technical Summary,” in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability – Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. Martin Parry, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 34, figure TS.4.  The CO2 stabilization levels on the upper portion of the 
figure are taken from the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report (TAR) and are not based on specific 
storylines regarding development, but rather purely on stabilizing levels of atmospheric GHG levels 




levels (and their associated radiative forcing), impact temperatures.30  The higher the 
climate sensitivity, the higher the temperature increases due to GHGs.  This is seen 
in Figure 3.5, coming from Schneider, which shows projections for the A1Fl 
scenario with different climate sensitivities. 
 
Figure 3.5. Role of Climate Sensitivity in Temperature Projections31 
 
 
A comparison of Figures 3.4 and 3.5 casts a concern for our analysis.  Based 
on the IPCC’s data, the A1FI scenario shows a maximum temperature change of 
+6.4 oC, while Schneider’s graph shows the possibility of warming over 12 oC.  This 
is quickly explained by the fact that the IPCC holds that climate sensitivity “is likely 
to be in the range of 2 to 4.5 oC with a best estimate of about 3 oC, and is very 
unlikely to be less than 1.5 oC,” whereas Schneider uses a more expansive range (1.1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The IPCC defines climate sensitivity as “a measure of the climate system response to radiative 
forcing” and “is defined as the equilibrium global average surface warming following a doubling of 
CO2 concentration” (IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 38).  As such, if the level of 
GHGs in the atmosphere were 300 parts per million (ppm) and a move to 600ppm would cause an 
increase in global temperatures of 1.7 oC, then the climate sensitivity would be 1.7 oC 




to 6.8 oC).32  Yet, this points to a problem of uncertainty regarding our ability to 
accurately model future climactic conditions, since we do not know the actual value 
of this property.  I will address the issue of uncertainty in the next chapter, but for 
now it is helpful to point out that the IPCC’s estimate of climate sensitivity is among 
the more conservative employed.  Operating with their measure is thus useful, since 
if we can show there are models resulting in human rights violations on the more 
conservative models, there is more reason to accept the claim that climate change 
violates human rights.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided a method for identifying human rights violations 
under the framework I argued for in Chapter 2.  Sections 1 and 2 provided a clear 
account of how human rights violations can be identified, both generally (Section 1) 
and environmentally (Section 2).  The procedures identified here could be applied to 
any specific matter of interest.  Given our interest in evaluating climate change using 
the methods identified in this chapter, Section 3 gave a brief overview of some of the 
relevant issues of climate modeling and data necessary for engaging in such an 
evaluation.  With the methods for identifying rights violations in hand, along with 
the relevant information related to projecting future climate scenarios, we can shift 
our attention to an examination of whether these scenarios show violations of 
individuals’ human rights and, if so, how. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 38.  Differences between the two can also be 
explained due to the fact that Schneider is drawing from much earlier analysis of climate sensitivity 
and treats the most likely value at 2 oC, while the IPCC places is at 3 oC.  Additionally, Schneider is 





Climate Change as a Violation of Human Rights 
 
 
With the tools in hand to ascertain potential rights violations from the 
previous chapter, Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter proceed to identify instances of 
rights violations resulting from climate change.  Section 1 focuses on the time 
horizon of the current generation (the present to approximately 2100 CE), while the 
Section 2 focuses on future generations (i.e. the time at which the world is populated 
by individuals who never existed in the present, which I estimate as anytime beyond 
2100 CE).  I make this separation to avoid some philosophically contentious issues 
surrounding the rights of future persons during my primary analysis of climate 
change, as well as to show that my framework can result in calls for action even if 
one rejects the rights claims of future persons.  The last substantial section of the 
chapter (Section 3) addresses issues surrounding uncertainty and why a certain 
degree of uncertainty does not lead to discounting and invalidation of the potential 
rights violations identified throughout the chapter. 
 
1. Violations in the Current Generation Horizon 
In this opening my discussion, I want to temporarily set aside philosophically 
contentious issues related to the rights of non-existent future persons.  To do this, I 
split the examination of climate change’s impacts into two different time horizons, 
the Current Generation Horizon (CGH) and the Future Generations Horizon (FGH).  




alive dies, and the latter is the period starting from that moment extending 
indefinitely into the future.  This section will focus on the CGH, while I will take up 
the philosophical issues related to an extension of my framework to the FGH in the 
next section. 
Since climate change is already producing impacts felt now and most studies 
focus from the present to 2100, it is helpful to adopt 2100 as an estimated endpoint 
for the CGH.  Moreover doing so is particularly convenient since, given plausible 
human lifespans, it is likely that most individuals born today will live until just 
around the end of the century.  Thus, this estimated time frame would at all times 
include at least one individual currently alive who would bear the rights identified in 
Chapter 2.  Consequently, other individuals would have a duty not to infringe on 
those rights.  Leaving the specifics of those duties aside until Chapters 5 and 6, we 
can simply use data from emissions scenarios and the procedures offered in the 
previous chapter to identify potential violations of capability entitlements, which 
would establish that climate change constitutes a violation of the current generation’s 
human rights.  Thus, it is not only reasonable, but extremely helpful, to estimate the 
CGH as the present through the end of the century. 
Having isolated the focus for this section, we have two general methods that 
can be used to show that the impacts of climate change constitute a violation of 
human rights.  The first is to point to specific impacts that have been set forth in the 
scientific literature and use the procedures from the previous chapter to show that the 
impact in question violates a specific capability, or the impact, on its own, shows a 




way, the focus will be on specific geographic areas, rather than broader global 
implications.  The second method for highlighting violations is to focus on the 
relation the environmental meta-capability holds to other capabilities and examine 
the vulnerabilities of countries in relation to their adaptive capacities (i.e. a measure 
that shows the probability that purely adaptive measures within a given country can 
prevent harm from climate change).  If a country can be shown to have its adaptive 
capacity outstripped on a given model, then it is reasonable to conclude that the 
environmental meta-capability of its citizens will be violated, as it would be similar 
to the previous chapter’s World A. 
In the discussion that follows, I will move from selected highlights of some 
general impacts of climate change to a more focused examination of a few specific 
locales using the first approach focused on specific impacts and capabilities.  I will 
conclude with a look at adaptive capacities and the second method for identifying 
potential violations.  I should be clear from the outset that I am not seeking to offer 
definitive proof of violations; rather, my goal is to merely show it is reasonable to 
consider climate change a human rights issue and that my framework can be used to 
defend such a claim.  To definitively prove the point would require more space and 
scientific knowledge than I possess and would require the inclusion of local 
stakeholders in assessing capability impacts in particular contexts. 
When examining the impacts of differing scenarios of climate change 
globally, it can be difficult to see whether this framework can offer any definitive 
claim regarding violations of human rights via the capabilities framework.  As Figure 




Figure 4.1. Summary of Key Impacts for Varying Degrees of Warming1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability – Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. Martin Parry, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 16, Figure SPM.2. The numbers in the right sidebar of the figure provide the 
references for where in the full report that issue is discussed.  Thus, the substantial burden on health 




many of the impacts do not directly affect humans (e.g. coral bleaching) and thus do 
not fall under the scope of the framework offered here; or, they show a mix of 
benefits and burdens (e.g. water availability at given latitudes).  However, since we 
are dealing with a framework of human rights, rather than a cost-benefit analysis, 
there is no moral justification for a trade-off that benefits one person at the cost of 
another’s human rights.  Additionally, there are impacts that clearly touch on things 
specifically highlighted by the Capabilities Approach, and thus covered under the 
rights framework being employed.  This includes the potential harms noted under 
both “Food” (e.g. a decrease in all cereal production) and “Health” (e.g. increased 
morbidity) in Figure 4.1, as well as the fact that projected decreases in water 
availability and increased drought in certain areas would clearly threaten individuals’ 
capabilities of “Life” and “Bodily Health.”  We could even begin to imagine how, 
depending on the context, increased drought could decrease river flows to the point it 
infringes on an individual’s ability to pursue recreational activities part of the 
capability of “Play.” 
While this general information provides reason to employ the framework in a 
more detailed examination that would likely uncover particular rights violations, it 
does little to establish violations on its own.  Looking for particular rights violations 
requires a more detailed examination of a particular setting or context, since the 
particulars related to threshold levels are contingent on local factors.  Taking a 
localized focus looking only at negative impacts is unproblematic given our 
framework.  Violations of human rights are not something that can be compensated 




conditions to the point that any violations cease (or will not occur, given the future-
orientation of the analysis).  Thus, if we find evidence of even one violation due to 
climate change, and we can make changes now that would result in that violation not 
occuring and doing so would not cause rights violations in the present (or different 
violations in the future), there is a responsibility for that violation to be remedied, or 
more specifically prevented.  As we will see in Chapter 6, this is a responsibility that 
lies primarily in states. 
The first locale for closer examination is Bangladesh, home to the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna delta system.2  In this area, the more common impacts facing 
individuals include increased vulnerability to storm surges, increased flooding 
(highlighted by the 2004 flood that put nearly 75% of the country underwater), and 
complete loss of land, mostly due to increases in sea levels, a primary consequence 
of climate change.  A 2006 study measuring the impacts of sea-level rise shows that, 
based on the scenarios above, it is likely 3.4 million people will be directly affected 
in the delta alone, with potentially 5.5% of the delta area lost entirely.3  Furthermore, 
as reported by John Houghton, the numbers are even starker using other models and 
considering the country as a whole: “About 10% of the country’s habitable land 
(with about 6 million population) would be lost with half a metre of sea level rise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 While I am focusing specifically on Bangladesh, many similar issues and vulnerabilities apply 
to other low-lying coastal areas and mega-deltas throughout the world, including the Mississippi 
River delta and the Nile River delta. It has been projected that the latter, along with the Ganges-
Brahmaputra and Mekong deltas, will each directly affect more than one million people by 2050.  See 
Robert Nicholls, Poh, Poh Wong, et al., “Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas,” in Climate Change 
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability – Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. Martin Parry, et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 327. 
3 Jason Ericson and others, “Effective Sea-Level Rise and Deltas: Causes of Change and Human 
Dimension Implications,” Global and Planetary Change 50, no. 1 (2006): 78.  This study is cited in 




and about 20% (with about 15 million population) would be lost with a 1-m rise.”4  
Even more conservative estimates for sea-level rise in this portion of the world, place 
it near the half a metre noted by Houghton.5  Consequently, Bangladesh will more 
than likely face significant impacts due to climate change. 
Using these basic assumptions, we can apply the general methods provided in 
the previous chapter to determine whether these impacts show rights violations, and 
if so whether these violations are of Bangladeshis’ environmental meta-capability or 
mere failures to implement the appropriate protections for other capabilities.  The 
first step in this process is to identify which capabilities are harmed by these impacts.  
It is obvious that the potential for increased flooding and loss of land threatens 
multiple capabilities of Bangladeshis.  First and foremost, their basic means of 
subsistence would be under threat.  As Houghton notes, “half the country’s economy 
comes from agriculture and 83% of the nation’s population depends on agriculture 
for its livelihood,” and the likely changes in sea level would destroy much of the 
country’s suitible farmland.6  However, not only would their livelihoods be at risk, 
but their access to adequate shelter and health would decrease in the face of extreme 
flooding and other weather events.  Regardless of where the level of adequacy is set 
through the procedure identified in the previous chapter, it seems unconvtroversial to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 John Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing, 4th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 181-182. 
5 The IPCC notes that due to the geographic variability of sea level rise in Asia, it is difficult to 
project the rise for a specific coastal area.  However, they note that “[e]ven under the most 
conservative scenario, sea level will be about 40cm higher than today by the end of 21st century” [Rex 
Victor Cruz and others, “Asia,” in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability – 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, eds. Martin Parry and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 484]. 




claim that without some type of adaptive response, these impacts would constitute a 
violations of Bangladeshies’ human rights. 
However, it is more difficult to say whether this violation would be merely a 
failure of those in the future to implement reasonably available adaptive measures 
(e.g. new technologies or institutional structures) or a failure of those in the past for 
engaging in actions leading to environmental conditions that do not allow for any 
measure of reasonable adaptation to enable the capabilities (i.e. a violation of 
Bangladeshis’ environmental meta-capability in the future).  Part of this 
determination depends on whether the threats to Bangladeshis’ health and safety can 
be prevented through the introduction of new building methods, additional sea walls, 
or other technologies that would diminish the impact of increased storm surges and 
flooding.  For the moment, assume this is the case and we are dealing with only a 
0.5m rise in sea level.  If the impacts of this rise in sea level can be addressed via 
adaptive measures (e.g. new sea walls), then any failures to fulfill Bangladeshis’ 
capabilities of “Life” and “Bodily Health” would be not the result of the sea level 
rise.  Instead, any violation of an individuals’ capabilty thresholds would be due to a 
failure to put the appropriate adaptive measures in place.  Here, the harm is not the 
sea level rise itself, but rather the failure in the future to utilize reasonably available 
measures to counteract the sea level rise. 
However, under the assumptions of the scenarios being evaluated it is likely 
that the Bangladeshis, on their own, will not be able to implement helpful adaptive 
measures and the rise in sea level will result in 10% of land that was previously 




environmental refugees requiring relocation.  While relocation (as an adaptive 
measure) might prevent violations of those Bengladeshies’ capabilities of “Life” and 
“Bodily Health,” it runs into a problem highlighted by Holland.  Relocation 
potentially violates their capability of “Emotions,” requiring them to “sever 
attachments to things and people outside themselves, such as the physical geography 
that makes a place meaningful and the familiar relationships to others that routinely 
make a place or a home familiar and safe.”7  Since forced relocation of individuals is 
a violation of their human rights under our framework, this would serve as a case 
where adaptive measures (e.g. relocation) cannot prevent all violations of the 
capability thresholds.  Thus, the violation is of the environmental meta-capabiltiy, 
since the environmental conditions would fail to enable all the individuals’ 
capabilities in those areas of the delta rendered uninhabitable.  This is an important 
distinction, since it places the failure in the past and points to a need to prevent 
bringing those environmental conditions into being.  As such, the only way to avoid 
the rights violation is to engage in mitigation efforts in the present avoiding the 
scenarios evaluated here. 
This point can be made with more clarity and thrust when we consider the 
case of low-lying island states, particularly atoll states in the Pacific.  As just 
discussed, determining whether violations are of an individual’s environmental meta-
capability or just her general capabilities turns on adaptive capacity.  However, atoll 
islands highlight the fact that we are more than likely dealing with violations of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Holland, “Justice and the Environment in Nussbaum’s ‘Capabilities Approach’: Why 





environmental meta-capability.  Discussing the limits of adaptation, Jon Barnett 
notes the following problem: 
For example, if recent estimates of a 140 cm rise in sea-level rise 
(Rahmstorf, 2007) and annual coral bleaching (Donner et al., 2005) 
are correct, then there is little that can be done to avoid or adapt to 
losses of land on low-lying atoll islands.  The result may be increases 
in morbidity and mortality, and increased demand for migration, with 
a worst case outcome being the collapse of the ability of island 
ecosystems to sustain human habitation and subsequent risks to the 
sovereignty of the world’s five atoll-island states (Barnett and Adger, 
2003).8 
 
Additionally, Barnett notes that in these cases “migration cannot be seen as an 
‘adaptation’ but rather as a loss – of culture, livelihood, place and the right to a 
home.”9  This affirms Holland’s point above that forced relocation is itself a 
violation; it is a loss of some basic rights.  Faced with data pointing to scenarios like 
this, it is reasonable to conclude that on most projections climate change results in a 
violation of individuals’ environmental meta-capability.  Regardless of any 
reasonably available adaptive measures taken in the future, it will still not be 
possible given the environmental conditions to fulfill all individuals’ capability 
thresholds.  Thus, it would seem that if the only way to prevent these future rights 
violations were through a reduction of GHG emissions in the present, and making 
such reductions would not result in any rights violations in the present, then it would 
seem morality would demand that such actions be taken in the present.  I will say 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jon Barnett, “Climate Change Science and Policy, as if People Mattered,” in Climate Change, 
Ethics, and Human Security, eds. Karen O’Brien, Asuncion Lera St. Clair, and Berit Kristoffersen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 50.  Barnett cites the following sources, in order of 
appearance:  Stefan Rahmstorf, “A Semi-Empirical Approach to Projecting Future Sea-Level Rise,” 
Science 315, no. 5810 (2007): 368-70; Simon Donner and others, “Global Assessment of Coral 
Bleaching and Required Rates of Adaptation under Climate Change,” Global Change Biology 64, no. 
1-2 (2005): 11-25; and Jon Barnett and Neil Adger, “Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries,” Climatic 
Change 61, no. 3 (2003): 321-337. 




more about what obligations this creates and who bears them in Chapter 6, but for 
now we can operate with the general claim that some future scenarios will result in 
future environmental conditions that violate individuals’ environmental meta-
capability and we are obligated to avoid bringing those scenarios into being. 
By focusing on the role adaptive measures play in identifying whether the 
environmental meta-capability is violated in a particular scenario, a second method 
for identifying violations of the environmental meta-capability can be offered.  In the 
previous chapter, I used the examples of Worlds A and B as a means to identify 
whether violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability occur.  World A 
was the world in which no reasonably available institutions or technology would be 
able to address any violations of capability thresholds, while World B was one in 
which the needed institutions or technology were reasonably available.  
Consequently, in World B there are measures available to prevent any rights 
violations, whereas in World A there are no such available measures.  Consequently, 
World A is a world in which individuals’ environmental meta-capability is violated.  
Moreover, we can say that World A is a world that has outstripped its adaptive 
capacity—a term referring to any given locale’s ability to respond to climatic 
changes without suffering significant negative impacts.10  Thus, the more limited a 
country’s adaptive capacity, the higher the likelihood climate change will result in 
violations of its citizens’ environmental meta-capability.  Under any particular 
scenario, if a country shows a significant chance of having its adaptive capacity 
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outstripped, then we can treat that as an indicator of environmental meta-capability 
violations.  Examining countries’ chances of having their adaptive capacity 
outstripped, we can integrate recent studies on adaptive capacity and vulnerability 
(i.e. the chance of having adaptive capacity outstripped) into our framework.         
While there are numerous indices determining countries’ adaptive capacity 
and climate vulnerability, recent work by Gary Yohe and his collaborators offers an 
extremely helpful analysis using Antoinette Brenkert and Elizabeth Malone’s 
Vulnerability-Resilience Model (VRIM).11  Yohe et al. note that the VRIM uses 
multiple measures for both countries’ sensitivity to environmental stresses and their 
adaptive capacity, which then produce its vulnerability index.12  Coupling these 
vulnerability indices for countries with possible temperature changes based on the 
IPCC’s A2 and B2 scenarios, Yohe et al. “offer mapping portraits of relative 
vulnerability to climate change.”13  Additionally, these portraits are made using two 
different climate sensitivities (1.5 oC and 5.5 oC), representing the lower and upper 
bounds of estimates at that time.  These scenarios and climate sensitivities were 
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Change, 2.   In addition to the A2 and B2 scenarios, their assessment also includes modified A2 and 




chosen, as they are “not-implausible” and offer “glimpses of exposure to relatively 
modest and potentially severe climate change.”14 
 
Figure 4.2. Global Vulnerability for Varying Degrees of Warming in 205015 
 
 
Yohe et al.’s work shows that while developing countries are at significant 
risk from climate change, the developed world is not immune either.  When looking 
to mid-century, their models show that with a climate sensitivity of 1.5 oC both the 
A2 and B2 scenarios show little to no vulnerability throughout most of the world, 
though parts of Western Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Asia show modest 
vulnerability (Figure 4.2 left-side), pointing to the unlikelihood of environmental 
meta-capability violations.  Yet, if climate sensitivity is on the higher end (Figure 4.2 
right-side), then most of the world faces at least modest vulnerability, with much of 
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Africa and Asia facing moderate vulnerability.  If we extend projections to the end of 
the century, Figure 4.3 shows that on the low end of climate sensitivity with the A2 
scenario, some countries will face extreme vulnerability (showing a high likelihood 
of environmental meta-capability violations) with most facing at least modest 
vulnerability.  Worse, the high end of climate sensitivity shows that on either the A2 
or the B2 scenario most of the world would be facing extreme vulnerability by 2100.  
Thus, under these scenarios, there would be significant violations of individuals’ 
environmental meta-capability, and states would be under an obligation to not allow 
such scenarios to come into being. 
 
Figure 4.3. Global Vulnerability for Varying Degrees of Warming in 210016 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




These models are particularly useful for our purposes since to advance the 
claim that climate change violates human rights, we only need to show that there is 
at least one locale in a given scenario that has its adaptive capacity outstripped.  If 
this were the case, to allow such a scenario to come into being would constitute a 
violation of that locale’s individuals’ environmental meta-capability and 
consequently their human rights.  Yet, not only does Yohe et al.’s data show that 
there are contexts under this type of threat even on conservative projections, it shows 
that the developed world is under threat, which under our framework would mean 
widespread human rights violations.  Yohe et al. offer the following summarizing 
this point: 
Our results have shown that some developing countries are projected 
to experience impacts of climate change that stress their capacities to 
adapt before 2050 even at low climate sensitivity; at high climate 
sensitivity, some of these countries may be overwhelmed, and even 
developed countries will become increasingly vulnerable.  With high 
climate sensitivity, by 2100 much of the world may need not only 
high adaptive capacity but also significant emissions mitigation to 
have been implemented in order to avoid high levels of 
vulnerability.17 
 
A similar conclusion, regarding the immediate need for mitigation now, is echoed by 
Michael Mann, who highlights that “‘[b]usiness as usual’ climate-change projections 
for 2100 indicate that the adaptive capacities of even the developed world are likely 
to be exceeded.”18  Consequently, it seems that without some level of action now, 
climate change will cause violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability, 
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as seen through examinations of both individual impacts and the likelihood of 
adaptive capacity being outstripped. 
 
2. Violations in the Future Generations Horizon 
The previous section offered evidence showing it is reasonable to conclude 
that climate change will violate individuals’ environmental meta-capability over the 
course of the current generation’s lifetimes.  Focusing only on the CGH, I capped the 
time frame under consideration at the year 2100 and avoided contentious 
philosophical claims regarding the rights of currently non-existent people.  However, 
if the projected impacts of the previous section hold true, significant negative 
impacts due to climate change will likely continue well beyond 2100 (though they 
might start to lessen due to GHG stabilization efforts or additional technological 
advances).  In this section, I assume such impacts and rights violations will continue, 
to some degree, beyond the end of the century and focus solely on the philosophical 
issues surrounding future persons and rights.  It is essential to address this matter, 
since if my framework can only speak through 2100, it might present different moral 
obligations and recommend alternative policy choices than if it speaks beyond 2100. 
To fully address the issues surrounding rights and future generations is far 
beyond the scope of this study, and I do not seek to offer any original contribution to 
the debate at large.  Rather, for my purposes, I simply highlight some common 
objections to claims that currently non-existent persons bear rights and the responses 
offered in support of the rights of future persons.  Generally, I find the arguments, 




persons possessing some rights compelling.19  As such, my primary goal in this 
chapter is to highlight why it is reasonable to think that future people have rights, 
rather than offer a full-fledged defense of such a claim. 
Though there are many ways one might object to future persons bearing 
rights, these protestations are generally based on the premise that there is an essential 
difference between human beings currently living and those that will eventually 
come into existence in the distant (or not too distant) future.  Partridge identifies four 
general foci that distinguish objections: indeterminacy, non-actuality, incapacity, and 
temporal remoteness.20  While these issues can be interrelated (e.g. future 
generations’ incapacity might be related to their indeterminacy), most objections 
highlight a single focus as the morally relevant fact for rejecting the rights of future 
generations.  Consequently, I will address each in turn, showing why one ought to 
reject it as a morally relevant factor assuming one accepts the interest-based account 
of human rights I offered in Chapter 2. 
The most typical presentation of an indeterminacy objection is the Non-
Identity Problem, commonly attributed to Derek Parfit.21  Parfit’s work on this issue, 
however, is actually a response to Thomas Schwartz’s earlier argument that the 
indeterminacy of future persons severs all moral ties between current and future 
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William Blackstone (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974), 43-68; all references are to the 
reprint in Feinberg’s own book]; and Ernest Partridge, “On the Rights of Future Generations,” in 
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generations.22  Schwartz’s argument rests on the claim that any change in policies or 
way of life in the present will cause the future to be populated by an entirely 
different set of individuals than if the status quo had been maintained.  This is based 
on the claim that even the slightest change in conditions at conception will result in a 
different genetic individual being brought into existence.  Any children this “new” 
genetic individual has will be different genetically speaking than if the status quo had 
been maintained, and the same would follow for any grandchildren of the “new” 
genetic individual.  Moreover, any change in policies or way of life is likely to start a 
change like this for multiple individuals.  Consequently, over time, any changes in 
policies or way of life results in an entirely different genetic future than had things 
been otherwise.  Using the example of a debate between two population policies, a 
“laissez-faire policy” and a “restrictive policy,” Schwartz summarizes the matter as 
follows: 
Suppose the laissez-faire policy has been adopted.  Consider those of 
our distant descendants whose lives will have been significantly 
affected thereby.  Let X be any one of them.  Then it is quite certain 
that X would not have existed under the restrictive policy and hence 
will not lack any benefit he would have enjoyed under the restrictive 
policy.23 
 
Thus, for Schwartz you can neither harm nor benefit particular future individuals, 
and this fact absolves us of any moral obligations towards future persons.  Moral 
obligation relies on the ability to identify harms and/or benefits to particular persons. 
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There are two general rebuttals to Schwartz’s argument: reject his conclusion 
that one cannot harm (or benefit) future persons, or accept the claim that one cannot 
harm or benefit particular future persons and show how this does not sever moral 
ties between current and future generations.  Alan Carter takes the first route, arguing 
that Schwartz’s argument fails because he treats presently existing individuals as a 
collective entity, whereas he should have treated them as individuals.24  Considering 
environmental issues, Carter notes the following: 
Certainly, a person would be unable to harm any future person if 
every future person’s existence was dependent upon every one of his 
or her otherwise harmful actions.  But it is absurd to think that anyone 
has the power through every one of his or her environmentally 
destructive activities to determine the coming into existence of every 
future person.  Moreover, a person would only be unable to harm 
future persons if, for every otherwise harmful action which he or she 
might perform, the existence of every person who would otherwise 
have been harmed by the action in question was dependent upon that 
particular action.25 
 
Consequently, we could take Carter’s argument to show that my individual acts of 
polluting can harm particular future persons and thus can be seen to violate their 
environmental meta-capability (insofar as that is how we understand the harm of 
polluting).  This in and of itself is most likely unsatisfactory for a skeptic about 
future generations’ rights.26  However, at this point, it becomes clear the opponent is 
no longer focused on grounds of indeterminacy, but on some other consideration for 
why future persons do not have rights that bear on the present.  Just because we can 
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harm particular future persons does not mean they have human rights that create 
duties for the current generation.   
The second route for addressing objections relating to indeterminacy is more 
straightforward than the first.  Given our focus on human rights, our concern is with 
rights stemming from universally shared human interests.27  All individuals by virtue 
of their being human possess these interests (to the extent they serve to ground 
human rights).  Moreover, as Feinberg notes, these interests are ones we can clearly 
identify and “affect, for better or worse, right now.”28  The rights of future 
generations do not require knowledge of the particular individuals’ identities, but 
rather only that they are human.  Feinberg offers the following analogy to drive the 
point home: 
We can tell, sometimes, that shadowy forms in the spatial distance 
belong to human beings, though we know not who or how many they 
are; and this imposes a duty on us not to throw bombs, for example, in 
their direction.  In like manner, the vagueness of the human future 
does not weaken its claim on us in light of the nearly certain 
knowledge that it will, after all, be human.29 
 
Since future generations will possess the same general interests in having their 
capabilities protected irrespective of their particular identities and this in turn 
requires the fulfillment of their environmental meta-capability, then regardless of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 While Chapter 2 highlighted the work of Joseph Raz in presenting an interest-based account of 
human rights, Feinberg shares a similar understanding of the nature of rights. 
28 Feinberg, “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations,” 181; cf. Annette Baier, “For the 
Sake of Future Generations,” in Reflections on How We Live (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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who they each turn out to be they have a fundamental interest in their environmental 
meta-capability being met.  Consequently, we can coherently say that those unknown 
persons have a right to their environmental meta-capability being met, just as 
Feinberg’s shadowy forms have a right to not be harmed by bombs thrown in their 
direction. 
It is clear, on this analysis, that indeterminacy cannot be a morally relevant 
factor.  An individual possesses human rights “not because who he [or she] is (as an 
identifiable person), or when he [or she] is, but for what he [or she] is.”30  All that is 
relevant from this perspective is that the individual is a human being.  Thus, if you 
accept the rights of current generations by virtue of their being human, you must also 
accept the rights of future generations for the same reason.  However, it is possible 
that conceding this does not require one to hold that these rights create duties in the 
present.  While indeterminacy focuses more on the coherence of future rights and 
their possibility, the remaining foci of objections turn to reasons why these rights do 
not create moral claims in the present.  
Two of the remaining three reasons identified by Partridge for rejecting the 
claims of future generations’ rights are much more easily dealt with than the third.  
These are the issues of temporal remoteness and incapacity.  Temporal remoteness 
objections are based on the assertion that time creates a disconnect between the 
present and the distant future that negates moral responsibility.  While in some cases 
the gap caused by time can outstrip a given generation’s ability to reasonably foresee 
harmful impacts of its actions on future generations, it is not the time between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




two generations that negates responsibility.  If it is true that A is morally responsible 
for some harm to B in the present due to the fact that A ought to have reasonably 
foreseen the harm, then it should also be true even if A and B are separated by 
hundreds of years.  It is the horizon of reasonable foresight that matters (along with 
an ability to act as necessary to avoid the harm, since ought implies can).  As 
Partridge concludes, “foresight, capacity, and choice, not time (however long) are the 
morally relevant factors here.”31  Thus, there might be reasons that the rights of 
future generations do not create duties requiring action by current generations due to 
the current generations’ lack of knowledge or technology.  In such cases, however, it 
is the lack of knowledge or technology that has to be the relevant consideration, not 
time itself. 
Applying this to the issue of climate change and future generations’ right to 
their respective environmental meta-capability, an objection grounded in the proper 
criteria of foresight, capacity, and choice would fail.  As the scientific data and 
projections offered to this point have made clear, foresight is present.  Additionally, I 
would propose that we have the capacity to make the necessary changes.  We simply 
fail to choose to implement that capacity, even though the choice is present.  Thus, at 
least in the case of climate change and future generations’ rights stemming from their 
environmental meta-capability, we cannot object on these grounds. 
Objections based on incapacity can be addressed with similar ease.  This type 
of argument hinges on the fact that future generations cannot claim their rights in the 
present.  Since future generations are incapable of making claims in the present, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




those in the present cannot incur any duties related to future generations’ rights.  
Partridge points out that the most powerful response to this argument “is that 
individuals incapable of claiming their rights may have these rights defended by 
others acting in their behalf.”32  This is something we clearly see when dealing with 
legal rights (e.g. when someone signs a Power of Attorney giving another individual 
authority to act on their behalf).  Following this line of response in our particular 
examination, the incapacity objection fails as long as there is a spokesperson for 
future generations’ environmental meta-capability.  Even the most cursory glance at 
the world today shows that this is clearly true.  Numerous scientists, activists, and 
politicians act as advocates on behalf of posterity. 
Feinberg gives us an even more compelling reason for rejecting this type of 
argument against future rights.  He argues that when dealing with moral rights the 
recognition of claims is called for “by moral principles, or the principles of an 
enlightened conscience.”33  Thus, the principles themselves serve metaphorically as 
advocates.  Again, this is true for both current and future generations.  The fact that I 
can speak up on my own behalf is irrelevant on a moral analysis, given the 
framework offered.  Moral rights exist and can create obligations regardless of 
explicit recognition of them by individuals.  Consequently, the incapacity argument 
against future individuals’ right to their environmental meta-capability fails. 
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The remaining objection based on the non-actuality of future generations’ 
rights appears the most forceful.  Arguments of this type might run something like 
the following: 
1. While future generations can possess rights, these rights are contingent on 
there being future human beings. 
2. Since these rights are contingent on there being future human beings, these 
rights do not actually exist until future generations come to exist. 
3. A right cannot create a duty unless it exists in actuality (i.e. is non-
contingent). 
4. Future generations do not exist in the present, and thus their rights do not 
exist in actuality in the present. 
5. Thus, future generations rights cannot create duties in the present. 
 
Examining the argument, it is clear the first premise is true.  If it were known that the 
current generation of human beings would be the last generation (for whatever 
reason), it is obvious there would be no rights of future generations that could 
generate any duties whatsoever since there would be no interests of future humans 
(even general ones) to generate rights.34  Premise 2 seems to be reasonable when 
considering cases in which there are no future generations, and premise 4 is an 
empirical fact coupled with the implications of premises 1 and 2.  As such, it seems 
that if non-actuality is to be rejected as a morally relevant factor, premise 3 will have 
to be the target. 
At first glance, however, premise 3 seems plausible.  If the rights claim does 
not actually exist in the present and can turn out to never come into existence (i.e. 
cases in which there are no future generations for whatever reasons), then one might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Feinberg, “On the Rights of Future Generations,” 182.  This assumes that there is no right 
to be born or brought into existence.  For a more detailed discussion of why there is no such right 
under an interest-based account see Joel Feinberg, “Is There a Right to Be Born?” in Rights, Justice, 





question how it can generate duties in the present.  Yet, once we consider the 
preceding discussion of this section, particularly the responses to the problems of 
temporal remoteness and incapacity, this premise seems less plausible as a moral 
principle.  Taking seriously the facts of the matter related to climate change, namely 
that we can harm future individuals by our actions and we have reasonable foresight, 
capacity, and choice, it is not clear why this is any different from presently existing 
rights. 
Consider the case of a typical rights claim.  If A has a right to X, we would 
say that B has a corresponding duty to A (be it positive or negative) only if B is in a 
position to actually fulfill the duty to A should B choose to do so.  As such, B’s 
capacity and choice are factors in A’s rights claim creating a duty in B.  Moreover, 
certain epistemic conditions are also relevant in determining whether A’s rights 
claim creates a duty in B that B can be held morally responsible for.  If B had the 
requisite capacity and choice to create the duty, yet was in an epistemic position such 
that she could not have been aware of her duty (or at least of the harm she would 
cause to A), then B could not be considered responsible for not fulfilling her duty to 
A.  Thus, in the case of a typical rights claim the morally relevant factors are once 
again an individual’s reasonable foresight, capacity, and choice. 
If this analysis is correct, then time is irrelevant.  As long as current 
generations possess (or, more accurately, ought to possess) reasonable foresight 
about their actions and they have the capacity and choice to act appropriately in light 
of that, then the morally relevant factors are present.  Just because some other series 




never coming into existence (and thus their rights never coming into actuality), this 
should not alter the current generation’s duties based on their reasonable assumption 
that there will be future generations of humans.  If it is reasonable for current 
generations to expect (or desire) future generations to come into existence, then they 
ought to act on those duties created by future generations’ rights.  
From the discussion of each focus, it is clear they are closely related and 
responding to one often responds to (or at least raises problems for) another.  While 
each objection has been addressed theoretically, many might remain skeptical when 
moving to application.  Kerri Woods offers this type of worry in her new book on 
environmental sustainability and human rights: 
If I face a trade-off between the concrete rights of actually existing 
persons, and the contingent rights of non-existing persons, it is clear 
which rights should take priority.  To imagine that I need not face 
such a trade-off is to imagine that the problems of global poverty will 
spontaneously resolve themselves without assistance from 
environmentally burdensome economic development.35 
 
Woods objects to the rights of future generations here because their recognition 
would result in a tragic conflict of rights, which according to her has a clear victor 
(i.e. the rights of the present).  While it seems reasonable to say that in cases of 
conflicting rights actually existing rights would trump contingent rights, it is not 
clear why this itself would be a reason to reject future rights and duties on current 
generations.  Moreover, Woods assumes that to address the rights of current 
generations would require violating the rights of future generations (at least in an 
environmental sense).  This does not have to be the case.  While we often associate 
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environmentally destructive behavior with economic development, the two do not 
have to be linked.  There might be a course of action and way of addressing global 
poverty that can still protect future generations’ environmental meta-capability. 
Consequently, we need a framework to identify rights violations and how to 
appropriately respond in order to know if we are facing a tragic choice between 
respecting the rights of some while violating the rights of others.  Moreover, the 
existence of a tragic scenario in which a human rights violation will occur regardless 
of one’s action is not an argument against the existence of either of the rights 
involved.  In fact, to refer to such a scenario as “tragic” is to recognize the moral 
force of both rights claims.  A human rights framework does not have to claim there 
can never be tragic scenarios in which one is forced to choose between rights, nor 
does it offer moral guidance for those scenarios.  As such, it is reasonable to apply 
the framework being offered here in examining the impacts of climate change on 
both current and future generations. 
 
3. Uncertainty and Discounting 
Even if one does not take the extreme position of rejecting the rights of future 
generations, one might read Woods’ objection as showing that in granting future 
generations rights, those rights do not bear as much moral significance as the rights 
of currently existing individuals.36  To claim this is to hold that there are morally 
relevant reasons for engaging in discounting.  When engaging in this practice, one 
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employs a social discount rate to determine the weight of future persons’ interests on 
the present.  Simon Caney explains this practice and the social discount rate in the 
following manner: 
[The social discount rate] refers to the rate by which the claims of 
future generations to resources currently held by current generations 
diminishes or increases or remains constant over time.  A social 
discount rate, thus, determines the extent to which resources should 
be devoted to people’s interests now in preference to people’s 
interests at a later date.  The higher the positive social discount rate 
the less should be spent on the future. 
 
If you think current persons deserve more moral consideration than future persons 
do, then you employ a positive discount rate, whereas if you think future persons 
deserve equal moral consideration then you employ a zero discount rate (i.e. you do 
not engage in discounting). 
Proponents of discounting generally point to various issues of uncertainty 
regarding future conditions as reason for adopting their position.  As we saw in the 
previous chapter, there is obvious uncertainty regarding the future impacts of global 
climate change.  The models used to determine future emissions are based on 
guesses of what the world might be like economically, socially, and technologically; 
estimates of the extent to which GHG emissions will impact temperatures are based 
on a range of possible values of climate sensitivity, the actual value of which is 
currently unknown.  Most analyses of climate change offer spectra of possible 
impacts across ranges of “likely” emission levels and temperature changes.  As the 
IPCC’s most recent assessment report notes, the ranges it offers for projections such 
as temperature changes “indicate 90% uncertainty intervals (i.e. there is an estimated 




5% likelihood that the value could be below that range).”37  Since we do not know 
for certain what will happen, it seems sensible to discount, though perhaps only at a 
very low rate. 
Yet, even in the face of uncertainty surrounding analyses of climate change, 
there is motive to reject calls for discounting.  Here, I follow Simon Caney who has 
convincingly argued that when framing the issue in terms of fundamental human 
rights there are no morally relevant reasons for discounting.38  Caney argues that 
while other interests or values might be subject to discounting, those that ground 
fundamental human rights cannot be.  As I find Caney’s arguments compelling, and 
since he employs an interest-based account of rights similar to my own, my focus in 
the remaining portion of this section is to briefly highlight why one ought not 
discount future generations’ human rights. 
Caney highlights four components of discounting that are often appealed to 
as morally relevant factors: (1) pure time preference, (2) distributive principles of 
intergenerational justice, (3) risk, and (4) uncertainty.  The first relies on the idea that 
time itself is a morally relevant factor.  However, we have already seen in the 
preceding section that this is not the case.  The interests grounding human rights, 
particularly individuals’ environmental meta-capability, are independent of particular 
individuals’ temporal location.  As Caney notes, “being born earlier in time is just 
not the right kind of property to justify favoritism.”39  Distributive principles cannot 
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38 See particularly Simony Caney, “Human Rights, Climate Change, and Discounting,” 
Environmental Politics 17, no. 4 (2008): 536-555, and Caney, “Climate Change and the Future,” 163-
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be relevant for a rights based approach, since human rights are not something that 
can be compensated purely with resources (i.e. money).40  Moreover, if the 
environmental conditions were such that future generations’ environmental meta-
capability is not met, then it would be impossible for all of their human rights to be 
fulfilled, particularly if the environmental damage were irreversible (as many say is 
the case with climate change). 
With these two factors out of the way, we are left with the problem of general 
uncertainty highlighted just above.  Here, I say general uncertainty since Caney 
breaks this into the two remaining factors: risk and uncertainty.  The former “refers 
to cases where one identifies an outcome and can determine the probability that it 
will occur,” while the latter “refers to cases where one identifies an outcome but is 
not able to determine the probability of its coming to pass.”41  In both cases, it is our 
lack of a guarantee (i.e. 100% probability) about future events that serves as a reason 
to discount.  If we do not know for certain that future persons’ rights will be violated, 
then it seems fair to treat those rights with less significance than those of currently 
existing persons whose situation we can identify with certainty. 
Caney responds to this by presenting four considerations applying to a rights-
based approach to climate change that taken in conjunction offer compelling reasons 
for rejecting risk and uncertainty as morally relevant, thereby rejecting any call for 
discounting.  They are as follows: 
(R1) The changes to the climate involve both (a) a high probability of 
severe threats to large numbers of persons’ fundamental human rights 
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and (b) a possibility of even more catastrophic threats to fundamental 
human rights.42 
 
(R2) Affluent members of the world can abstain from emitting high 
levels of greenhouse gases, and thereby exposing others to risk, 
without violation of their own human rights.43 
 
(R3) The risks of dangerous climate change will fall 
disproportionately on those whose human rights are already 
violated.44 
 
(R4) The benefits that arise when the affluent of the world emit high 
levels of greenhouse gases fall almost entirely to them, and not to 
those most at risk from climate change.45 
 
My discussion in the previous chapter shows R1 and R3 to be true, given that, as 
Caney highlights, most of the dangerous impacts of global climate change have a 
66% or higher likelihood of occurrence according to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Report.46  R2 is easily supported by our framework when comparing the capability 
levels of individuals in the United States (or any developed country) to the minimal 
threshold levels.  The comparison would show a large gap representing a clear ability 
to reduce capability levels without going below minimal thresholds.  R4 is also 
obviously true as shown by comparisons of development and capability levels for 
high and low emitters (recall the discussion in Chapter 1 comparing GHG emissions 
with the Human Development Indices for the top ten GHG emitting countries).   
Human rights signify the minimal moral entitlements humans owe one 
another.  As such you cannot justify the violation of some individual’s rights as the 
result of risk or uncertainty “in situations where the risk-takers need not engage in 
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43 Ibid., 178. 
44 Ibid., 179. 
45 Ibid. 




the risky behavior and can avert it without forfeiting their own human rights, when 
the risk-bearers already lack fundamental human rights, and when the benefits of the 
risky behavior fall to the risk-takers and not the risk-bearers.”47  The reality of R1-R4 
shows climate change presents such a situation.  Consequently, it is wrong to engage 
in discounting the rights of those in the future and individuals in the present ought to 
engage in actions to protect future generations’ rights.  However, it should be noted 
that this only applies to those who currently have their fundamental human rights 
fulfilled.  This allows those who do not have their fundamental rights currently 
fulfilled to continue to emit and even increase emissions in an attempt to meet their 
minimal capability thresholds.  Thus, those in the Global South would still be 
allowed to continue their development, even if doing so requires increasing GHG 
emissions.  It is those in the North, however, who can avert the risks of climate 
change without sacrificing their own human rights fulfillment.  What should be clear 
is that the rights of others cannot be discounted when dealing with matters of 
affluence or luxury.  This is why, in Chapters 2 and 3, we saw the need for capability 
ceilings, which will be taken up in more detail in the next chapter’s discussion of the 
obligations stemming from the potential rights violations identified in this chapter. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter focused on applying the methods of the previous chapter to the 
case of climate change.  Section 1 focused on a time horizon covering the present up 
to the death of the last presently existing person (approximated as 2100 CE for ease 
of discussion).  This was done to avoid the philosophically contentious issues related 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




to the rights of future persons and to show that even if one is skeptical of such rights, 
my framework still facilitates an ethical evaluation of climate change.  Moreover, 
this section offered a glimpse of the type of data that provides evidence for the claim 
that unabated climate change constitutes a violation of human rights.  Section 2 
provided a philosophical defense of the claims that future generations are the bearers 
of rights, and that these rights create duties in the present.  In defending this, I 
offered reasons for rejecting the four primary objections to future persons’ rights: 
indeterminacy, temporal remoteness, incapacity, and non-actuality.  After addressing 
this stronger objection (i.e. that the rights of future generations cannot exist), Section 
3 provided a defense against the weaker objection that due to the uncertainty 
surrounding climate projections we ought to discount those future rights.  This was 
rejected primarily because there is a high likelihood of human rights violations in the 
future that can be averted without causing presently existing individuals to sacrifice 
their own human rights fulfillment.  Since human rights are not something that can 
be compensated, this fact causes us to not discount the moral claims of future 
persons.   
What is important to highlight is that the framework and arguments I have 
offered here do not assume that climate change will necessarily result in a violation 
of human rights.  Rather, I have offered a framework for evaluating possible future 
scenarios in order to determine which particular scenarios are morally acceptable.  
The general argument of this chapter is that under many of the more likely scenarios 
offered by the IPCC and other scientists, climate change will result in violations of 




meta-capability.  Thus, it would be morally wrong for current generations to 
continue down the paths that produce those scenarios.  What this chapter offers is a 
way to evaluate which paths are morally acceptable and what steps we need to take 
given that the status quo is clearly not acceptable under this framework.  It is 
important to stress that what I am offering is a vocabulary for talking about the 
impacts of climate change and evaluating which routes are morally acceptable.  If 
there are multiple scenarios that meet the criteria offered in this and the previous 
chapter, my account will take a neutral stance regarding those particular scenarios. 
Having shown over the past two chapters how the evaluative system I am 
offering applies to both current and future generations and why the current path we 
are on is morally unacceptable, I shift my focus in the remaining two chapters of the 
dissertation to what is required of current generations in light of the moral harms I 
have identified to this point.  Does moral responsibility demand reductions in 
emissions by all countries?  In Section 3, I claimed that those who do not have their 
current human rights fulfilled are allowed to continue their levels of emissions (and 
even increase them).  As such, it might seem that responsibility will fall squarely on 
affluent countries.  Identifying who is responsible for the harms brought by climate 
change and the moral obligations that follow from that responsibility is the focus of 
the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Moral Obligation in the Case of Climate Change: Theory 
 
 
Unabated climate change will cause violations of individuals’ human rights, 
particularly via their environmental meta-capability.  This claim was demonstrated in 
the previous chapter’s presentation of possible scenarios under various climate 
projections and the negative impacts that would be faced under those scenarios.  
Moreover, it is reasonable to extend the analysis to the rights of future generations.  
Applying the method for identifying rights violations to the various projected 
scenarios, we can distinguish three types of scenarios: (1) those in which there are no 
rights violations; (2) those in which there are violations of other capabilities, but not 
a violation of any individual’s environmental meta-capability; and (3) those in which 
there is a violation of at least one individual’s environmental meta-capability.  In the 
first type of scenario, no moral failure exists.  While it is clear there is a moral failure 
in the second type of scenario, the moral failure lies in the actions of the future, 
rather than the present.  It is true the fulfillment of future individuals’ human rights 
might be easier had there been more environmental protection in the present, but 
since there are no violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability the moral 
failure lies in future institutions, not in the environmental impacts of actions in the 
present.1  Consequently, it might be good for those in the present to act in ways that 
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in place a set of institutions A (where technological advancements are included as part of this set) and 
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minimal capability thresholds to be met.  However, if a different set of institutions, B, were 
implemented, the combination of B and X would allow individuals’ capability thresholds to be met.  
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lessen the impacts of climate change, but there would be no obligation to do so.  The 
third type is the most serious, given that a violation of individuals’ environmental 
meta-capability necessarily entails that those individuals’ capability thresholds 
cannot be fulfilled simultaneously, resulting in human rights violations.  Moreover, 
this violation of individuals’ environmental meta-capability is attributable to actions 
in the present, since it is our actions now that either add to or lessen the impacts of 
climate change.  Given that in such cases the moral failure clearly lies in the actions 
of present generations, it is an open question as to what moral obligations this creates 
in current generations and who bears these duties.  Providing the theoretical 
background to answer this is the task of the present chapter.  The next chapter will 
then apply the theory offered here to the case of climate change. 
Before advancing my discussion, I want to clarify my use of the term 
“responsibility” by distinguishing between two types of moral responsibility 
identified by Tracy Isaacs: (1) moral responsibility as blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness and (2) moral responsibility as moral obligations and duties.2  The 
former is generally evaluative and past-oriented, whereas the latter is prescriptive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Thus, the fault is not in the present for bringing about X, but rather in the future for their failure to 
implement B.  Now, consider that the combination of environmental conditions Y (the result of 
actions in the present to protect ecological systems) and A would have allowed for individuals’ 
capability thresholds to be met.  While the actions in the present to bring about Y might be good, the 
failure to do so is not a moral harm, since B allows capability thresholds to be met even in the case of 
X.  Given that actions in the present can impact the set of available institutions, it is important to note 
this assumes the set of institutions B would be reasonably available given the economic, social, and 
technological assumptions made under the scenario evaluated.  If it were the case that the set of 
institutions B were not reasonably available, then we are dealing with a different set of assumptions 
and therefore a different scenario—one that would be an example of the third type of scenario.  
2 Tracy Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 12-16.  John Parrish makes a similar distinction in a recent paper, identifying what he calls 
“attributive responsibility” and “assignment responsibility,” which fit Isaacs’s categories respectively.  
See John Parrish, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” International Theory 1, no. 1 (2009): 121-
123. 
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and future-oriented.  Moral responsibility in this second sense tells us what we ought 
to do regarding future actions.  As such, it is this second sense that is of primary 
relevance to our study, and, unless otherwise noted, I use “moral responsibility” and 
“responsibility” in this second sense of one’s moral obligation or duty.  The rights 
framework of Chapter 2 and the method for evaluating outcomes of future climate 
scenarios presented in Chapter 3 can be applied to tell us what actions in the present 
and near future are morally acceptable (i.e. those that result in scenarios in which 
there are not violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability) and what 
actions are not (i.e. those that result in scenarios in which there are violations of 
individuals’ environmental meta-capability).  Thus, we have a moral responsibility to 
refrain from those actions in the latter grouping, while staying within the domain of 
the former. 
One final caveat must be put forward.  The discussion in this chapter focuses 
on theoretical moral issues rather than more practical political or legal ones.  While 
political and legal matters might appear as examples to aid in understanding the 
moral obligations I seek to identify, I remain neutral about specific political or legal 
responses to climate change.  This chapter makes clear that there is a moral 
obligation to act in a way that does not bring into being any future scenario that 
would result in violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability.  However, 
if there are multiple types of actions (political, legal, or otherwise) that would fulfill 
this obligation, then the account offered here cannot choose among those means.  I 
am merely providing a procedure for identifying obligations that operates in 
conjunction with the evaluative framework of the previous chapters.  Additionally, in 
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taking a purely moral perspective, I do not consider the feasibility of meeting these 
obligations under current institutional structures (particularly since these structures 
themselves might need to be changed).  Given that ought implies can, all that matters 
for my discussion is that it is possible for the obligations I identify to be fulfilled, 
however likely or unlikely it might be given current geopolitical realities. 
With the target of discussion clear, the chapter will progress as follows.  
Section 1 highlights some general problems climate change poses for isolating and 
assigning obligations resulting from its harm.  Showing that analyses of moral 
responsibility engaged only at the individual or only at the collective level—what 
Isaacs refers to as “single level” analyses—run into problems, I spend the remainder 
of the chapter advancing a two-level approach for understanding the current 
generation’s obligations in the face of climate change.  Section 2 offers an overview 
of Isaacs’s general two-level approach to moral obligation in collective contexts.  I 
will end the theoretical discussions here by offering, in Section 3, a brief summary of 
principles of collective action relevant for applying Isaacs’s theory. 
 
1. Problems Identifying Moral Obligations in the Case of Climate Change 
Due to the nature of the phenomenon, climate change offers a significant 
challenge for determining and locating what, if any, obligations result from its 
negative impacts.  Consider a typical analysis of a rights claim under the interest 
theory of rights I employed in Chapter 2.  For X to have a right to something, X must 
have some interest that justifies “holding some person(s) to be under a duty.”3  Thus, 
if we have a right to the fulfillment of our environmental meta-capability, as I have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 166. 
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argued, then it must create a duty in some other moral agent(s).4  Avoiding the 
contentious nature of positive duties, it is clear, at minimum, that this right creates a 
negative duty to refrain from acting in a manner that creates environmental 
conditions resulting in the inability of the rights bearers’ environmental meta-
capability to be fulfilled.5  Consequently, X has a right to the fulfillment of her 
environmental meta-capability, and Y has a corresponding duty not to act in a way 
that prevents the fulfillment of X’s right. 
As the previous chapter has shown, under certain emissions scenarios, the 
fulfillment of X’s right will be prevented.  Given the analysis above, there is a clear 
obligation for Y to avoid those scenarios.  But, who is the Y that bears this 
obligation?  In previous chapters, when identifying the harm to X, climate change 
has simply been treated as though it were the single act of a single agent.  Obviously, 
this is not the case.  The harm posed by climate change (and what violates X’s right) 
is not one of a single origin; rather, it is a case of what Joel Feinberg terms an 
“accumulative harm.”  Using air pollution as a paradigm case, Feinberg offers the 
following explanation: 
If there were only one automobile allowed to operate in the entire 
state of California, its exhaust fumes would soon be dissipated and no 
harm to the ambient air would even be worth mentioning.  One 
hundred cars might begin to threaten the air quality but it is unlikely 
that they would bring it to the threshold of harmfulness.  But 
somewhere between those minor exhaust emissions and those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Here, I switch from talk of persons to moral agents given that this chapter considers the moral 
obligations of both individuals and collective entities.  All that matters for my discussion is whether 
the entity in question can be treated as a moral agent. 
5 In focusing on negative duties, I take my cue from Thomas Pogge’s work addressing world 
poverty.  Doing so allows Pogge (as well as my account here) to meet the libertarian’s minimalist 
constraint that “human rights require that we not harm others in certain ways – not that we protect, 
rescue, feed, clothe, and house them” [Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2002), 66-67]. 
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produced by millions of cars without catalytic converters the 
threshold of harm is reached.6 
 
This example highlights the nature of accumulative harms as resulting from actions 
of collections of agents where no single agent’s action(s) can cause the harm on its 
own.7  Climate change clearly fits this bill.  In fact, Feinberg’s own example can be 
made to represent the accumulative nature of climate change.  Taking GHG 
emissions as the primary driver of anthropogenic climate change, the emissions of 
one car (or one person) would not be of any consequence.  Even the emissions of 
hundreds of thousands of people would not be able to produce the type of harmful 
scenarios identified in Chapter 4.  Rather, it is the accumulative emissions of billions 
of people, year after year, that result in the harm. 
Unfortunately, this poses a problem for understanding moral responsibility.  
If the harm of climate change is accumulative and my individual emissions are not 
sufficient for bringing about this harm, then it seems my emissions do not prevent 
the fulfillment of X’s right to her environmental meta-capability.  Proponents of 
collective, rather than individual, responsibility for climate change take this line.8  
Such arguments are driven by the claim that we cannot ascribe causal responsibility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Volume One: Harm to Others (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), 228. 
7 This echoes Andrew Kernohan’s definition of an accumulative harm, which he draws from 
Feinberg’s work: “It is a harm to another person brought about by the actions of a group of people 
where the action of no single member of that group is sufficient, by itself, to cause the harm” [Andrew 
Kernohan, “Accumulative Harms and the Interpretation of the Harm Principle,” Social Theory and 
Practice 19, no. 1 (1993): 52]. 
8 See, particularly, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and 
Individual Moral Obligations,” in Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics and 
Ethics, Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Vol. 5, eds. Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong and Richard B. Howarth (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), 285-307. 
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for an accumulative harm to any singular agent.  As Andrew Kernohan has forcefully 
argued: 
Because of the limitation of our cognition apparatus, we can never 
have a metaphysical theory of imputation for accumulative 
consequences.  We will never be able to say who the real perpetrator 
is, or to say what the share of causal responsibility someone really 
bears.  Accumulative consequences are not reducible to individual 
consequences.9 
 
It seems that if we cannot ascribe causal responsibility in whole, or even in part, to 
individuals, then we have to place responsibility on some collective entity to which 
causal responsibility can be assigned.  Consequently, it would be this entity that 
bears the obligation not to act in a manner that brings about the types of harmful 
emissions scenarios identified in the previous chapter. 
Yet, placing obligation on some collective entity also generates problems.  As 
Anna Stilz notes, under typical theories of moral responsibility, the following four 
conditions must be fulfilled in order for an entity to be treated as a moral agent: “1) it 
intended the act that resulted in harm; 2) it had the capacity to grasp moral and other 
reasons; 3) it was in deliberative control of its own actions; and 4) it acted 
voluntarily, without duress.”10  Anytime a collective entity fulfills these conditions it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Andrew Kernohan, “Individual Acts and Accumulative Consequences,” Philosophical Studies 
97, no. 3 (2000): 345. 
10 Anna Stilz, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 19, 
no. 2 (2011): 191-192.  Here, Stilz cites work by Philip Pettit and J. Angelo Corlett, as offering 
detailed defenses of these conditions.  See Philip Pettit, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Ethics 117, no. 
2 (2007): 177-192, and J. Angelo Corlett, “Collective Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 32, no. 4 (2001): 573-584.  For the purposes of this chapter, I will not engage in any 
defense of these conditions, deferring instead to the literature cited.  Moreover, I generally assume 
that there are collective entities that meet these conditions, thus accepting the general premise of 
theories of collective moral responsibility.  For general discussions regarding the possibility of 
collective agency and responsibility see Peter French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Larry May, The Morality of Groups: Collective 
Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights (South Bend, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1987); Larry May and Stacy Hoffman, eds., Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of 
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can be treated as a moral agent, and thus be a bearer of moral obligations.  For 
example, consider BP, the global oil and gas company.  Without getting into the 
conceptual details of collective intention, it is clear in some general sense that, as a 
company, BP engages in intentional actions (e.g. choosing to drill a new well) 
determined through deliberative mechanisms within the company.  Given this, BP 
meets conditions 1 and 3.  Additionally, condition 2 seems to be met due to the fact 
that, in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, BP 
accepted responsibility and expressed regret over their wrongful actions related to 
the spill.  This leaves only condition 4, and even a cursory glance at BP’s corporate 
decisions seems to show this to be met.  Thus, we can hold BP morally responsible 
for its corporate decisions.11 
However, while it is clear corporations like BP can be treated as moral 
agents, this does not get us much traction when analyzing the harm of climate 
change.  The difficulty here lies in identifying a collective that not only satisfies the 
conditions just noted, but also engages in actions sufficient for bringing about 
harmful emissions scenarios.  Otherwise, we are left with the same problem facing 
individualist accounts highlighted above.  The inability to identify such a collective 
can be seen in many of the “Jack and Jill” examples Dale Jamieson uses to argue that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Debates in Theoretical and Applied Ethics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991); and Peter 
French and Howard Wettstein, eds., Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility: Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy, Volume XXX (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). 
11 For seminal discussions of corporations, like BP, as meeting the criteria of moral agency, see 
Peter French, “The Corporation as a Moral Person,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 3 
(1979): 207-215; and Kenneth Goodpaster, “The Concept of Corporate Responsibility,” Journal of 
Business Ethics 2, no. 1 (1983): 1-22.  Goodpaster helpfully presents a court case involving the Ford 
Motor Company as an entry point for his discussion.  For a succinct summary of French’s argument, 
see his entry on “Corporate Moral Agency,” in The Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Business 
Ethics, eds. Patricia Werhane and Edward Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Business, 1997), 
148-151. 
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our normal modes of moral analysis cannot fit climate change.12  In these examples, 
Jamieson presents different variations on the harm of Jack stealing Jill’s bike (or 
depriving her of it), noting how as the examples get more varied it is difficult to 
identify the moral culprit.  By the time he arrives at the example he takes to be most 
analogous to the case of climate change, we clearly see the problem for using typical 
collectivist analyses.  The example runs as follows: “acting independently, Jack and 
a large number of other unacquainted people set in motion a chain of events that 
causes a large number of future people who will live in another part of the world 
from ever having bikes.”13  In such a scenario, there is no shared, collective 
deliberation by the unacquainted individuals.  Thus, the group that appears to cause 
the harm of climate change cannot meet the criteria for moral personhood given in 
the previous paragraph.  The same is true for Feinberg’s pollution case above. 
Consequently, climate change presents difficulties for identifying moral 
obligation both in individuals, given that we can show they themselves are not 
bringing about the harm we have identified, and collectives, given that we cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Dale Jamieson, “Climate Change, Responsibility, and Justice,” Science and Engineering Ethics 
16, no. 2 (2010): 436-437.  In these examples, Jamieson starts with the case of a single individual 
causing a single intentional harm (i.e. Jack stealing Jill’s bike) and then adds modifications related to 
the cause of the harm (e.g. in Example 2 the bike’s disappearance is the result of the uncoordinated 
action of strangers), the geographic distance between Jack and Jill (e.g. in Example 4 while Jack’s 
actions result in Jill’s bike being stolen, Jack is located on a different continent), and the temporal 
distance between Jack and Jill (e.g. in Example 5 Jack lived in the past and engaged in actions that 
prevented Jill from having a bike in the present).  For a detailed response to Jamieson’s “Jack and Jill” 
examples, see Stephen Gardiner, “Is No One Responsible for Global Environmental Tragedy? 
Climate Change as a Challenge to Our Ethical Concepts,” in The Ethics of Global Climate Change, 
ed. Denis Arnold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 38-59.  Gardiner argues that 
Jamieson’s examples to not as analogous to the present situation regarding climate change as 
Jamieson takes them to be, and that with more analogous examples we can fit the scenario under 
normal paradigms of moral analysis.  As will be seen in this chapter, I agree with Gardiner that 
climate change can fit under current understandings of moral responsibility, though my use of Isaacs’s 
account results in a different approach than Gardiner’s. 
13 Jamieson, “Climate Change, Responsibility, and Justice,” 436. 
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identify a cohesive collective to hold accountable for the harm that also meets the 
criteria of moral personhood.  These difficulties, however, only come about when 
trying to tie moral obligation related to climate change to causing the harm itself.  
Additionally, the issue is made more difficult by a myopic focus on a single level of 
responsibility (i.e. either collective or individual).  Isaacs pushes against this 
paradigm for phenomena like climate change, in favor of one that treats moral 
responsibility as existing simultaneously in both individuals and collectives.  She 
does this by focusing not on the cause of the harm itself, but rather on the failure to 
prevent an avoidable harm.  Her approach complements the framework presented in 
the previous chapters.  The target of moral analysis for climate change is not 
individuals’ actions causing the harm, but the failure of individual and collective 
actions to prevent it (i.e. the failure to prevent emissions scenarios resulting in 
violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability).  This is the negative duty 
highlighted in the opening of this section.  If we can use Isaacs’s theory to detail the 
obligations we bear vis-à-vis climate change, then we will have described the 
correlative duty created by our right to our environmental meta-capability.  By 
offering an account of our duties, along with the previous chapters’ discussion of our 
rights and method for identifying violations of those rights, this project can be 
viewed as presenting a complete moral framework for evaluating climate change.  As 
such, we turn to a brief overview of Isaacs’s general theory of individual and 
collective moral obligation, before spending the rest of the chapter addressing its 
application to the case of climate change. 
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2. Isaacs’s Two-Level Theory of Moral Obligation 
In her recent book, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, Isaacs offers 
a two-level theory of moral responsibility for cases involving some form of 
collective action (or inaction).  It is important to note that in her analysis, Isaacs 
treats neither collective nor individual responsibility as primary.  While each level 
can inform the other, they are distinct—each capturing a portion of normative 
significance.  For Isaacs, “[i]ndividual moral responsibility is not a function of 
collective moral responsibility (or vice versa) and claims about the responsibility of 
collectives do not entail (or erase) claims about the responsibility of individual 
members.”14  Focusing on a single level “will inevitably leave out an area of 
normative significance, resulting in an incomplete account of moral responsibility.”15  
Thus, Isaacs’s simultaneous consideration of both individual and collective 
responsibility makes her theory “two-level.” 
Although Isaacs’s theory addresses both responsibility as blameworthiness 
and responsibility as obligation, our primary interest is her account of the latter.  This 
is because previous chapters offered a future-oriented method for identifying 
potential harms and we therefore need an account of responsibility that shares this 
future orientation.  We need to be able to determine what an individual or collective 
entity can (or cannot) do, morally speaking, given that certain actions entail harmful 
emissions scenarios.  This requires staying in the realm of responsibility as 
obligation. 
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While Isaacs identifies environmental degradation (or climate change) as a 
case in which there is no actual collective agent (i.e. an organized institutional actor), 
it is important to first present her theory of responsibility in cases where there is one.  
This is for two reasons.  First, cases that lack a collective agent operate, to a certain 
extent, in the same manner as those in which there is a collective agent.  Thus, to 
understand the former, we must have an understanding of the latter.  Second, as I 
show in the next chapter, applying Isaacs’s theory to the case of climate change 
requires modification, as we have to run her account multiple times: first, where 
there is no actual collective agent, and then in cases were there are actual collective 
agents.  Thus, we need the method for addressing obligation in both types of cases 
(i.e. those with a collective agent and those without a collective agent) in our toolkit. 
Cases involving the existence of an identifiable collective agent operate in a 
straightforward manner.  Isaacs summarizes this with the following: 
Understood in the terms of the two-level account I have 
developed…collective obligation operates at a level distinct from 
individual obligation.  In order to discharge its obligations at the 
collective level, a collective agent requires that its members fulfill 
their functions.  The duties associated with roles within a collective 
will be in large part determined by, though they are distinct from, the 
obligations of the collective as a whole.16 
 
We can see this in the case of any given corporation.  Consider Apple.  First, we 
identify the duties of Apple as a whole.  For the sake of discussion, we will stipulate 
that Apple has a singular duty: make a profit for its shareholders.  This duty is one 
that clearly does not belong to a single individual Apple employee, regardless of 
rank.  No one individual’s actions are sufficient for Apple as a company to make a 
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profit.  Rather, each individual has specific duties to satisfy associated with his or her 
place in the company (e.g. the person in payroll doing the appropriate tasks to ensure 
other employees get their paychecks; the person in the store selling products to 
generate revenue).  These specific roles are dictated by the general collective 
obligations of the organization (in this case, making its shareholders profit), and, 
according to Isaacs, “the individuals’ obligations in the organizational context are 
exhausted by the requirements of their roles.”17  Thus, Apple employees’ duties are 
determined exclusively by Apple’s general duty as a company.  Moreover, no single 
employee has to fulfill the duty of Apple; in fact, to do so is conceptually impossible.   
While this approach seems clear at the outset, it becomes more muddled at 
the individual level.  When examining various roles within collective structures, it is 
not always clear what the specific individual duties are.  Taking the example of a 
university, Isaacs contrasts the roles of a payroll clerk and a faculty member.18  She 
notes that while the duties of the former are laid out clearly in a job description, 
those of the latter can be less clear or at least there can be more variation in how they 
can be fulfilled.  This results in the following claims regarding the relation between 
individual obligations and organizational hierarchies: 
The more responsibility one has within the collective, the less obvious 
the specifics are of what one is required to do and how one is required 
to do it.  Moreover, the roles in which it is less clear and there is more 
latitude are precisely the roles that are likely to be most directly 
responsible to the collective’s obligations.  Those in power are in a 
better position to ensure that the collective acts as it ought.19 
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Though the individual in a position of power might have a greater role in making 
sure the collective fulfills its obligations, it is still not possible for their actions to 
singlehandedly fulfill the collective obligations.   
We can apply this power-obligation relation to the example of Apple above.  
While it might be clear what the employee at the Apple Genius Bar must do to 
facilitate Apple meeting its collective obligation, it is far less clear what Apple’s 
CEO Tim Cook ought to do, other than to say he bears greater obligations than the 
employee at the Genius Bar given his greater power and over-arching control.  Yet, 
even with this greater power, given the collective institutional structure Tim Cook’s 
individual actions cannot fulfill all the particular actions Apple employees must take 
in order for Apple to meet its obligation and make a profit for its shareholders (i.e. he 
cannot himself build the computers and pay the employees).  This occasional 
vagueness related to the obligations of those in power is not a reason for rejecting 
Isaacs’s theory.  It simply highlights the differential obligations that exist within a 
collective, both in kind and degree of importance, and the fact that any moral 
analysis of collective action will require specific attention to those in positions of 
greater power. 
Some might object that this understanding of responsibility allows 
individuals lacking power to be absolved of moral blameworthiness, in cases where 
the company engages in wrongful behavior, by professing they were merely 
following orders.  If Isaacs’s theory understands moral responsibility as only “doing 
one’s job” in fulfilling collective goals, we might be hesitant to accept it.  However, 
Isaacs points out that simply doing one’s job, or following orders, does not exhaust 
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individual moral responsibility.  We still have broader moral obligations arising from 
outside of the organizational context.  Here, Isaacs offers whistle-blower cases as an 
example of a scenario where individuals have additional responsibilities beyond 
those dictated by their organizational role:  “In these cases, the collective’s failure to 
fulfill its collective obligations creates a scenario in which individuals, as moral 
agents, are morally required to do something that goes beyond their usual duties in 
order to ‘help’ the collective fulfill its obligations.”20  Consequently, it is important 
to recognize that fulfilling one’s role only yields right action in normal cases (i.e. 
those cases in which the collective is not in violation of its duties).  In cases where a 
collective is in violation of its duties (or is openly engaged in harmful behavior), 
individual moral obligation goes beyond the organizational context and requires 
proactive attempts to get the collective to change its practices. 
With this brief overview of Isaacs’s theory for cases in which a collective 
agent exists complete, we can move to addressing those where an organized 
institutional agent does not already exist.  Examples of such cases, according to 
Isaacs, are the issues of global warming and global poverty.  Just as no single 
individual is responsible for the harms in these cases, neither is there a collective 
entity clearly responsible for their cause or continuation that meets the requirements 
of moral agency presented in Section 1.  No single corporation or state intentionally 
acts in a manner sufficient for creating global poverty (or allowing it to continue), 
though it is a clear unintended consequence of many corporate or state policies and 
actions.  While no individual or collective appears to bear responsibility, these 
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problems have collective solutions readily available should the necessary parties act 
in a coordinated manner.21  In such circumstances, moral obligation is not focused on 
direct causal responsibility, but rather the need for collective action to alleviate the 
harms (or prevent them from coming into being, when considering possible future 
harms).22 
To clarify where moral obligation lies in such situations, Isaacs offers a 
discussion of what she terms “bystander cases.” 23  Using a series of cases, building 
up to what she refers to as a “Coordinated Bystander Case,” Isaacs shows how we 
can identify both collective and individual obligation in cases lacking a collective 
agent, but requiring a collective solution.  The case she offers is as follows: 
Coordinated Bystander Case: Four bystanders are relaxing on the 
riverbank when six children on a raft run into trouble when they and 
their raft end up in rapids.  They are hurtling helplessly toward a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In both cases, it is true there is disagreement about which solutions might be the most effective 
or “right”; however, this does not take away from the fact that there are solutions on offer.  In the case 
of global poverty, it is generally accepted that a mix of institutional reforms and assistance in the 
amount of 1% of the gross national product of the high-income world would be sufficient to end 
global poverty.  For a detailed discussion of how global poverty can be addressed, with references to 
numerous other studies and relevant data, see Jeffery Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic 
Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).  While solutions to climate change are 
admittedly more contentious in terms of particulars, there is general agreement regarding the need for 
a reduction of GHG emissions to some degree allowing atmospheric GHG levels to stabilize; on this 
point, see Chapter 10 of John Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing, 4th Edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  For a helpful summary of information related to the 
viability of mitigation as a collective solution, see the IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of 
Climate Change - Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, eds. Bert Metz, Ogunlade Davidson, Peter Bosch, Rutu 
Dave, and Leo Meyer (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 1-23; available on-line at <http://www.ipcc.ch/public 
ations_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg3_report_mitigation_of_climate_cha
nge.htm>. 
22 It is true that there still must be a link (at least counterfactually) between the actions of the 
agents bearing the responsibility and the outcomes of concern.  In the case of climate change, I take it 
that comparisons between the various climate scenarios, in terms of showing how changes in actions 
(particularly, GHG reductions) result in changes in outcomes, provides such a link.  Not only do my 
arguments to this point support such a link, the various detailed analyses in IPCC reports provide 
more robust support. 
23 Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, 141-144.  The first of these cases is similar 
in structure to Peter Singer’s drowning child case, see Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1972): 229-243. 
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dangerous waterfall downriver and are unlikely to survive if they go 
over it.  Nothing any of the four bystanders can do as an individual 
will make a difference, but there is an obvious course of coordinated 
action they could take to divert the raft into calmer waters.  This 
measure would pose little risk to the bystanders and would save all of 
the children.24 
 
In such a case, since it is stipulated that the individuals cannot accomplish anything 
acting alone, and given that ought implies can, there cannot be any moral obligation 
from a purely individual focus.  However, taken from a collective perspective and 
treating the four bystanders as an “it” (something meeting the guidelines for 
collective agency), the same type of role-base mapping (i.e. the identification of 
obligation based on one’s role within a collective structure) we saw above applies.  
Viewed this way, the group has the obligation of taking the coordinated action that 
saves the children, while each individual has an obligation shaped by their role in 
whatever the necessary coordinated action is.25  As with the above discussion of the 
role organizational hierarchy plays in mediating responsibility, it is important to keep 
in mind that given each bystander’s situation, they may not all bear the same roles or 
obligations (e.g. the physical condition of one might result in a different obligation 
than one who is more frail).  Isaacs’s primary point with these cases is that under 
certain circumstances a random group of individuals can be reconfigured into a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, 143. 
25 Here, we are merely treating the counterfactual case where the individual’s have decided to 
form a collective to save the children.  Without such an agreement of the individuals, we would have 
to add a prior individual obligation to participate in the collective action itself.  Adding this prior 
obligation arises from considering the group as a putative group, rather than an already existing group, 
which is the focus of the rest of this section. 
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“collective capable of intentional action,” which then allows for the assignment of 
both individual and collective responsibility, as presented above.26 
Although this is helpful for analyzing cases in which a random group of 
individuals actually does reconfigure itself into a collective, it does not seem of 
much help when such a reconfiguration does not occur.  Without an actual collective, 
it seems that Isaacs’s theory is only able to offer obligations that are contingent on 
the forming of a collective moral agent, and without such action these obligations 
bear no moral force.  To address this issue, and argue that these obligations are actual 
rather than contingent, Isaacs turns to Larry May’s work on moral responsibility, 
collective inaction, and the notion of “putative groups.”27  According to May, a 
putative group exists in cases where “there is not yet an organized group with a 
decision-making procedure,” but there is potential for the development of such a 
group with the ability to address some harm.28  Putative groups can then be used to 
address cases, like climate change, where there is collective inaction, referring to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, 145.  One circumstance that might prove 
particularly relevant for the application of Isaacs’s theory is group size, given that collective action 
might prove impossible in extremely large groups.  If collective action were to prove impossible, then 
there could be no responsibility, neither collective nor individual, given that ought implies can.  I will 
take this issue up in the next section when seeking to apply Isaacs’s theory to the case of climate 
change.  My primary focus in this section is to present the general theory behind Isaacs’s account, 
recognizing it might not apply in all cases where collective action could in an ideal world alleviate 
harm. 
27 See Larry May, “Collective Inaction and Shared Responsibility,” Nous 24, no. 2 (1990): 269-
277.  A revised and slightly expanded version of this paper was published in Larry May, Sharing 
Responsibility (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 105-124.  Isaacs’ cites a reprinting 
of the original article that is slightly revised yet lacks the fifth section found in the expanded version 
in Sharing Responsibility; see Larry May, “Collective Inaction and Responsibility,” in Individual and 
Collective Responsibility, 2nd edition, ed. Peter French (Rochester, VT: Schenkman Books, 1998), 
211-231.  All further reference and citations of May’s work on putative groups will come from the 
expanded chapter in Sharing Responsibility. 
28 May, Sharing Responsibility, 105. 
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“the failure to act of a collection of people that did not choose as a group to remain 
inactive but that could have acted as a group.”29 
The concept of putative groups can be used to argue that in some cases of 
collective inaction, the putative group bears collective responsibility.30  May is quick 
to note that this only works in a limited set of cases where it is clear that the putative 
group “could have developed a sufficient structure in time to avoid inaction.”31  To 
clarify this condition, May offers the following, which I quote at length: 
During some famines, too little time elapsed from the time people 
learned about the problem, for example in June, until all the harms 
occurred, in July, for an effective relief effort to be mounted.  Even 
though the collection of people might have been able in other cases to 
act as a group, they were not responsible for failing to take steps in 
June to prevent the harms of July.  But in other cases, history will 
indicate that the people could have done something collectively in 
June, when they learned of the famine, to prevent harm from 
occurring in August.  As a result, those people may be collectively 
responsible for the harmful consequences of their collective inaction.  
No rescue was possible in August, once June had passed with no 
organization activity; nonetheless, these people might be collectively 
responsible for the August famine deaths because of what they could 
have done in June to form themselves into an organized group that 
could have prevented the harms in August.32 
 
Here, May employs a “plausibility condition” for assigning blame.  If counterfactual 
action could plausibly have made a difference, then the putative group bears 
responsibility.  This condition is clearly met in the second case of May’s example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid., 107.  Collective inaction is distinct from collective omission, which refers to “the failure 
of a group that collectively chooses not to act” (107).  In cases of collective omission, there already 
exists a collective and thus Isaacs’s theory would be clearly applicable. 
30 Both May and Held are focused on moral responsibility as blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness.  Consequently, the subsequent paragraphs discussing their accounts use 
“responsibility” in this sense. Examining responsibility in this sense, as it relates to putative groups, is 
still helpful since a similar relation ought to hold between responsibility in the sense of obligation and 
putative groups. 
31 May, Sharing Responsibility, 109. 
32 Ibid., 111. 
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but not the first.  More importantly, while available data and projections regarding 
climate change show the window for action as continually closing, it is still generally 
accepted that such a window does exist.  Thus, a putative group would bear blame in 
the case of the climate change (assuming one can show it satisfies other relevant 
conditions for successful collective action that I take up in the next section). 
However, May only places blame on the putative group (and its members) for 
its failure to organize, rather than its failure to actually engage in the particular 
actions necessary for preventing the harm.  This distinction is important, particularly 
if thought about in terms of obligation, which we can reasonably infer from his 
assignment of blame.  If you are morally blameworthy for doing X then it is 
reasonable to conclude you had an obligation to not do X.  If a putative group only 
has an obligation to organize into a collective agent, then its members can only be 
said to have a duty to organize themselves and then decide how to act.  However, if 
the putative group has an obligation for the particular actions necessary to prevent 
the harm in question, then its members have obligations to engage in activities 
appropriate to their role in that action.  Assume that in addressing climate change the 
role most individuals would play is to decrease the amount of time they drive their 
cars by 50%.  If the putative group (i.e. the collective formed by individuals) is only 
obligated to organize, then the individuals do not have an obligation to reduce the 
amount of time they drive their cars; they only have an obligation to form a 
collective group.33  However, if putative groups have an obligation not just to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The obligations of the individuals comprising the putative group would of course change 
should they fulfill their obligations to form an actual collective.  Only when there is an actual 
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organize, but to engage in the particular actions as well, then individuals possess an 
obligation to reduce their car use, even when they do not form a collective group. 
Wanting to establish obligations for the particular actions rather than only 
organizing, Isaacs turns to Virginia Held’s work.  Held moves beyond May’s claim, 
arguing that if “the action called for in a given situation is obvious to the reasonable 
person, it seems that we can sometimes conclude that the judgment “Random 
collection of individuals R is morally responsible for not doing A’ is valid,” where A 
is the action itself, not the failure to organize.34  To demonstrate how this condition 
applies, Held offers three cases involving random collectives, which I summarize as 
follows: 
Case 1. There are seven people in a subway car.  The second smallest 
of the seven suddenly begins to violently beat the smallest.  While this 
happens in full view of the others, they do nothing.  After ten minutes, 
the individual is dead.  Though one individual could not have safely 
subdued the person engaged in the beating, two or more could have 
easily done so.35 
 
Case 2. There are five persons in a train compartment.  One, a doctor, 
goes to another compartment, leaving his bag with medical supplies.  
While he is gone, one of the remaining 4 has convulsions and in 
struggling for air hits against an exterior door and falls out of the train 
to his death, while the other three passengers watch.  The doctor 
returns and is told what happened.  He tells the others they could have 
saved the man’s life if they had held him down and administered 
some medicine from the doctor’s bag.36 
 
Case 3. There are three individuals on an isolated street that witness a 
building collapse, which traps a fourth person inside, injuring her leg.  
The observers know that applying a tourniquet to the injured person 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
collective, rather than a putative one, can individuals have an obligation to reduce the amount of time 
they drive their cars on May’s account.   
34 Virginia Held, “Can a Random Collection be Responsible?” in Collective Responsibility: Five 
Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, eds. Larry May and Stacey Hoffman (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), 96. 
35 Ibid., 94-95. 
36 Ibid., 96. 
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will save her life.  However, to get in a position to do so requires 
moving a piece of rubble.  Each of the three observers argues for 
moving a different piece of rubble (the moving of which requires all 
three’s simultaneous efforts), and while they argue, the fourth person 
dies.  The removal of any one of the pieces would have allowed for 
the fourth individual’s survival.37 
 
Case 1 provides a clear example of a situation in which the course of action is not 
only obvious, but also readily available to the individuals.  Any reasonable person 
would see that a group of individuals (all of whom are larger than the attacker) could 
subdue an unarmed assailant and that there is a moral principle in play (namely 
preventing innocent death).  Case 2, according to Held, is a case in which the 
reasonable person cannot be said to see the solution.  Two things here cannot be 
reasonably expected of the individuals: (1) having the foresight that the individual 
will hit against the door and fall out of the train, and (2) having the knowledge that 
there medicine in the doctor’s bag that can save the individual, and knowing which 
medicine that is.  The solution to the harm in this case is something that would 
require very specific knowledge, far beyond what can be expected of a reasonable 
person without medical training.  Case 3 presents more complexity.  While it is 
obvious that some action would have saved the person’s life, it is not obvious to the 
reasonable person which specific action is necessary since any removal of debris 
would have sufficed.  Held argues that in this type of case, while the reasonable 
person would find it obvious that some action needs to be taken, she would not be 
able to determine which specific action was necessary.  Thus, we cannot hold the 
individuals responsible for failing to removing the rubble and save the individual’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid., 96-97. 
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life; we can only hold them responsible for not taking a decision between equally 
sufficient, but not necessary, actions. 
Isaacs takes both May’s and Held’s arguments to support the application of 
her theory to cases involving putative groups.  When the clarity condition outlined 
by Held is met, putative groups can be seen as having putative collective obligations.  
For Isaacs, these putative obligations have “exactly the same ordering and mediating 
potential for individual action that an actual collective obligation would.”38  
Furthermore, since a putative obligation holds the same potential for the role-based 
mapping of responsibility as an actual obligation, it grounds actual individual 
obligations.  This is the primary advantage of Isaacs’s view.  It is only when 
considered through the lens of the collective context that we can understand 
individual obligation.  While Isaacs might be too quick in assuming the proper action 
with respect to climate change is evident, she offers the following summary linking 
her view to climate change: 
Mediated by a putative collective obligation in which she could 
participate, her failing is not that she did not solve the problem of 
global warming—that is something we could never expect her to do.  
Instead, her failure is that she did not do her part in a collective action 
that could solve global warming.  Because a clear collective action to 
address this issue is possible and evident to the reasonable person, a 
putative collective obligation exists.  More important, this putative 
obligation, as much as an actual collective obligation would be, is a 
starting point for bridging the apparent gap between seemingly 
inconsequential individual contributions and new understandings of 
the part they play in more powerful collective undertakings.39 
 
Whether Isaacs’s view addresses climate change with the ease she suggests here will 
be the focus of the next chapter.  What is important at this stage is the manner in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, 149. 
39 Ibid., 150-151. 
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which collective and individual obligation are distinct, and that the former can be 
used to understand the latter, even in cases involving putative groups. 
 
3. Principles of Collective Action 
While Isaacs’s employment of May and Held’s work is useful, one might 
object it is only useful for cases of small-scale collective action.  Climate change 
requires collective action on a scale that seems to make cases involving a subway car 
filled with seven people meaningless.  However, this worry can be set aside through 
an analysis of basic principles of collective action.  As long as the principles of 
collective action point to a likelihood for success (or at least a legitimate ability to 
act) we do not have to worry about the numerical difference between the cases 
discussed in the previous section and the collective action for addressing climate 
change. 
 Consequently, this section will provide a brief overview of some 
fundamental issues related to collective action that show how large-scale collective 
action is possible.  Doing so will be essential in the next section when identifying the 
appropriate putative group associated with the collective action sufficient to 
adequately address climate change (i.e. sufficient for preventing future scenarios 
involving violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability).  In this section, I 
will address two key issues related to collective action that apply in the case of 
climate change: (1) group size and the likelihood for successful collective action, and 
(2) extrarational motivation.  In doing so, I will typically use language indicating 
individual persons as the agents of collective action, as this is the common mode of 
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analysis in the literature I draw from.  However, as Todd Sandler notes, “[a]ll of the 
collective action principles for two or more agents also apply for nations as 
agents.”40  Thus, the principles discussed here will apply in the next chapter applying 
Isaacs’s theory in instances with both individuals as agents and nations as agents. 
The most important issue related to collective action is the role group size 
plays in the likelihood of successful collective action.  In his seminal work The Logic 
of Collective Action, Mancur Olson argues that ceteris paribus small groups will be 
more successful in collective action to further their interests than large groups.  
Olson highlights this with the following conclusion: “The larger a group is, the 
farther it will fall short of obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good, and 
the less likely that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount of such a good.  In 
short, the larger the group, the less it will further its common interests.”41  However, 
Olson’s use of the terms “small” and “large” is not strictly about numerical size, but 
rather whether a group is “privileged” or “latent” (representing small and large 
respectively).42  A group is privileged if there is at least one individual i for whom 
the value she receives from the collective good is greater than the cost of her 
contribution to obtain the good, and a group is latent if for all i the value of the good 
less the cost of contribution is negative.43  While there is generally an empirical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Todd Sandler, Global Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 43. 
41 Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 36. 
42 Ibid., 45-51.  For a helpful summary of Olson’s theory on this issue, see Russell Hardin, 
Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: Resources for the Future & The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1982), 38-49. 
43 This can be captured by the following formula: Ai = Vi – C, where Ai is the advantage to i, Vi is 
the return to i, and C is the amount i has to contribute.  A group is then privileged if there is at least 
one individual group member for whom Ai > 0, and latent when Ai < 0 for all members; see Olson, 
The Logic of Collective Action, 23-25, and Hardin, Collective Action, 38-39. 
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correlation between group size and latency, it is possible for large privileged groups 
to exist.44 
Considering the case of climate change, it seems any identifiable grouping 
capable of taking actions sufficient to address climate change will be latent.  For 
those whose environmental meta-capability would not be harmed, there would be no 
value to the collective good and thus any cost on their part makes their total 
advantage negative.  Moreover, for those whose environmental meta-capability 
would be harmed, while the value of the collective good would be immeasurable, 
those individuals would not be able to obtain that good.  To say that the individuals 
harmed would not be able to obtain the good is to say that there is no cost they could 
pay individually that would result in the action. 45  Thus, it seems in the case of 
climate change, any group is doomed to latency, diminishing its likelihood of 
success.  Such a conclusion is troubling since if the collective action is not possible 
(or is highly unlikely to succeed), that group cannot be held under an obligation to do 
the impossible (or highly unlikely). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Hardin presents an example of a large privileged group through that actual case of Howard 
Hughes’s wanting to watch movies on television after the local television station went off air.  Hughes 
ended up buying the station and keeping them open because the value he gained (given the level of his 
desire to watch movies) was more than the cost of buying the station.  However, this good applied to 
another quarter million people.  While the value these individuals got would not have outweighed 
what it would have cost them to keep the station on air overnight (i.e. for all others Ai < 0), the 
collective group of nearly a quarter million people was privileged because of Hughes’s level of 
interest and willingness to pay whatever it took.  See Hardin, Collective Action, 42. 
45In the example in the previous note, the group was privileged because Hughes could make a 
contribution that addressed the issue and still resulted in a net advantage for him.  No singular cost by 
a developing country could result in a net advantage.  There is also an asymmetry at work here 
between the costs and benefits and the nonfungibility of human rights.  Such asymmetry requires 
additional detail regarding the preferences of all members of a group in order to determine whether a 
particular group is latent.  Hardin notes that when asymmetries of interest in collective action, 
asymmetric collectives prove more successful in political action for the good in question, compared to 
symmetric collectives; see Chapter 5 of Hardin, Collective Action, esp. 83-89.  I will not take this 
issue up here, particularly since the remainder of the section offers reasons for even latent groups have 
success in collective action. 
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However, Olson notes there is a type of latent group—what he terms the 
“intermediate group”—that possesses certain sociopolitical advantages that allow it 
to overcome its latency.  For Olson, such a group is defined as follows: 
An “intermediate” group is a group in which no single member gets a 
share of the benefit sufficient to give him an incentive to provide the 
good himself, but which does not have so many members that no one 
member will notice whether any other member is or is not helping to 
provide the collective good.46 
 
As long as the group size and the relevant actions are such that no member can hide 
its failure to participate, then there is an intermediate group, for which successful 
collective action can be possible.  Thus, if in the case of climate change a group can 
meet the requirements of Olson’s intermediate group, there is less worry of a gap 
between the “ought” and the “can.”  This is because collective action is reasonably 
possible for intermediate groups.  As such, we can say that an intermediate group 
could act in a collective manner, should they so choose.  Given this possibility, if 
there are moral reasons demanding some action by an intermediate group, we can 
hold them under an obligation to engage in that action. 
In addition to a group being an intermediate group, a second aspect of 
collective action can increase the likelihood of success for a latent group.  Olson’s 
analysis vis-à-vis privileged and latent groups assumes the individuals in such groups 
act under narrow self-interest.  However, “extrarational intrusions,” as Russell 
Hardin calls them, such as moral motivations, can cause some members of the group 
who would not participate on self-interested grounds (i.e. those individuals for whom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, 50. 
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the advantage gained minus the cost is negative) to participate anyway.47  
Consequently, the moral motivations an individual might gain from the preceding 
argument regarding the moral harm of climate change, can improve the likelihood of 
her participation in collective action to address climate change.  Moral analyses are 
thus important not only for trying to determine the right course of action, but also for 
motivating that action for those who would not be motivated out of self-interest.  
Hardin also notes that extrarational cooperation in collective action makes one “more 
likely to oppose a loss or collective bad (such as pollution) than to support a gain.”48  
Given climate change’s nature as a future collective harm to be avoided (at least on 
the most extreme scenarios where all nations are vulnerable), extrarational 
cooperation would then be more likely. 
Based on the general principles discussed above, one can conclude that 
collective action to address climate change could have a reasonable chance of 
success, assuming certain conditions are met.  First, the group necessary for the 
collective action must be either a privileged group or an intermediate group.  Second, 
there must be rational self-interest for the majority of the members to participate in 
the collective action.  Third, there must be extrarational motivations for most of the 
remaining minority.  I will argue in the next chapter that whether these conditions are 
met depends on the putative group identified when applying Isaacs’s theory.  I take it 
that if one selects a putative group meeting these criteria, Isaacs’s theory and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Hardin, Collective Action, 102.  For his detailed discussion of extrarational motives, see pp. 
101-124. 
48 Ibid., 120-121. 
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therefore the principles of May and Held can be taken to apply without a problematic 
gap between the ought and the can.   
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has provided the theoretical background necessary for 
identifying who bears the duty, identified in the opening of the chapter, to avoid 
bringing harmful climate scenarios into being.  Assuming an appropriate putative 
group can be identified, employing Isaacs’s theory, as it is presented in Section 2, 
allows for the identification of both collective and individual responsibility.  
Moreover, employing her account allows us to avoid the pitfalls of single level 
analyses identified in Section 1.  Given my discussion in Section 3, however, it is 
important to identify a putative group that meets the criteria of an intermediate 
group, since otherwise the putative group falls prey to its latency and we cannot hold 
it under an obligation to act.  The task of identifying an appropriate putative group 
and applying the theory presented here is the task of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Moral Obligation in the Case of Climate Change: Application 
 
 
 The previous chapter offered theoretical considerations necessary for 
identifying moral obligations in cases involving putative groups.  It was clear from 
the quote at the end of my discussion of Tracy Isaacs’s account that she thinks 
climate change fits this bill.  This chapter takes up that consideration.  I argue in 
Section 1 that while Isaacs’s theory does not fit the case of climate change with the 
ease she suggests, upon modification it can be applied to climate change.  In arguing 
for its application, I use the principles of collective action discussed at the end of the 
last chapter to address worries that might arise related to the scale of collective 
action necessary to address climate change.  Section 2 continues to address the 
application of Isaac’s account, focusing particularly on whether the conditions are 
met to yield only an obligation for the participants in the collective action to develop 
a decision structure or more expansive obligations related to the particular actions 
the members need to take beyond organizing.  Following this, Section 3 identifies 
four general locations of obligation—states, non-state collectives, individuals qua 
citizens, and individuals qua member of the private sphere—briefly sketching the 
duties borne by each.  The last substantive section of the chapter addresses an 
epistemic objection to my account, related to whether one can bear moral obligations 
without the belief or knowledge that anthropogenic climate change is occurring.  
Here, I respond to this objection and highlight the need for “green education” and the 
role testimonial knowledge plays in the preceding sections. 
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1. Applying Isaacs’s Theory: Identifying a Putative Group 
The quotation at the end of Section 2 in the previous chapter made it clear 
that Isaacs takes her theory of putative collective obligation and actual individual 
obligation to apply in the case of climate change.  She rightly points out that an 
individual’s moral failure with regard to climate change is primarily a failure not to 
be part of a collective effort that sufficiently addresses the problem.  However, her 
analysis of the mapping that exists in the case of climate change fails to properly 
capture a sufficient response to the potential harm, nor does it capture a group that 
meets the requirements just outlined for successful collective action.  Moreover, the 
skeptic might charge that the clarity condition vis-à-vis climate change is actually 
not met, contrary to Isaacs’s claim.  I will address each of these in turn, first arguing 
in this section that Isaacs’s theory for mapping responsibility can be properly applied 
to the case of climate change following a slight modification.  Second, in the next 
section, I argue that based on the testimony of relevant experts the clarity condition 
should be treated as being met.  It is worth noting that even if the clarity condition is 
not met, the theory can, at minimum, still yield an obligation to organize collectively 
and create a decision procedure to decide between equally sufficient actions (as we 
saw in the last chapter during the discussion of Virginia Held’s Case 3). 
The primary reason for skepticism regarding Isaacs’s application of her 
theory to climate change centers on the identity of the putative group.  As we saw 
previously, for individual obligation to be mapped based on the collective’s 
obligations, one must identify the collective that would be able to advance action 
sufficient for preventing the harm in question.  However, if mapping is done directly 
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from the putative group to the individual, it seems that one possible putative group is 
humanity as a whole (and I take it this is the putative group Isaacs has in mind).  Yet, 
if humanity is to serve as the putative group, mapping to individual obligation is 
exceedingly obscure, if not impossible.  Perhaps one might defend Isaacs on this 
point by noting that, in cases like those of a corporate CEO or university faculty 
member, individual obligation was not always clear.  Moreover, we can at least 
identify individuals in positions of power (e.g. CEOs, heads of state) as those who 
bear more responsibility for bringing about collective action to address the problem.  
Yet, this type of response fails to recognize not only the role that states and 
corporations play in the increase of GHG emissions levels—through the manner in 
which they perpetuate social and economic institutions that give individuals no 
choice but to contribute heavily to climate change—but also the role they will be 
required to play in the solution.  Moreover, it is highly unlikely humanity as a whole 
could meet the criteria necessary for successful collective action set forth in the 
previous section.  Thus, humanity, as a whole, is not fitting as the putative group for 
addressing climate change. 
What other options are there for a putative group able to sufficiently address 
climate change?  One might be a specific grouping of countries, such as “developed” 
countries.  As we saw in Chapter 1, the developed countries of the world (i.e. the 
Global North) emit far more per capita than those that are developing, and most of 
these emissions are based on things that could easily be identified as luxuries.  Thus, 
if this group of people came together to collectively reduce their emissions, it might 
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be possible to reduce the impacts of climate change to a level not resulting in 
violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability. 
However, this putative group is unsatisfactory for three reasons.  First, such 
an approach is not sensitive to those who are most vulnerable in the developed 
countries and lets those in the developing world who are wealthy and emitting far 
beyond what they need off the hook, morally speaking.  Second, it is not entirely 
clear that action only by the developed world would be able to prevent climate 
scenarios resulting in human rights violations, given many developing countries’ 
high emission levels (e.g. China emits nearly one-fifth of the world’s total GHGs).  
Third, if we are only addressing the developed countries, it is unlikely there would 
be sufficient motivation for the group to overcome its latency.  While some 
developed countries might be motivated by moral considerations, there would not be 
enough self-interested countries to get the collective action off the ground. 
To better capture what is required to effectively address climate change, I 
propose that the group consisting of all the countries of the world should serve as the 
appropriate putative group, since actions by this group could clearly address climate 
change.  While the collective actions of corporations and private citizens could, in an 
ideal setting, be altered to address climate change, the principles of collective action 
discussed at the end of the last chapter raise serious questions about the likelihood of 
such action.  Even if we consider the citizens and corporations found within a single 
country, it seems obvious that not only would such a group be latent, but also its size 
would be so vast that members of the group would be able to conceal their lack of 
participation.  As such, we cannot legitimately conceive of this as an intermediate 
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group.  However, the latency of such a group (i.e. the individuals and corporations of 
a particular country) could be overcome through the imposition of sanctions and 
coercion by the state, as an already existing coercive force.  Since coercion would be 
necessary to motivate the action of individual citizens and corporations, the 
collective action we are primarily interested in would be that of the various nations 
of the world engaging in the action of developing and enforcing an environmental 
regulatory framework, capable of imposing relevant incentives and coercion to get 
others to act appropriately (both amongst themselves and within their own 
countries).1 
In order for the nations of the world to be a potentially successful (and 
therefore applicable) putative group, they must meet the general criteria from Section 
3.  Currently, it seems reasonable to conclude that such a group is not a privileged 
group when considering the collective good of preventing harmful climate change.2  
However, in looking at how states interact and form various treaties, a grouping of 
all nations appears to meet the criteria of an intermediate group.  While there are 
currently around 200 countries making up this putative group, it is unlikely any one 
state would be able to hide a decision to not engage in the necessary actions for 
alleviating climate change.  Thus, the putative group comprised of the states of the 
world would have the sociopolitical advantages that allow intermediate groups to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For more on the role sanctions play in maintaining collective action, particularly through the 
creation of conventions, see Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: Resources for the 
Future & The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 174-180. 
2 Though this could change as time goes by and the impacts of climate change are more evident.  
Should the negative impacts of climate change become more felt or the projections point to a high 
likelihood of catastrophic harm across all countries, it is possible the value of acting to prevent that 
harm compared to the cost would become such that the international community would then be a 
privileged group; cf. Todd Sandler, Global Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 43. 
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overcome their latency.  Moreover, based on the presentation in Chapter 4, it is clear 
that under the types of harmful scenarios we are most interested in, most countries 
would have self-interested reasons for joining a global climate regime.  For those 
countries like the United States, who would face less harm, the moral arguments 
offered in the preceding chapters could potentially function as extrarational 
motivations.  When all of the considerations (i.e. the sociopolitical pressures of an 
intermediate group, the rational self-interest of a majority of countries, and 
extrarational moral considerations) are conjoined it is reasonable to conclude that the 
collective action to establish a global environmental regime (which could then in 
turn provide the incentives or sanctions to motivate the subgroup of citizens and 
corporations that would be otherwise latent) has a reasonable chance of success, 
satisfying the consequent of “ought implies can.” 
Yet, treating the states of the world as a putative group raises a problem for 
Isaacs’s application of her theory to climate change, as she presents it.  Putative 
groups mediate responsibility to individuals, grounding actual individual obligations.  
If the putative group is composed of collectives, then the putative group cannot 
mediate responsibility directly to individuals.  There can be no mapping in this 
scenario from group to individual.  Rather, the mapping can only be from the 
putative group to the collectives (i.e. states) composing it. 
However, there is no reason why Isaacs’s theory cannot apply to both 
putative groups comprised of individuals and putative groups composed of 
collectives.  What allows the individual obligations, in Isaacs’s account, to be actual 
rather than putative has to be the fact that individuals actually exist as moral agents.  
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The collective obligations borne by putative groups are not actual, since the putative 
group is only a potential moral agent (though a special kind of one).  Individuals, on 
the other hand, are already moral agents.  Consequently, any obligations that are 
distinctly tied to these existing moral agents will have to exist in actuality as well.  If 
this is the case, then we can reasonably conclude that a putative group can mediate 
responsibility and create actual obligations in its members insofar as its members 
already exist as moral agents.  Thus, a putative group comprising existing collective 
moral agents can mediate actual obligations to those collectives based on the roles 
they would play in the putative group.  The mapping from putative group to moral 
agent applies regardless of the type of moral agent. 
With this alteration, we can see how Isaacs’s theory can operate in the case of 
putative groups made of collectives.  In such scenarios, we identify the collectives 
composing the putative group and the sufficient course of action.  If the clarity 
condition is not met (recall Held’s Case 3 from the previous chapter), then the 
collectives would only bear an obligation to organize themselves and develop a 
decision procedure for determining which action, among possible sufficient actions, 
to take.  If the clarity condition is met, then each collective would be obligated to 
fulfill those actions relevant to its role in the overall collective action.  At this stage, 
the result would be a putative group with a putative obligation (i.e. the sufficient 
course of collective action to address the problem) and a group of collectives, each 
bearing actual collective obligations based on its role in the putative group.  Using 
this as an intermediary step, we can move to assigning obligations to individuals by 
applying Isaacs’s original account for mapping actual collective obligations to 
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individuals.  For example, if the first stage of this process identifies Apple as having 
a collective obligation to reduce its carbon footprint, then this obligation operates no 
differently than its obligation to make a profit for its shareholders.  Whatever the 
actual collective obligations are, we can identify corresponding actual obligations in 
individuals that are distinct from both the putative obligation and the collective 
obligations.  Moreover, there is no reason this process could not be repeated again in 
the case of a putative group made up of collectives, which are themselves made up of 
collectives. 
This multi-step variant of Isaacs’s method allows for an application to 
climate change that better fits the general scope of discussion regarding necessary 
and sufficient action, while still providing a way to identify individual 
responsibilities.  As already noted, the action required to adequately address climate 
change is typically addressed at a collective level.  To avoid scenarios that result in 
human rights violations of the type we are interested in, global GHG emissions must 
be reduced.  Given the social and economic institutional constraints placed on 
individuals, a reduction of global GHG emissions will require change to these 
institutions.  If food is produced in a way that results in unacceptable GHG 
emissions, then many individuals will have no choice but to purchase this food and 
contribute to the problem.  Thus, rather than identifying the putative group required 
for sufficient action as the aggregate of all existing individuals, it is better to identify 
the agents of change as those who regulate the collective economic and social 
institutions within each society. 
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Having identified the putative group as the various countries of the world, 
each with an obligation to enter into and enforce a global climate regime that 
prevents future scenarios identified as harmful, we can run a second step to identify 
the obligations mediated by these overarching collective obligations.  Taking the 
United States as our example, the federal government would have an obligation to 
ratify and then enforce the global climate treaty.  Given the role of a member of 
Congress, they would have an obligation to propose or support relevant legislation to 
keep the United States within the guidelines of the global climate treaty, while a 
typical citizen might have an obligation to vote against those who do not support 
such legislation.  Moreover, as part of the federal government’s enforcement of 
standards set by the global climate treaty, corporations will likely be given new 
regulations to follow.  Corporations in their varied roles in the United States might 
have new obligations to reduce emissions.  This would then require Isaacs’s method 
to be run a third time, in order to identify the obligations possessed by individuals in 
their roles in the collective structures of corporations (including both as employee 
and consumer).  While a complete presentation of the varied obligations cannot be 
offered here, it is clear this framework can be used in conjunction with the method 
offered in Chapter 3 for determining when rights violations occur to offer a more 
complete picture of the necessary solutions and requisite moral obligations. 
 
2. Evaluating the Clarity Condition 
To this point, I have been vague regarding the specific course of action the 
putative group needs to take, which would in turn allow us to identify the collective 
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obligations borne by the members of the putative group and the individual 
obligations of individuals qua their roles in various collective groups.  I have 
intentionally done this for two reasons.  First, to do otherwise would assume that the 
clarity condition vis-à-vis the sufficient action to prevent harmful emissions 
scenarios is met.  Second, offering a specific detailed course of action is beyond the 
purview of this examination and my expertise.  To offer such details would require 
careful dialogue with experts at both local and international levels in accordance 
with the method identified in Chapter 3 to identify those scenarios we have an 
obligation to avoid.  What I seek to offer in this project, as a whole, is a framework 
that can be used in future dialogue with the relevant experts to isolate the right action 
and craft appropriate policy specifics.  While it is clear future dialogue is necessary, I 
will offer reasons here to think that following the overall framework provided in the 
preceding chapters will allow for the clarity condition to be met in the case of 
climate change and that moral obligations extend beyond an obligation for the 
members of the putative group to merely organize themselves, creating a decision 
procedure for determining what action to take. 
Whether the clarity condition is met, regarding the course of action necessary 
to prevent bringing into being scenarios necessarily resulting in human rights 
violations (i.e. future worlds in which one or more individuals’ environmental meta-
capability are not met), depends on whether climate change fulfills Held’s clarity 
condition.  To help isolate the requirements for fulfilling the clarity condition, we 
need to make explicit the difference in Held’s Case 1 and Case 3 that makes the 
former fulfill the clarity condition while the latter does not.  To recall, Case 1 
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involves the bystanders failing to intervene in a beating that results in the victim’s 
death.  Case 3, on the other hand, involves an individual trapped under rubble where 
the bystanders argue over which piece of rubble to move in order to save the 
individual, where any of the actions would have been sufficient. 
It seems that what is of primary relevance in distinguishing these two cases is 
the epistemological position of the individuals who could intervene.3  In Case 1, an 
individual in the case who witnesses this event, would reasonably possess all the 
relevant information to not only realize something needs to be done, but also realize 
the group should act directly to stop it.  A reasonable person would be aware that 
five individuals all larger than the assailant could stop the attack and that there is 
some general moral reason for doing so.  Assume for the moment that calling the 
police, or calling for those in another car to help, might have proven sufficient for 
saving the victim’s life (or at least the bystanders had good reason to think that 
would be the case) but the continued beating would clearly result in greater harm to 
the victim.  Thus, while the reasonable individual would be able to recognize there 
are two possible courses of action sufficient for preventing the harm, they would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Held’s own discussion appears to point more to the fact that in one case there is a clear 
necessary and sufficient action (Case 1), and in the other (Case 3) there is not a clearly necessary 
action; see, Virginia Held, “Can a Random Collection be Responsible?” in Collective Responsibility: 
Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics, eds. Larry May and Stacey Hoffman 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), 95-97.  However, on reflection, it seems that the 
primary determinate is the epistemological position of the intervening agents, which is aided in Case 1 
by the fact there is a clear necessary and sufficient action.  Alternatively, in Case 2 it is not that there 
are multiple sufficient actions, but that the individuals are not in an epistemic position to reasonably 
favor one over the other.  On this point, I am particularly grateful for many helpful comments and 
discussion from my colleagues after presenting a paper based on an earlier draft of this chapter to the 
Department of Philosophy.  This earlier draft focused more on the necessary-sufficient action 
distinction. 
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have good reason to favor the immediate intervention over the calling for police, in 
that not only does it save the victim’s life it also reduces the overall harm caused.  
Now compare this to the position of the individuals in Case 3.  There are two 
ways of interpreting the relevant facts in Held’s presentation.  First, each individual, 
while aware that all three are required to move one piece of rubble, that doing so will 
save the victim’s life, and that there is a general moral principle in play giving reason 
to save the victim’s life, is unaware that moving any of the pieces of rubble is 
sufficient.  Thus, Individual 1 is only aware that moving Rubble 1 is sufficient, 
which is also true of Individual 2 and Rubble 2 and Individual 3 and Rubble 3.  
However, Held remarks that it is clear to the reasonable individual in such a situation 
that some action needs to be taken.4  If Individual 1 is only aware that moving 
Rubble 1 is sufficient, then he would not conclude that some action or other needs to 
be taken.  Rather, he would have good reason to continue to argue for moving 
Rubble 1.  However, if we interpret the situation as each individual having the 
knowledge that moving any of the pieces of rubble will be sufficient, then Held’s 
conclusion that some action needs to be taken follows.  Each individual would be in 
an epistemic position to know that something needs to be done, but they would not 
have any reason to select one piece of rubble over the others. 
On this analysis, Case 1 fulfills the clarity condition since not only does a 
reasonable individual in the situation have the facts making them aware of the 
sufficient action(s), they are also in an epistemic position that gives them reason to 
favor one action over all others.  Case 3 fails to meet the clarity condition since the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Held, “Can a Random Collective Be Responsible?”, 97. 
	   189 
reasonable individual is in an epistemic position making her aware of available 
courses of action, each sufficient for preventing the harm, yet providing no reason 
for selecting one over the other.  From this distinction, we can make the following 
claim related to the clarity condition and moral obligation.  In a particular collective 
action situation, if an individual is in an epistemic position that presents sufficient 
courses of action to alleviate some harm and includes some reason(s) for favoring 
one above all others, then that individual is responsible for not engaging in that 
reasonably favored course of action.  If, however, the epistemic position of the 
individual only presents equally sufficient courses of action, with no reason(s) for 
favoring one above all others, then that individual is only responsible for not 
engaging the other members who would be part of the collective action and making a 
decision procedure amongst themselves for selecting which sufficient course of 
action to follow. 
With the circumstances for meeting the clarity condition clear, we can 
determine whether climate change as understood under the framework on offer here 
is a case in which the clarity condition is met.  In doing this, it is important to 
highlight the role that testimonial knowledge plays.  For Held, whether the clarity 
condition is met depends on the epistemic position of the reasonable individual.  This 
is to say that we are concerned with the conclusions a normally functioning 
epistemic agent would reach given the relevant information available to her.  Thus, 
the individual in the given situation does not have to have direct knowledge.  Rather, 
they simply have to have the relevant knowledge available.  This is important for 
considering climate change given that few individuals other than the relevant 
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scientific experts have direct knowledge relating to future climate scenarios.  
However, this information is now so freely available and there is such a large 
scientific consensus that the conclusions of these experts would be included in the 
reasonable individual’s deliberations.  In this instance, it is important for non-
specialists to take specialists at their word, accepting their testimonial knowledge. 
Having clarified a key component of the epistemic position to be considered, 
we can ask whether climate change presents a case in which there are sufficient 
courses of action for addressing the harm readily available to a reasonable individual 
and if there is reason to favor one particular action over the other.  The first issue 
here seems rather straightforward.  Once the testimony of scientists is included in the 
epistemic position of the reasonable individual, based on the projections discussed in 
Chapter 3, it is clear that there are courses of action available (i.e. those scenarios 
that do not result in violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability) to 
prevent the potential harm of climate change.  Thus, the relevant course of action 
would be to engage in the types of policies and actions that are assumed under the 
acceptable scenarios, which would typically be done through significant reductions 
of GHG emissions.  On another approach, based on the notion of capability ceilings 
that has been employed through this project, one might even say that the sufficient 
action is simply keeping levels of capability protections under the relevant capability 
ceilings.  In this case, each particular climate scenario that does not yield violations 
of individuals’ environmental meta-capability might be seen simply as a different 
way of achieving this desired outcome.  Regardless, we can conclude that the 
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epistemic position of the reasonable individual includes knowledge of courses of 
action sufficient for avoiding harmful climate scenarios. 
Turning to the second issue—whether there is reason to favor one course of 
action over another—things become less clear.  How one responds here seems to 
hinge on the understanding of the specificity of “the action.”5  If the action clear to 
the reasonable individual is merely maintaining levels of capability protections under 
the capability ceilings, then there is clear reason for favoring this action under the 
epistemic position of the reasonable individual since on this framework it would be 
the only sufficient (and therefore necessary) action.  Moreover, if the methods 
offered in Chapter 3 were followed in dialogue with relevant experts, then the 
required identification of capability thresholds and ceilings could be expected to be 
included in the testimonial knowledge possessed by the reasonable individual.  In 
this case, the various acceptable scenarios would just be seen as different ways of 
achieving the relevant action.  However, one might prefer to think of “the action” as 
any one of the particular climate scenarios that do not yield violations of individuals’ 
environmental meta-capability.  On this view, it would appear the framework on 
offer here and the testimonial knowledge available from experts following the 
application of Chapter 3’s method for determining capability thresholds would not 
provide a particular reason for selecting one acceptable climate scenario over 
another. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This is an issue noted by Held, yet she does little to respond to it other than say that in some 
cases it will still be obvious what ought to be done, regardless of whether it means “the action” itself, 
or the various “sub-acts” that comprise the full action and are necessary for completing “the action”; 
see Held, “Can a Random Collection be Morally Responsible?”, 95. 
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Clearly there is room for future discussion regarding the clarity condition and 
the appropriate interpretation of “the action” required to prevent the harm of climate 
change.  However, there are two reasons to favor an interpretation according to 
which the situation regarding climate change meets the clarity condition, until we 
have a definitive reason to think otherwise.  First, as discussed in the preceding 
section, the nations of the world were selected as the putative group because such a 
group makes the likelihood of collective action getting off the ground reasonable and 
then allows for the states to coerce the necessary actions to be taken by their citizens 
and the corporations found within their borders.  The creation of a global climate 
regime that will then demand that states regulate actions within their borders (i.e. 
keep capability protections under capability ceilings) seems to point to a necessary 
and sufficient action.  There do not appear to be other viable options that would yield 
the appropriate collective action.  Second, the types of climate scenarios that would 
likely prove acceptable are those that require clear reductions of GHG emissions.  
Coupling this with the need for states to enforce regulatory standards, it seems that 
given the knowledge readily available to the reasonable individual it should be clear 
that GHG reductions are a necessary action, and there is an obligation to engage in 
reductions in addition to organizing collectively. 
Consequently, not only can we apply a modified version of Isaacs’s theory to 
the case of climate change to identify the duties corresponding to the rights discussed 
in previous chapters, but we can also say that the nature of the framework used in 
identifying the moral harm of climate change likely allows the clarity condition to be 
met.  Even if it were to turn out the clarity condition is not fully met, this account 
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still yields an obligation for states to create a global environmental regulatory 
framework, with a clear decision procedure for selecting among any available 
options.  Based on the knowledge readily available from experts (in both the natural 
and social sciences) once the methods of Chapter 3 would be applied, any reasonable 
person would be in an epistemic position to see that social and economic institutions 
must not allow for the extension of capabilities beyond capability ceilings.  Thus, we 
have a point from which to derive the specifics of both collective and individual 
obligations and the policies that need to be implemented in order to avoid future 
human rights violations due to climate change.  While acknowledging that offering 
such detail is beyond the scope of this inquiry, the next section further clarifies these 
obligations by isolating four different moral agents and the general types of 
obligations borne by each. 
 
3. A Typology of Moral Obligations vis-à-vis Climate Change 
The previous sections showed how it is possible to identify both collective 
and individual agents who bear moral obligations stemming from the future harm 
posed by climate change.  From this, we can generalize four locations of moral 
obligation—two at the collective level and two at the individual level.  The bearers 
of moral obligation at the collective level come from the first two steps of the multi-
step modification to Isaacs’s theory presented above.  They are the collective entities 
that compose the putative group, which are the various states of the world, and the 
collective entities (primarily corporations) that bear obligations stemming from their 
roles in fulfilling the framework put in place by states.  While each type of collective 
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(i.e. states and non-states) plays a role in the actions necessary to prevent violations 
of individuals’ environmental meta-capability, they cover distinct spheres of life, 
public and private, respectively.  From these two types of collective groups, we can 
isolate two corresponding roles of individuals who bear obligations: individuals qua 
citizens (mapped in the second step) and individuals qua members of the private 
sphere (mapped in the third step).  While both roles apply to every person, it is 
important to identify them as distinct locations of obligation resulting from different 
types of collective entities individuals participate in.6  This gives us a four-fold 
taxonomy of the bearers of moral obligation: (1) states; (2) non-state collectives; (3) 
individuals qua citizens; and (4) individuals qua members of the private sphere. 
 
Table 6.1. Taxonomy of Moral Obligations for Climate Change 
MORAL AGENT SOURCE OF OBLIGATION PRIMARY OBLIGATIONS 




Dictated by State 
Regulations 
Act According to Gov’t Regulations 
(e.g. reduce carbon footprint) 
Individual qua 
Citizen Role in the State 
Promote/Support Environmental 
Regulation through Political Action; 
Comply with those Regulations 
Individual qua 
Member of the 
Private Sphere 
Role in Non-State 
Collectives, especially 
Corporations 
Encourage Compliance with 
Government Regulation 
(e.g. refuse to purchase from 
non-compliant companies) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 cf. Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment, 2nd edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), esp. 46-66.  Sagoff stresses that the recognition of 
the citizen role, beyond the typical consumer role, requires us to abandon the use of mere cost-benefit-
analysis in favor of a broader public reasoning that includes ethical, aesthetic, and religious values.  
This is similar in many ways to the holistic considerations included in my framework. 
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If the putative collective obligation in the case of climate change is to keep 
capability protections under the allowed capability ceilings, then the collectives 
composing the putative group bear obligations based on their roles in bringing such 
action to fruition.  When considering states, it is clear their primary role is one of 
regulators and enforcers.  Under the typical capitalist paradigm, states operate not by 
producing their own goods for their citizens, but by setting up rules for the private 
sector in producing goods.  States set the regulatory environment for social and 
economic institutions and interactions, and have the right to levy punishment for 
those who fail to follow the rules of the game.  Moreover, states are the only 
collective body capable of binding themselves with other states to create enforceable 
transnational regulatory environments.  Thus, not only do states have obligations to 
set and enforce the necessary regulatory environments domestically, but they also 
have an obligation to do so internationally.  This means states bear an obligation to 
enter into a global climate treaty, creating a binding regulatory and enforcement 
framework based on protecting individuals’ environmental meta-capability.  Since 
this includes an obligation to not extend the protection of capabilities beyond 
capability ceilings, more developed states would most likely be required to make 
significant reductions in overall emissions (given limitations on “luxury” items or 
activities), while developing countries would have space for continued development 
to bring their citizens’ capability protections up to minimum thresholds.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 One might argue that the standard state institutions employed in developed liberal democracies 
are unable to produce the type of change demanded here.  If true, this would point to a need for 
radical political change in light of the moral harm presented by climate change.  I will not engage the 
point here in more detail, other than to say that while I think changes in institutional structures would 
be required, I do not think they would result in the type of radical change potentially demanded here.  
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The roles of non-state collectives are more varied with respect to effective 
climate action.  Here, I consider corporations as the primary bearers of non-state 
collective obligation, though other non-state collectives such as NGOs would be 
subject to similar analysis.8  First and foremost, non-state collectives would have an 
obligation to operate in a manner preventing their own actions (or, if they produce 
some product, the actions of their consumers in using their product) from producing 
environmental conditions that violate individuals’ environmental meta-capability.  
The obvious example here would be that corporations would have an obligation to 
reduce their GHG emissions to whatever allowable levels are required to maintain 
the fulfillment of individuals’ environmental meta-capability both now and in the 
future.  The levels would be dictated by the states in enforcing a global climate 
regime.  It is important to note that this obligation would place different 
requirements on different corporations, depending on their operations.  Moreover, 
non-state collectives would also be obligated to pursue alternative methods for 
providing their goods in a more environmentally friendly manner.  For example, car 
manufacturers would likely be obligated to improve gas mileage and move to 
vehicles powered by renewable energy sources.  Additionally, given capability 
ceilings, they might have obligations to not provide certain types of vehicles to the 
general consumer (e.g. inefficient “status” symbol vehicles like Hummers).  Lastly, 
non-state collectives would bear some obligation to pressure other non-compliant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For an example of a detailed account arguing for a radical restructuring of standard state institutions, 
see Alan Carter, A Radical Green Political Theory (London: Routledge, 1999). 
8 Many NGOs can be thought of as providing a product for some consumer, be it something 
abstract like knowledge or organizational capacity or concrete like food or a building.  Thus, in 
providing these goods, they would bear the same types of obligations typical corporations bear.  
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collectives to fulfill their obligations, something that could be achieved by an act as 
simple as refusing to use a certain supplier until the supplier meets specific 
environmental standards. 
Moving from the collective to the individual level, we can outline some of 
the general obligations borne by individuals based on their varied roles within 
collectives.  The easiest case to address is that of the obligations borne by an 
individual qua citizen of a state.9  If the state bears a responsibility to create and 
enforce the relevant regulatory environment, then the individual qua citizen bears an 
obligation based on their role within the state for bringing about such action.  For the 
everyday citizen, this is fairly easy to identify.  Citizens have an obligation to 
participate in the political process to push for the necessary environmental policies.  
In a democracy, this could entail writing letters to or meeting with one’s 
representative, voting against those who do not support the morally obligatory 
policies as defined by this framework, participating in protests to raise awareness, 
and other activities geared at motivating political action.  For someone whose role as 
a citizen includes holding public office, it is clear they bear further obligations.  The 
specific actions required by these obligations might not be as clear as for the 
everyday citizen, particularly for roles higher up in the political hierarchy.10  What is 
clear is that these obligations will continually be about using one’s role to get the 
necessary political action to happen.  For example, an individual in Congress would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Here, it should be obvious I am thinking of democratic states, particularly since under the 
Capabilities Approach individuals are entitled to political participation via the capability “Control 
over One’s Environment.”  Thus, this approach would count nondemocratic states as illegitimate. 
10 Recall the discussion in the Section 2 of the previous chapter regarding the difference between 
identifying the individual obligations of a payroll clerk versus the a faculty member and Isaacs’s 
claim that the clarity of specific actions required can diminish as one’s power in an organizational 
hierarchy increases. 
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have an obligation to draft appropriate domestic legislation and ratify a 
comprehensive climate treaty, while the president would have an obligation to work 
with other countries to create and enforce a comprehensive climate treaty. 
The final bearer of moral obligation is the individual as a member of the 
private sphere.  This category consists of the obligations borne by individuals that 
are mediated by the collective obligations of non-state entities.  Here, an individual’s 
obligations come primarily through their role as consumer.  If a corporation has an 
obligation to alter production practices to meet certain standards, then the role of the 
consumer is to pressure them to do so by refraining from purchasing those products.  
As such, if a corporation is failing to meet the requisite standards, individuals should 
purchase alternative products.  However, there are some cases in which it is not 
possible for consumers to purchase alternative products (e.g. the consumer is priced 
out of alternatives; the consumer’s location makes getting other alternatives 
impossible).  In these instances, individuals would have an obligation to use other 
means to pressure corporations (e.g. letter writing, protests, calls for political action 
against them).  For those individuals who do not work in the public sector, their 
obligations will also be informed by their roles as employees.  An individual who is 
CEO of an energy company might face an obligation to drive the company to pursue 
renewable types of energy.  Such “employee-grounded” obligations would be in 
addition to the “consumer-grounded” obligations borne by the individual.  In its most 
general formulation, the obligations borne by individuals qua members of the private 
sphere would require them to not extend their own capabilities beyond capability 
ceilings—something likely entailing minimizing luxury activities and altering their 
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general patterns of consumption.11  For most individuals, these demands would not 
be overly demanding.   
One final comment can be made here about this typology.  Since climate 
change is inherently a collective problem and requires collective solutions, the 
obligations borne by collectives are more pressing, morally speaking, than those 
borne by individuals.  If states set and enforce the necessary regulatory framework 
and corporations alter their practices to facilitate individuals’ ability to live within 
appropriate levels of consumption, then individual initiative becomes less important.  
With the right structures and incentives, individuals’ actions will tend to aggregate in 
positive ways, rather than negative ones.  Additionally, there are certain necessary 
actions that simply cannot be done at an individual level (e.g. establishing a 
comprehensive climate treaty).  Thus, we can say that not only does the typology 
identify four distinct types of obligations; it also gives each a level of priority.  
Collective obligations hold priority over individual obligations, but at the collective 
level, states’ obligations hold priority over non-state obligations since states possess 
the ability to coerce and punish non-state actors.  Given that, states bear the strongest 
obligations, followed by non-state collectives, in turn followed by individuals in their 
roles as citizens and then members of the private sphere.  This ordering is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Many of the ideas in the previous two paragraphs related to individual responsibility are also 
discussed in the literature that has recently developed on environmental citizenship.  Any future 
examination of individual responsibility under my framework would be well served by appeals to this 
literature.  For some key works on environmental citizenship see, Andrew Dobson, Citizenship and 
the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Angel Valencia Siaz, “Globalisation, 
Cosmopolitanism, and Ecological Citizenship,” Environmental Politics 14, no. 2 (2005): 163-178; 
Derek Bell, “Liberal Environmental Citizenship,” Environmental Politics 14, no. 2 (2005): 179-194; 
Andrew Dobson and Derek Bell, eds., Environmental Citizenship (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2006).  Additionally, a forthcoming book by James Connelly looks helpful for future discussion of the 
expectations placed on individuals; see, James Connelly, Sustainability and the Virtues of 
Environmental Citizenship (New York: Routledge, Forthcoming 2012). 
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intended to let those on the lower end of the ladder “off the hook,” since all parties 
still bear moral obligations.  Rather, it is offered to help think about the most 
important changes required to prevent bringing about harmful climate scenarios, 
stressing the collective nature of the problem. 
 
4. Why Personal Ignorance Does Not Dissolve Obligation 
Before concluding this chapter, it is important to address an epistemic issue 
related to my framework for identifying moral obligation: does ignorance by an 
agent (either collective or individual) of the situation generally, or the facts related to 
sufficient action specifically, dissolve that agent’s obligations?  Being able to answer 
the question in the negative is of particular importance due to the number of 
individuals who doubt anthropogenic climate change is occurring.12  Additionally, as 
I have frequently highlighted throughout my discussions, to offer full accounts of 
both the harm and the specific obligations, one would require levels of knowledge 
regarding climate change that are not commonly possessed.  Thus, while many 
people have a general sense of the problem and need for collective action, if an 
individual who lacked some specific piece of knowledge related to climate change 
were to not bear any moral obligations due to that lack of knowledge, we might be 
hard pressed to find those individuals who would actually bear moral obligations 
stemming from climate change. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The most recent PEW Research Center national poll on climate change, shows that 28% of 
Americans do not believe there is solid evidence the earth is warming, while another 18% believe that 
there is solid evidence the earth is warming due to only natural causes [see PEW Research Center, 
“More Moderate Republicans See Evidence of Warming: Modest Rise in Number Saying There Is 
‘Solid Evidence’ of Global Warming,” 1 December 2011; available on-line at <http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/12-1-11%20Global%20warming%20release.pdf> (accessed 10 December 
2011)]. 
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The framework I presented in Chapter 3 for identifying capability and meta-
capability violations and this chapter’s presentation of Isaacs’s use of putative groups 
and the clarity condition are helpful in addressing this worry due to their deployment 
of a reasonable persons test.  Consequently, what matters for the moral analysis is 
not whether a given individual is in an epistemic position such that she believes 
climate change is occurring or has an understanding of the specific details needed for 
action, but whether the reasonable person, given the information readily available, is 
in an epistemic position to know climate change is occurring and is problematic in 
the ways I have identified in this project.  Given the consensus that exists among 
relevant scientific experts, this dimension of my account points to a need to defer to 
highly specialized experts in the case of climate change.  Without other experts 
presenting significant counterevidence or other reasons that might legitimately serve 
as defeaters, we ought to accept the testimony of scientists.  Given this, it is 
irrelevant from a moral perspective whether you personally are aware of or believe 
these facts and conclusions.  You bear the same moral obligations regardless. 
While it seems fair to conclude that individual ignorance cannot dissolve the 
moral obligations laid out above, as long as the situation passes the reasonable 
person test, one could attempt to argue that we do not actually possess enough 
knowledge of the situation for it to pass this test.  There are two potential targets for 
this type of objection: (1) the underlying scientific data, and (2) the levels for 
capability ceilings, which require extensive local input.  It is true I have not provided 
the second, but I have offered a methodology that can be applied to gain the relevant 
knowledge that would then be used to inform specific policies or the identification of 
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specific harmful warming thresholds (e.g., any warming over 2.37 oC would result in 
violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability).  Given that I am not 
offering specific policy prescriptions without this knowledge in hand, this is not a 
viable target of the objection unless one claims such information is impossible to 
gain.  This impossibility claim seems implausible given the amount of existing 
knowledge about what warming thresholds result in harms to vulnerable populations, 
along with the existing literature on applying the Capabilities Approach.13   
Consequently, it seems that the target of this objection is the underlying 
scientific data.  While it could be the case that the IPCC reports do not actually 
represent the relevant facts, as a philosopher, I lack a good reason to operate under 
such an assumption.  Given the high level of consensus, even across different 
analyses, it seems unlikely that the IPCC reports are drastically different from the 
reality we are facing.  For example, the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature (BEST) 
study, a recent analysis funded by individuals with a history of being known climate 
deniers, offered preliminary results matching those of various other scientific bodies, 
including NASA and the IPCC.14  In fact, many scientists feel that if there is any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For the general scientific consensus regarding harmful warming thresholds, including detailed 
case studies, see IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability – Contribution 
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, eds. Martin Parry and others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  Other 
prominent discussions of the thresholds for various negative impacts of climate change include, John 
Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 172-234, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber and others, eds., Avoiding Dangerous Climate 
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), esp. 1-93.  For a sampling of discussions 
related to the application of the Capabilities Approach, see Part 3 of Flavio Comim, Mozaffar 
Qizilbash, and Sabina Alkire, eds., The Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures, and Applications 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
14 For more information on the BEST study, including an explanation of its methodology, access 
to its data sets, and results, see its website (http://www.berkeleyearth.org).  Not only was the study 
partially funded by the Koch brothers, who are outspoken climate-deniers, but also its lead 
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difference between the facts of the matter and the IPCC reports, it is that the IPCC 
reports are actually underplaying some impacts and offering a more conservative 
picture of likely climate scenarios.  Moreover, if we utilize the scientific facts 
presented by the IPCC reports and were to complete the methods for identifying 
acceptable climate scenarios in Chapter 3, we would be in possession not only of 
information relevant to the harm but of the needed responses, as well.  Thus, it is 
sensible to assume the reasonable person test to be met, which in turn allows for the 
framework offered here to function. 
In closing this section, it is worth noting that this type of objection points to 
another important issue related to the fulfillment of both collective and individual 
obligations vis-à-vis climate change.  If obligations are borne in the face of personal 
ignorance, it is likely that without some type of education and awareness of the 
situation, individuals will not act in ways that fulfill their obligations.  Consequently, 
there is a need for what can be termed “green education.”  This education would be 
focused on helping individuals understand the role the environment plays in the 
fulfillment of their human rights (i.e. understanding the environmental meta-
capability), as well as providing the relevant information regarding the harms of 
climate change and other types of environmental degradation and ways in which we 
can respond to these harms.  It would take more discussion than I can offer here to 
determine whether the provision of “green education” is something that would be 
morally obligatory under the framework I have provided and who would bear that 
obligation.  For the time being, it is satisfactory to simply say that “green education” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
investigator, Richard Muller, had previously expressed some skepticism regarding previous analyses 
related to climate change. 
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would serve as an advantageous and important tool in helping individuals gain the 
knowledge they need to fulfill their moral obligations. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has laid out an approach for identifying both collective and 
individual moral obligations in light of the potential harms posed by climate change.  
By identifying obligations at both levels and showing how they are distinct, this 
approach is able to emphasize the need for collective solutions without letting 
individuals off the hook at the same time.  Such an approach can give us hope and 
show us how our individual actions can make a difference in what might seem like 
an otherwise hopeless scenario.  As Isaacs notes: 
…when we reorient ourselves in relation to others and take the 
broader perspectives of collective action, new moral possibilities 
present themselves, and our contributions, small though they may be, 
gain greater significance from the collective contexts in which they 
take place.15 
 
With this account, we are offered a way to move forward and identify what paths are 
morally open to us.  Moreover, by tying obligation to human rights, this framework 
is sensitive to the needs of vulnerable communities and cultural/geographic contexts, 
while also providing an account that can place strong obligations on individuals who 
are living above morally acceptable levels of functionings regardless of their 
geographic locations.  With this general account of moral obligations, as well as the 
framework of the previous chapters, we have a way of moving discussion on climate 
policy matters forward in a manner that complements the methodology of climate 
projections and respects our moral duties.   
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 The project set out to offer a framework that can provide a moral analysis of 
climate, which could then be used to help evaluate current climate policies and craft 
a policy that would be just.  In developing my framework, I sought to answer three 
normative questions that underlie the current political stalemate in climate 
negotiations: (1) What is the harm of climate change?  (2) What obligations exist in 
light of that harm?  (3) Who bears those obligations?  The preceding chapters have 
provided answers (or at least methods for obtaining the answers) to those questions.  
Following a general introduction to the political and ethical issues related to climate 
policy, Chapters 2 through 4 provided the answer to the question of harm, while 
Chapters 5 and 6 took up the two questions about obligation.  While a complete 
application of the project’s framework was not provided (i.e. every particular climate 
scenario resulting in violations of the environmental meta-capability has not been 
identified), such an application could be conducted through future dialogue with 
relevant experts.  This future dialogue could then culminate in the development of a 
just climate policy.  Consequently, I have completed what I set out to do. 
 However, I would be remiss to end the project here without noting an 
important question following from the application of my framework.  I claimed in 
the previous chapter that according to my analysis states bear an important duty to 
enforce a mandatory climate regime and regulate activities within their borders in 
accordance with that regime.  Yet, what about states that choose not to fulfill that 
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duty and appropriately regulate activities within their borders?  I call this the 
problem of non-compliant states and will offer a brief discussion of it in concluding 
the dissertation by posing questions, which could be answered by future research.  In 
making the problem clear, I will offer a brief recap of my overall argument in 
Section 1, followed by a more detailed explanation of the problem itself in Section 2.  
In the final section, I will highlight a conceptual tension in my framework between a 
need for simultaneously strong and weak conceptions of sovereignty, offering 
potential directions for future discussions related to sovereignty. 
 
1. Climate Change, Harm, & Responsibility: A Recap 
 Climate change is a pressing threat to humanity, yet little has been achieved 
in attempts to address it through a global climate treaty.  The failures of the Kyoto 
Protocol and recent talks aimed at reaching agreement on a new binding, climate 
treaty in Copenhagen (COP15) and Durban (COP17) show a disagreement related to 
underlying normative issues.  Chapter 1 provided an examination of this 
disagreement, paying particular attention to the role inequalities in GHG emissions 
between the global North and South play in the debate.  Ultimately, the disagreement 
between the North and South was shown to hinge on differing value judgments 
related to both the harm of climate change and responsibility for it.  In making this 
normative turn, philosophers and theorists have entered the fray, offering what I 
identified as two types of analyses: equity approaches and rights-based approaches.  I 
made it clear that I favor rights-based approaches, and set out to offer a rights-based 
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approach in providing a satisfactory answer to the questions of harm and 
responsibility as they relate to climate change. 
 Wanting to operate with a rights-based approach, Chapter 2 set out to explore 
the viability of a rights-based approach to climate change (or environmental issues 
more generally).  Following other scholars in employing an interest theory of rights, 
and focusing only on human rights as universal moral rights, I examined two 
different ways one might link the environment to human rights.  The first linked the 
environment to human rights through a single, generic “environmental right,” while 
the second focused on the way environmental impacts harm particular human rights.  
Ultimately, I concluded that both ways of linking the environment to human rights 
fell prey to a problem of scope, since in analyzing climate change we would need a 
detailed listing of all relevant interests grounding human rights that would be 
impacted by climate change.  To lessen this worry, I closed the chapter by offering 
an account of human rights based on Breena Holland’s environmental extension of 
Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach.  Doing so resulted in individuals 
possessing a right an environmental meta-capability, along with rights to the central 
capabilities identified by Nussbaum.  I argued that this conception of human rights 
could avoid the scope problem, or at least offer a more detailed analysis than the 
other approaches discussed in the chapter. 
 Chapter 3 took this rights framework and offered methods for identifying 
rights violations caused by climate change.  Since it is the capabilities themselves 
that do the primary work in my account, this chapter focused on identifying 
violations of capability thresholds.  The first method I offered looked at particular 
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impacts of climate change (i.e. increased flooding in low-lying areas) and determine 
whether they result, for any given capability, in individuals’ threshold levels not 
being met.  The second method focused on violations of the environmental meta-
capability through an examination of countries’ overall vulnerability to climate 
change.  Here, if a state, given its general institutional structures and reasonable 
adaptive abilities, is at high risk of negative impacts from climate change, it is a sign 
its citizens’ environmental meta-capability is violated.  In addition to offering these 
two methods, Chapter 3 offered a brief presentation of how climate projections are 
made using various scenarios offered by the IPCC.  Consequently, my framework 
and the methods offered in this chapter serve as an evaluative tool for particular 
climate scenarios, allowing one to determine whether any given scenario is morally 
acceptable (i.e. not resulting in violations of individuals’ environmental meta-
capability).  By operating in this manner, my framework is able to help identify 
which, if any, of the IPCC scenarios is an acceptable pathway for the current 
generation to embark upon. 
 The methodology of Chapter 3 was then applied in Chapter 4 in defense of 
the claim that climate change (in many of the project scenarios) will result in 
violations of individuals’ environmental meta-capability.  This was done by 
employing both methods from Chapter 3, using mini-case studies to examine 
particular impacts under the first method and a general study on countries’ climate 
vulnerability under the second method.  It is important to stress that the chapter did 
not offer a complete analysis of all climate scenarios, but rather served to show how 
the framework operates and that it is reasonable to treat unabated climate change as a 
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violations of individuals’ right to their environmental meta-capability.  While the 
first part of the chapter focused on applying the methods of Chapter 3, the second 
offered a philosophical defense of the rights of future generations.  Doing so allows 
my framework to apply when examining climate projections beyond the end of the 
century.  This is important since if future generations are not said to have rights that 
place moral claims on those in the present, our duties related to climate change could 
be dramatically altered. 
 The end of Chapter 4 brought with it the end of my analysis of the first 
question: what is the harm of climate change?  Consequently, Chapters 5 and 6 
turned to the remaining questions of responsibility: what obligations exist in light of 
the potential for harmful climate scenarios and who bears those obligations.  Given 
that only some future climate scenarios are harmful under my analysis, the obligation 
borne by whatever relevant moral agent we identify is to not bring about those 
scenarios that are harmful.  Thus, the avoidable harm of climate change results in a 
negative duty—though one that calls for substantial changes in behavior given the 
projected trajectory of current practices.  With this general duty in mind, Chapter 5 
provided the theoretical background necessary for identifying the appropriate agent 
bearing this duty, as well as any additional duties that might result once the 
appropriate agent is identified, while Chapter 6 made the actual identification. 
 Identifying the relevant moral agent in the case of climate change is 
particularly problematic due to climate change’s nature as an aggregative harm.  
After rejecting both purely individualist and collectivist “single level” analyses of 
moral obligation in the case of climate change, Chapter 5 presented Tracy Isaacs’s 
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“two level” account of moral obligation, as a means for addressing the theoretical 
difficulties posed by climate change.  Isaacs’s theory allows obligation to exist at 
both the individual and collective level simultaneously, using general collective 
obligations to map distinct and differentiated individual responsibilities based on 
individuals’ roles within the collective organization.  Moreover, Isaacs’s theory 
allows for the ascription of moral obligation in cases, like climate change, where 
there is a harm that can be prevented through collective action yet the relevant 
collective entity does not exist.  This is achieved through work by Larry May and 
Virginia Held on putative groups.  In the cases involving putative groups, the same 
role-based mapping that applies when dealing with existing collective entities 
applies, with individuals having moral obligations based on whatever their role 
would be in the putative group.  Isaacs’s theory, however, focuses on what is small-
scale collective action, especially when compared to climate change.  To avoid 
objections that her theory cannot apply to the scale of collective action demanded by 
climate change, I closed the chapter with a discussion of some basic conditions that 
if met make the possibility of successful collective action likely.  As long as the 
putative group identified in the case of climate change meets these conditions, 
Isaacs’s theory ought to apply. 
 The task of applying Isaacs’s theory to the case of climate change was the 
task of Chapter 6.  Here, I offered an argument for treating all the countries of the 
world as the appropriate putative group.  An important consideration in defending 
the use of this putative group was the fact that such a group met the basic conditions 
for successful collective action outlined in Chapter 5 and that states are able through 
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regulation to force corporations and individuals within their borders to cease harmful 
practices when those corporations and individuals would not do so otherwise.  
Having identified the relevant putative group and argued that epistemic position of a 
reasonable agent in this group allows us to ascribe obligations beyond an obligation 
to organize as a collective entity, I applied a multi-step variant of Isaacs’s theory.  
First, the collective obligation of the putative group creates differentiated 
responsibilities among countries, as some will have to make more emissions 
reductions than others—primarily due to the fact that many developed countries will 
be well over allowable levels of capability protections (i.e. over capability ceilings).  
Individuals gain obligations here, as we can run the collective-to-individual mapping 
process from Isaacs’s theory to identify the obligations of individuals in their roles as 
citizens.  Additionally, since part of states’ obligations will be to regulate private 
actions, new obligations will be created for non-state collectives (primarily 
corporations).  Here, we run Isaacs’s collective-to-individual mapping process again, 
using the new obligations of non-state collectives to identify the obligations of 
individuals in their roles as consumer.  This application results in a four-fold 
taxonomy that can be used to roughly capture the obligations that exist in the case of 
climate change: (1) those of states; (2) those of non-state collectives (primarily 
corporations); (3) those of individuals qua citizens; and, (4) those of individuals qua 
consumer.  While I did not provide a complete listing of all the obligations resulting 
from climate change, as that would require a complete analysis of which climate 
scenarios are harmful, we were at least left with a sketch of the general types of 
obligations possessed by the relevant agents, which could then be used in crafting 
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ethical climate policy and making ethical decisions about individual actions moving 
forward. 
 
2. Global Regulation and the Problem of Non-Compliant States 
 In reaching its end in Chapter 6, this project culminated with an argument 
that states bear a strong moral obligation to create and enforce a global climate 
regime.  Yet, this call for global environmental regulation runs into a potential 
problem.  As I have made clear throughout, climate change is a global issue 
requiring global collective action on the part of all states.  If one or more states fail to 
act appropriately and properly regulate activities within their borders, there is a 
possibility that harmful climate scenarios will not be avoided.  Consequently, it 
seems the global regulations need to be enforced even upon those states that elect not 
to participate.  If so, what do we do about states that fail to fulfill the obligations 
outlined in the previous chapter? 
 This worry seems pressing given the prevalence of states in the world today 
that refuse to participate in binding climate treaties.  For example, the United States 
has consistently refused to comply by any climate treaty that exempts some countries 
from setting significant reduction targets.  This is driven primarily by economic self-
interest, as made clear by the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, passed unanimously by the 
United States Senate in the lead up to the negotiations that established the Kyoto 
Protocol.  The resolution explicitly states that the Senate would not ratify any treaty 
that did not require reductions by developing countries and “would result in serious 
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harm to the economy of the United States.”1  Given that reductions by countries 
under my framework would be tied to capability ceilings, likely resulting in countries 
like the United States being required to make significant reductions while many 
developed nations would be morally justified in making no (or very limited) 
reductions, it would seem the United States would not voluntarily participate in the 
necessary regulatory regime barring some additional motivation (e.g. sanctions by 
other countries, extrarational moral motivations). 
 More recently, we have seen the problem of non-compliant states manifest 
even when a state initially agreed to be compliant.  On December 12, 2011, just one 
day after the conclusion of the most recent session of the Conference of Parties 
(COP17) to the UNFCCC in Durban, Peter Kent, Canada’s Minister of the 
Environment, announced that Canada was formally withdrawing from the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Canada’s decision to withdraw from the world’s only legally binding 
climate treaty was heavily motivated the fact that doing so would prevent them from 
paying nearly C$14 billion in penalties for failing to meet their emissions targets.2  
Moreover, as Kent noted, too many of the world’s emitters of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) are not covered under the treaty: 
Before this week [the COP 17 meeting], the Kyoto Protocol covered 
less than 30% of global emissions.  Now it covers less than 13%—and 
that number is only shrinking.  The Kyoto Protocol does not cover the 
world’s two largest emitters – the United States and China – and 
therefore will not work.3  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 United States Senate, Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 105th Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 98. 
2 Peter Kent, “Statement by Minister Kent,” 12 December 2011, Foyer of the House of 
Commons; available on-line at <http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=FFE36B6D-
1&news=6B04014B-54FC-4739-B22C-F9CD9A840800> (Accessed 6 January 2012). 
3 Ibid. 
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While this decision is currently being challenged in court, it is only being done so 
domestically, with opponents of the move arguing “the decision goes against a 
federal law passed in the House of Commons in 2007 that stipulates Canada has to 
enforce the treaty.”4  Though other countries have expressed annoyance and 
displeasure with Canada’s decision, they currently can do nothing to prevent this 
move by Canada. 
 Both types of cases (i.e. those in which the country chooses not to participate 
from the outset and those in which the country participates and later withdraws to 
avoid punishment) point to the fact that the regulation called for in Chapter 6 needs 
to be mandatory.  States must be justified in taking actions against states that are 
non-compliant and mechanisms need to be put in place to facilitate such actions.  
However, in considering the problem of non-compliant states, it is important to 
distinguish between two ways it can manifest: as a conceptual challenge and as a 
practical challenge.5  The conceptual challenge points to an apparent tension in my 
framework in that it seems simultaneously committed to strong and weak 
conceptions of state sovereignty.  The practical challenge relates to the ability to 
produce and implement the type of global environmental regulation called for by my 
framework in the real world.  I will not address the practical challenge, as that is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Marianne White, “Kyoto Withdrawal Challenged in Court,” Montreal Gazette, 14 January 2012; 
available on-line at <http://www.montrealgazette.com/technology/Kyoto+withdrawal+challenged+ 
court/ 5995316/story.html> (Accessed 15 January 2012).  The law in question is the Kyoto Protocol 
Implementation Act (S.C. 2007, c. 30), the text of which is available on-line at <http://laws.justice.gc. 
ca/eng/acts/K-9.5/FullText.html> (Accessed 21 January 2012). 
5 These two manifestations highlight a similar distinction made by Andrew Hurrell in his 
discussion of transboundary environmental problems and problems they raise for the state.  Hurrell 
divides the issue as it relates to states into questions of moral adequacy and practical viability.  See 
Andrew Hurrell, “The State,” in Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge, eds. Andrew Dobson 
and Robyn Eckersley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 167. 
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task better suited for political scientists and those working on international relations, 
and there is a wealth of literature relating to such discussions.6  Rather, in closing the 
dissertation, I will offer a brief discussion of the conceptual challenge, looking at 
potential directions for future research.  Ultimately, I do not find these challenges 
unique to my framework, nor do I take them to undermine the arguments I have 
offered to this point. 
 
3. Strong, yet Weak Sovereignty: Questions for Future Research 
 The conceptual challenge posed by the problem of non-compliant states 
arises due to the fact that my framework appears committed to a strong conception of 
state sovereignty, while recognizing that the nature of climate change itself and the 
call for a mandatory regulatory regime point to a need for a weaker view of 
sovereignty.  This tension can be made clearer if we break sovereignty into its 
internal and external components.  Internal sovereignty is, in a simplified sense, the 
classical definition—absolute and supreme authority in domestic matters—while 
external sovereignty adds the notion that the sovereign is free from external 
hindrances and interference in domestic affairs.  Thus, put in a more nuanced 
fashion, the framework I have offered seems to require strong internal sovereignty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For examples of discussion related to structuring a global environmental regime and general 
environmental governance, see Oran R. Young, ed., Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the 
Environmental Experience (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. 
Sprinz, eds., International Relations and Global Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2001); and Robert Durant, Daniel Fiorino, and Rosemary O’Leary, eds., Environmental Governance 
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and weak external sovereignty.  Yet, the need for strong internal sovereignty makes 
it less likely that external sovereignty will be weak. 
 That my framework calls for a strong notion of internal (and even external) 
sovereignty comes from two components.  First, its use of the Capabilities Approach 
as a grounding for human rights commits it to such a position.  As Nussbaum 
remarks in her most recent book, “[t]he nation, then, has a moral role that is securely 
grounded in the Capabilities Approach, because the approach gives central 
importance to people’s freedom and self-definition.”7  The need to consider 
individuals’ particular contexts and the various ways in which cultures will manifest 
the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list requires states.8  For example, recall Chapter 3’s 
discussion of how adequacy as it relates to shelter is contingent on geographic 
location.  Determinations such as this require sensitivity to local contexts to a degree 
that could likely not be met by a global state.  Moreover, this commitment to states 
and their moral role in this framework also yields an apparent right of non-
intervention, as long as the state maintains some level of legitimacy.9 
 The need for a strong conception of sovereignty, at least internally, is also 
implied in my call for states to regulate the private activities of their citizens and any 
corporate entities within their borders.  In order for climate change to be addressed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 114; see also, Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: 
Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2006), 255-262 & 316. 
8 However, there might be reason for thinking some currently existing states do not provide 
structures that allow appropriate exercises of their citizen’s freedom and autonomy, and thus those 
states’ governmental institutions ought to be altered.  I will not take up this issue here, other than to 
say that in such cases it seems reasonable to conclude the state in question is illegitimate and thus 
intervention in its affairs is morally justifiable. 
9 See Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 111-112.  Here, Nussbaum assumes that legitimacy does 
not require a country to provide the complete fulfillment of all its citizens’ capability thresholds, but 
rather some lower standard. 
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effectively, many activities resulting in GHG emissions must be severely limited and 
alternative technologies need to be developed and implemented.  However, since 
these are typically matters that result from private actors, the call to limit activities 
resulting in GHG emissions or force corporations to develop and use new 
technologies through regulations places a premium on a public good over private 
rights.  To restrict private rights in this manner points to a strong conception of state 
sovereignty in the vein of Hobbes. 
 While states present themselves as morally relevant under my framework, 
there is also reason to think their sovereignty must be weakened in order to properly 
address climate change.  Here, there are two issues pushing sovereignty in a weaker 
direction.  First, the transboundary nature of climate change gives nations legitimate 
claims regarding the activities that take place within each other’s borders.  Steve 
Vanderheiden captures this nicely: 
Climate policy, it would seem, cannot justifiably be described as 
purely an internal matter, because GHGs emitted anywhere have the 
same effects regardless of their geographic origin and therefore have 
the potential to harm those residing outside of the nation-state’s 
borders.  This “spillover” effect turns what might otherwise be an 
exclusively domestic concern into one in which other states become 
justifiably interested parties.10 
 
When states become justifiably interested in the domestic affairs of another due to 
the spillover effect of climate change, it is reasonable to think they might possess 
some right to intervene in the “domestic” affairs of a non-compliant state through 
sanctions or some other measure.  However, without a global state, there is no body 
that can adjudicate any disputes that might arise related to climate change and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change (Cambridge: 
Oxford, 2008), 86. 
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determine whether a state’s intervention is justified by what we might call the 
spillover doctrine.  Just as this problem is solved within a group of individuals by 
ceding authority to a state, so to can it be solved within a group of states.  
Consequently, it seems that to properly address transboundary issues, including 
climate change, states must cede some authority to a global body that can adjudicate 
disputes in particular domains (in our case, the environmental domain).  Doing so, 
however, serves as a limitation or weakening of those states’ sovereignty. 
 Moreover, as I noted above, the obligations possessed by all countries seem 
to justify the enforcement of a global climate regime upon even those countries that 
choose not to participate.  This is the compulsory nature of the obligations to make 
reductions and act against climate change.  On this view, states can then be 
legitimately sanctioned in an effort to gain their cooperation.  Yet, this allowance of 
legitimate sanctions (or other means to achieve compliance) implies a weakening of 
states’ external sovereignty.  It justifies a form of intervention in the domestic 
activities and affairs of non-compliant states. 
 So, how might this tension be reconciled?  On its face, the claim that a state 
must possess strong internal sovereignty, yet weak external sovereignty, seems odd.  
To fully address this issue would involve a careful examination of sovereignty as a 
concept, a project in its own right and one that has a large literature.11  Moreover, the 
need to reconcile notions of sovereignty with global interdependence and global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For detailed examinations of the concept of sovereignty, see F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd 
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: The Evolution of an 
Idea (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007). 
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governance is not unique to my project.  In fact, this tension between sovereignty 
and wider governance has recently come up in debates related to the application of 
Europe-wide human rights law to particular member states.12  Given that the 
questions related to sovereignty do not impact only my framework and point to 
issues better suited for future research, I will not offer any detailed comments here.  
Rather, I will close by offering a few thoughts on ways future examination might aid 
in addressing the tension. 
 One potential avenue is to argue that states that fail to protect individuals’ 
right to their environmental meta-capability are illegitimate.  Here, legitimacy would 
be tied to a state’s respect for human rights.  We can find such an approach in the 
work of Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman, who conceive state legitimacy as 
resting “on the ability and willingness of a state to adequately protect the human 
rights of its constituents and to respect the rights of all others.”13  If a state is 
illegitimate, then it has no justifiable claim to sovereignty (at least from a normative 
perspective).  In such a case, there is no tension, since without a justifiable claim to 
sovereignty other legitimate states (i.e. those fulfilling their obligations) would be 
free to intervene in the affairs of the illegitimate state. 
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13 Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice 
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Morris’s analysis of the state; see Chapters 4 & 6 of Christopher Morris, An Essay on the Modern 
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  A similar claim is made by Michael Ignatieff, 
who while tying legitimacy to the assent of the people, remarks that this can only come from the 
protection of people’s basic rights; see Michael Ignatieff, “Human Rights, Sovereignty, and 
Intervention,” in Human Rights, Human Wrongs: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2001, ed. Nicholas 
Owens (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2003), 58. 
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 Related to a focus on legitimacy as stemming from respect for human rights, 
a second approach calls for a reconceptualization of sovereignty as being bound by 
moral limits and consequently includes a responsibility to protect.  This conception 
has recently come to the fore of international politics following the publication of a 
report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) titled The Responsibility to Protect.14  This document spells out principles 
for legitimate humanitarian intervention and seeks to move away from a 
characterization of “sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both 
internal functions and external duties.”15  A similar characterization of the state’s 
role, with respect to environmental matters, has been present since the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972.  Principle 21 of 
the Stockholm Declaration, which was the final document from UNCHE, declares 
that states have “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.”16  While treating sovereignty as a matter of 
responsibility, rather than a matter of control, could prove fruitful generally, more 
analysis would be necessary to endorse the applicability of the responsibility to 
protect paradigm in the case of climate change. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, ON: International Development Research 
Centre, 2001).  The general principles of responsibility to protect were affirmed by the United Nations 
in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, Paragraphs 138 and 139, and the United Nations 
Security Council in Resolution 1674. 
15 Ibid., 13. 
16 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21 [U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972)].  Susan Bragdon applies this principle to 
restrict sovereignty in the environmental realm, while allowing the state to maintain a strong notion of 
sovereignty for other issues; see Susan H. Bragdon, “National Sovereignty and Global Environmental 
Responsibility: Can the Tension Be Reconciled for the Conservation of Biological Diversity?” 
Harvard International Law Journal 33, no. 2 (1992): 381-392. 
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 Regardless of the direction one takes, there appear to be reasonable 
possibilities for reducing the apparent tension in my framework created by the 
problem of non-compliant states.  In closing it is important to stress that if we have 
reason to accept the arguments offered to this point and our current conception of 
sovereignty is not consistent with this moral analysis, it would be reasonable to 
reconsider our attachment to current conception of the state and sovereignty, rather 
than reject the framework offered here.  Since the human rights I have discussed here 
are universal moral rights, independent of any particular legal or political 
jurisdiction, we ought to make sure the notion of the state and its sovereignty we 
employ is consistent with such rights.  It may simply be the case that climate change 
and the problem of non-compliant states serves to highlight the need to develop new 
conceptions of state sovereignty, a project that seems on the agenda of political 
theorists.  Whether our answer is an existing conceptualization of sovereignty or a 
yet to be developed one, we can at least see how we might address questions for 
sovereignty raised by the need for global environmental regulation. 
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